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INTRODUCTION 
PLURALISM AND PLURALITY
AURÉLIA BARDON
MARIA BIRNBAUM
LOIS LEE 
KRISTINA STOECKL
In  many  parts of the world, different forms 
of cultural diversity have become central 
to experiences of and engagements with 
contemporary societies. Human societies 
have always been diverse but the modern 
period is distinctive, shaped by new forms of 
communication, global migration and media that 
have widened and established diversity and perhaps 
even ‘hyper-diversity’.1 Concepts that describe 
diversity directly or indirectly are prevalent over 
this period – multiculturalism and multifaithism, 
‘melting pots’ and ‘marble cakes’, globalism and 
cosmopolitanism, pluralism, hyperpluralism2 
and, of course, diversity itself. In this publication, 
we want to focus on religious diversity amongst 
other types of cultural difference. Most of us 
experience religious diversity on a daily basis: not 
only do media communicate it to us, just looking 
around us, it is obvious that others have different 
beliefs, commitments, ritual lives and cultural 
moorings, and that practical differences and 
ideational disagreements are at least as common 
as shared practice and agreement when it comes 
to moral, religious or philosophical life. 
1 Steven Vertovec. “More multi, less culturalism: The 
anthropology of cultural complexity and the new poli-
tics of pluralism.” Revista d’Etnologia de Catalunya 15 
(1999): 8-21.
2 Alessandro Ferrara. The Democratic Horizon. Hyper-
pluralism and the Renewal of Political Liberalism. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
The intention of this volume is to provide a set 
of resources for approaching different discourses 
around religious diversity, highlighting in 
particular the distinctive approaches and 
sensitivities emerging from different disciplinary 
engagements. As a foreground to this work, 
this introduction draws attention to two 
fundamentally different approaches that have 
often become entangled in discourses surrounding 
diversity, and which are visible even in the way 
the concept of ‘diversity’ is used today. This is 
the distinction between the descriptive notion of 
plurality and the normative notion of pluralism. 
This distinction is significant, but it is frequently 
obscured in discussions that lend the concept of 
‘diversity’ a dual aspect, as a way of describing 
the proliferation of differences in contemporary 
societies and as a somehow desirable feature 
of those societies. By contrast to the ubiquity 
of ‘diversity’ and ‘pluralism’ in contemporary 
discourses about the multiplicity and coexistence 
of religions and worldviews, ‘plurality’ – the 
natural partner to ‘pluralism’ and the concept 
upon which its meaning rests – is conspicuously 
absent. This introduction (i) demonstrates that a 
clear distinction between pluralism and plurality 
can advance both the academic and public debate 
on religious diversity and (ii) shows how the 
chapters of this volume, each of which drawing 
on specific disciplinary traditions in defining 
diversity, exemplify the complicated dynamics 
between pluralism and plurality.
PLURALITY AND PLURALISM
The existence of deep religious differences and 
disagreements in societies around the world is 
a descriptive fact: it is simply how things are. In 
itself, such diversity is neither a good or bad thing, 
something that we should promote or bemoan, or 
that the state should respect or limit it. As an entirely 
descriptive term, ‘plurality’ does not provide any 
normative resource to evaluate the desirability of 
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any particular case of plurality. In other words, 
descriptive plurality can be unlimited. It simply 
tells us that there are disagreements and conflicts, 
not that these disagreements or conflicts are of the 
type that we should respect or seek to settle. 
Standing in clear distinction from this plurality is 
the idea of pluralism, core to the political project 
of liberalism. That is, in democratic and liberal 
societies, a normative commitment to pluralism 
means that we do not only observe that citizens 
disagree about many different issues, but also 
that we believe that such disagreement is not 
problematic in itself and that the state should not 
impose on all citizens one single view or way of 
doing things. In this view, citizens should be free 
to decide for themselves, within certain limits, 
how they want to live their lives, according to 
their own conception of the good. Pluralism is 
therefore the result of conditions of freedom, and 
it limits the authority of the state. 
Thus, normative pluralism refers to the 
commitment to respect certain disagreements. 
The liberal state should refrain from imposing 
any particular view that is the object of such 
a disagreement: it presupposes the fact of 
plurality, and suggests a way to deal with this 
plurality. Because normative pluralism is itself a 
philosophical position rather than an empirical 
observation, it requires a justification: any 
account of normative pluralism has to offer a good 
reason to respect certain disagreements rather 
than to impose a controversial view, even when 
this controversial view is shared by a majority 
of citizens. Why, for instance, would we want 
to guarantee religious freedom, including the 
freedom not to believe, even though a majority 
of citizens believes in the existence of God and 
belongs to the same religious tradition? The liberal 
justification for the commitment to normative 
pluralism is that disagreements are unavoidable 
under conditions of freedom when it comes to 
metaphysical questions.3
3 See John Rawls’s discussion of the “burdens of judg-
ment” (Rawls, Political Liberalism, 1993, p. 54).
Contrary to descriptive plurality, normative 
pluralism has limits. The liberal justification 
implies, for instance, that it applies to certain 
disagreements, those regarding metaphysical 
questions, but not to others. Pluralism, in other 
words, does not apply for instance to basic liberal 
values. Even though there might be a plurality of 
views concerning these basic liberal values, such 
plurality will be justifiably excluded. For this 
reason, the liberal state can legitimately impose 
the respect of human rights, even if some citizens 
might disagree that human rights should be 
respected. This is why the distinction between 
descriptive plurality and normative pluralism 
matters: plurality, as the mere existence of 
disagreements, does not always entail pluralism, 
referring to the idea that disagreements should be 
respected by the state. 
Accounts from political theory highlight, then, a 
clear distinction between descriptive plurality and 
normative pluralism, and thereby call attention to 
the frequency with which the two approaches are 
confused. 4 Our view is that it is more accurate and 
certainly productive for scholars to make a clear 
distinction between descriptive and normative 
concepts, and that the terms ‘plurality’ and 
‘pluralism’ capture this distinction simply and 
effectively. Not only does this distinction keep 
in view important distinctions between diversity 
and the way in which relations between diverse 
groups are conducted, but it is also a necessary 
first step to providing more nuanced models of 
both plurality and pluralism. On the one hand, 
4 George Crowder, for instance, clearly made the distinc-
tion between the two dimensions but used the concept 
of pluralism for both: “The word ‘pluralism’ has several 
different meanings in moral and political theory. It may 
stand for the empirical claim that different people hold 
different beliefs and values, or for the normative view 
that such diversity is desirable.” (George Crower, “Plu-
ralism and Liberalism,” Political Studies, 1994, 293). 
William Galston has also distinguished acknowledging 
diversity as a fact from accepting diversity as an instru-
mental or intrinsic value (William Galston, Liberalism 
Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Politi-
cal Theory and Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2004, 27). 
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and as several contributions to this volume 
highlight, plurality is not a straightforward 
matter of equally distributed and empowered 
constituents. Rather, there are different forms 
of plurality, shaped by the differential size and 
power of the groups involved and by the specific 
cultures of those groups. On the other hand, and 
also explored by contributors to this volume, 
pluralism is itself plural. Pluralisms differ on the 
extent in terms of the types of exchange they 
demand between groups, the way in which those 
groups are conceived of, and on the objectives 
pluralist models seek to fulfill. Pluralist ideologies 
can arise in the context of liberal political theory, 
but so too may they be developed in relation to 
social policy concerns about inclusion. Pluralism 
may be tied to neo-liberal discourses that value 
open markets and then seek to adjust societies to 
the effects of those markets; but pluralism may be 
a communitarian initiative, which recognizes that 
religious diversity that exists even in contexts that 
appear to be generally homogenous and engage 
with this as an intrinsic value of human society.
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM
Both the descriptive (“plurality”) and the normative 
(“pluralism”) dimensions of diversity can apply to 
a range of different objects. In our contemporary 
societies, we disagree and respect disagreements 
on religious, cultural, political, philosophical, 
or moral issues. Religious pluralism, however, is 
special. As such, it raises challenges that are of a 
particular kind and calls for special solutions. 
What is special about religious pluralism is that 
it exists at three different levels. First, religious 
pluralism refers to the coexistence of different 
religious traditions. In this inter-religious 
pluralism, disagreements focus on what the 
“true” religion is, on how religious believers 
should worship their God, and on what kinds of 
dogmas, rites or practices make up the unalterable 
“essence” of a belief. Second, religious pluralism 
refers to the fact that particular religious traditions 
are themselves internally pluralistic. In this 
intra-religious pluralism, disagreements occur 
concerning the true interpretation of a particular 
text, event, ritual or traditional practice. Third, 
religious pluralism also refers to the coexistence 
of religious and non-religious individuals and 
worldviews. Religion, whether it is understood as 
living a religious life, having religious beliefs or 
having a religious conception of the good, is only 
‘one option among others’,5 and there is a growing 
part of the population in modern secularized 
societies that can be considered as non-religious, 
including notably agnostics and atheists.
Because of these three different levels, there is no 
easy way to manage religious pluralism. When it 
comes to the pluralism of conceptions of the good 
life, for instance, it is enough for the state to refrain 
from imposing any particular conception on all 
its citizens. The same solution applied to religious 
pluralism, which would amount to the separation 
of religion and politics, is however sometimes seen 
as imposing a non-religious view, and therefore as 
disrespecting the third level of religious pluralism 
between religion and non-religion.6 The particular 
challenges that arise in relation with religious 
pluralism come from here. 
On the one hand, the liberal state should respect 
the disagreements at each of the three different 
levels of religious pluralism, without imposing 
any particular religious tradition, any particular 
interpretation of a religious tradition, and without 
5  Charles Taylor, A Secular Age. Cambridge: The Beknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2007. 
6  Laborde argues that the separation of church and state 
can be seen as “the institutional expression of the exclu-
sion of religious belief from the public sphere, and of the 
secularist assumption that religions must have no place 
in public life and must be confined to the private sphere. 
Far from a common-ground judgment, which could be 
endorsed by all citizens, this amounts to the imposi-
tion of a substantively secularist philosophy on religious 
believers.” (Cécile Laborde, “Political Liberalism and 
Religion: On Separation and Establishment,” The Jour-
nal of Political Philosophy 21(1), 2013, 74)
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imposing either religion or non-religion. On the 
other hand, religious pluralism is also limited by 
other commitments such as basic liberal norms. 
Any interpretation of a particular religious 
tradition or any new religious tradition conflicting 
with human rights will consequently not be 
considered as justified by pluralism, and might be 
legally prohibited. 
Starting from different disciplinary approaches, 
and focusing on different features or dimensions, 
all the contributions gathered in this volume 
illustrate what makes religious pluralism special, 
why it is problematic to manage religious 
pluralism, and what its legal, social or political 
implications are. 
WHAT IS RELIGIOUS PLURALISM?
Part I introduces the terms of the question: what 
is the ‘religion’ and the ‘pluralism’ in ‘religious 
pluralism’? Though their ideas were developed in 
a workshop at the European University Institute 
in 2015, contributors here and elsewhere in 
the volume speak from their own disciplinary 
traditions, taking different approaches to 
terminology as a result. One resource that this 
volume therefore provides is an overview, in these 
short pieces, of how notions of diversity, plurality 
and pluralism work in different kinds of discussion 
– and to provide therefore new opportunities for 
reflection on these different approaches. 
Taking these issues head on, Élise Rouméas’s 
chapter, ‘What is Religious Pluralism?’ opens the 
section and the volume. The chapter works across 
disciplines, providing an overview of the some of 
the central ways in which different disciplines have 
approached and understood ‘religious pluralism’. 
This chapter makes a particular distinction 
between what Rouméas terms theological, 
sociological, philosophical pluralisms alongside 
the idea of religious pluralism as a political ideal. 
This chapter is an important beginning because it 
draws attention to how different methodological 
and ideological approaches give rise to distinctive 
understandings of ‘religious pluralism’, as well as 
to how disciplinary-specific assumptions shape 
how the concept is interpreted. 
The next chapters confirm Rouméas’s observation. 
In his chapter ‘Political-Theological Pluralism’, 
John W. Ackerman shows how multiple ideas of 
pluralism may not simply give rise to problems 
of misunderstanding or confusion. Rather, he 
draws attention to how different approaches may 
compete with one another. In particular, he focuses 
on liberal notions of religious pluralism and the 
way in which this understanding has colonized 
discourses and made it difficult for alternative 
models. Drawing on the work of Hannah Arendt 
and Franz Rosenzweig for possible alternatives, 
Ackerman argues that the existing narrowed 
down array of political-philosophical responses to 
the challenge of pluralism is problematic for two 
reasons: first, it universalizes one philosophical 
tradition, secular liberalism, as the valid response 
to modern pluralism; and second, it sidelines 
other potential philosophical approaches which 
offer different, and maybe more adequate, 
ways of thinking about religious pluralism 
in contemporary society. For Ackerman, this 
contestation helps understand a paradox at the 
heard of contemporary political-philosophical 
debates: on the one hand, the religious and 
cultural plurality of contemporary societies is 
celebrated and endorsed through a commitment 
to pluralism, on the other hand, this commitment 
to pluralism is narrowed down to basically one 
admissible answer: political liberalism. 
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In ‘Italy and Controversies around Religion-
Related Issues: Overemphasizing Differences’, 
Alberta Giorgi and Luca Ozzano historicise 
definitions of ‘religious pluralism’. 
Focusing on controversies surrounding religious 
pluralism in Catholic-majority Italy – debates in 
which religious plurality is closely entwined with 
issues and popular concerns about migration – 
Giorgi and Ozzano show that ‘religious pluralism’ 
has no single definition in the political sphere. 
Rather, its meaning is constructed by invested 
actors according to specific situations and needs. 
With implications for theoretical work, too, this 
work confirms that, in practice, religious pluralism 
is itself plural in the way we have outlined above: (i) 
pluralism in relation to the growing pluralization 
and hybridization of the religious landscape, 
(ii) pluralism within a religious tradition; (iii) 
pluralism in relation to the dichotomy religion 
versus secular. 
For Milda Ališauskienė an empirical study of 
religious pluralism is an opportunity to consider 
different sociological theories concerning the 
nature and development of religious pluralism. 
In focusing on Lithuania – a country whose 
religious landscape is dominated by the majority 
Roman Catholic church – Ališauskienė’s chapter, 
‘What and Where is Religious Pluralism in 
Lithuania?’, can be read alongside Agnieszka 
Pasieka’s chapter ‘Religious Pluralism and Lived 
Religion: an Anthropological Perspective’ on 
Poland to explore the extent to which religious 
diversity needs to be evenly distributed to be 
considered plural and to foster social and political 
pluralism. Both chapters explore the ways in which 
uneven plurality and accompanying hierarchies 
of power shape and inhibit the development of 
social and political pluralist settlements over time. 
Echoing Giorgi and Ozzano’s sensitivity to the 
need for typologies of pluralism, Ališauskienė’s 
and Pasieka’s approach calls attention to how 
apparently non-pluralist arrangements may be 
better understood as – and demand attention as 
– embryonic or proto-pluralist arrangements and 
conceptualized as such. 
Secularism has been justified in liberal political 
theory as a response to the fact of religious pluralism. 
Liberal philosophers have tended to associate 
secularism with the ideas of religious freedom, 
toleration and reasonable accommodations. In 
‘Two Uses of “Laicidad”’, Sebastián Rudas 
Neyra argues that there is another important 
understand of secularism which has been largely 
ignored by liberal political theory. He calls this 
second understanding ‘anticlerical’, claiming 
that this form of secularism may be a liberal and 
legitimate one, and particularly useful in societies 
where there is one strongly dominant religion. 
Finally in this section, for Garvan Walshe and 
Stephen de Wijze the prospects for religious 
pluralism are bleak. Rather, ‘religious pluralism’ 
is a contradiction in terms, at least as a political 
ideal. In ‘Civility Within Conflict: Managing 
Religious Pluralism’, the authors contend that 
liberal and libertarian approaches to justice are 
inevitably tragic, because it is impossible, in their 
view, to establish a set of core principles that all 
citizens can endorse. Instead, they call for an 
account of justice that sees conflict, not pluralism, 
as the inevitable outcome of the plurality of 
worldviews and religions. By putting the concept 
of religious pluralism to one side, they say, it is 
possible to recognize the necessary injustice that 
some religious believers will experience as social 
institutions seek to manage this conflict, and they 
argue, too, that this conflict can be pursued within 
the bounds of civility and that civility can reduce 
the injustice involved to an acceptable minimum.
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PLURALISM AND THE FREEDOM OF 
RELIGION
The notion of religious pluralism is bound up 
with the idea of religious freedom, whether it 
is understood as a special right or as part of a 
more general one, such as freedom of conscience. 
Societies are awash with difference and tensions 
arising from those differences; of these differences, 
religious difference is unusual (though not unique) 
in being a form of difference that many societies 
seek to honour and protect. Part II of the volume 
considers what kind of freedoms religion should 
or should not be granted in the name of pluralism, 
and the logics upon which these freedoms are 
granted.7
In ‘Conscientious Objection to Sam-Sex 
Marriages and Partnerships: The Limits of 
Toleration in Pluralistic Liberal Democracies’, 
Stijn Smet investigates a particularly controversial 
case of exemption: in several countries where 
same-sex marriage is legal, some civil servants 
have asked to be exempt from registering such 
marriages because of their religious convictions. 
Such citizens argue that the state would impose an 
unfair burden on them if it were to demand that 
they act against what their conscience tells them. 
Smet focuses on the UK case of Ladele v. Islington, 
and argues that, although there is a conflict 
between secular law and religious convictions, 
exemptions should not be granted because to do 
so would cause expressive harm. What is key in 
cases of exemptions claims for civil servants is 
that the expressive function of the law is at stake, 
since civil servants are agents of the state.
Another line of concern is raised by Eileen Barker, 
whose sociological work explores understandings 
and injustices surrounding new religious 
movements – popularly referred to as cults. In line 
7 Winnifred F. Sullivan, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Saba 
Mahmood, and Peter G. Danchin, eds. Politics of Reli-
gious Freedom. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2015.
with recent concerns about the kinds of religious 
practices that are enabled, encouraged or excluded 
according to freedom of religion discourses, Barker 
points to the way in which abstract freedoms 
are imperfectly implemented. This evocatively 
titled chapter – ‘Freedom for Me and, Perhaps, 
You – but Surely Not Them? Attitudes to New 
Religions in Contemporary Democracies’ – 
is a reminder that freedom of religion and the 
notion of religious pluralism itself relies on some 
construction of ‘religion’, and necessarily creates 
legitimate and illegitimate forms. There is a need, 
it follows, for a critical engagement with claims 
about pluralism, given the serious curtailments 
of that pluralism even in places that, as Barker 
says, ‘pride themselves on their progressive and 
inclusive approach to diversity’.
Recent debates on the meaning and justification 
of religious freedom have led many liberal 
philosophers to adopt an egalitarian theory of 
religious freedom.8 Egalitarian theorists question 
the special treatment of religion and the idea 
that religious freedom is a special kind of right. 
Instead, they turn to alternative categories of 
general rights – such as freedom of conscience 
or the right to ethical independence. These 
increasingly significant approaches are explored 
by two contributors to this volume. Firstly, 
Anna Blijdenstein examines the way egalitarian 
theorists of religious freedom understand and use 
the concept of religion in, ‘Egalitarian Theories 
of Religious Freedom and the Black Box of 
Religion’. 
The problem Blijdenstein wants to draw attention 
to is this: when egalitarian theorists deny religion 
any special legal or political status and seek to 
develop analogous concepts to work with like 
conscience, they do so on the basis of a particular, 
biased and controversial conception of religion. 
8 On egalitarian theories of religious freedom, see notably 
Cécile Laborde, “Equal Liberty, Non-Establishment and 
Religious Freedom,” Legal Theory, 20(1): 52-77, 2014. .
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Blijdenstein’s chapter outlines some of the main 
assumptions about religion shared by egalitarian 
theorists, and shows how these assumptions 
affect the way egalitarian theorists think about 
particular religious traditions such as Islam. 
Dara Salam’s exploration of ‘Religious 
Exemptions and Freedom of Conscience’ 
examines the case of religious exemptions and 
asks whether, from the perspective of egalitarian 
theories, such exemptions should be granted. He 
focuses on the egalitarian suggestion that freedom 
not of religion but of conscience may justify a range 
of exemptions, including important religious ones. 
The chapter identifies some important differences 
between the egalitarian arguments of John Rawls, 
Charles Taylor and Jocelyn Maclure, Ronald 
Dworkin, Brian Leiter, Christopher Eisgruber 
and Lawrence Sager. Salam shows that the 
problem of exemptions is a consequence of ethical 
and religious pluralism and of the inevitable 
clash between moral convictions and generally 
applicable aws. 
Echoing issues raised by Walshe and Stephen de 
Wijze, Volker Kaul’s chapter poses a more serious 
challenge to the related notions of freedom of 
religion and religious pluralism. Kaul’s chapter, 
which asks ‘Is Religious Pluralism simply a 
matter of justice?’, seeks to make space for 
concern that has been controversial in political 
philosophy, namely about the extent to which 
some religious views may be inconsistent with and 
resistant to religious pluralism. He tries to salvage 
the notion of religious pluralism from its reductive 
and arguably highly destructive interpretation, 
as exemplified in Huntington’s famous Clash 
of Civilizations thesis, and in so doing his work 
draw attention to a possible paradox at the heart 
of the notion of religious pluralism. This is that 
the religious pluralism is founded on the idea 
that religion is, more than other beliefs and 
attachments, something that people cannot and/
or should not be expected to compromise on; yet, 
at the same time, for some believers pluralism is 
itself a compromise – and not one that they may 
be willing to make. For some, religion may be an 
anti-pluralist doctrine. Kaul therefore demands 
that we take seriously the fact that some actors 
reject the notion of pluralism and moderation in 
belief.
DISAGREEMENTS, DIFFERENCES AND 
PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION
The idea of a pluralistic society where religious 
difference is accepted, negotiated and maybe 
even capitalized on and enjoyed relies heavily 
on the assumption that important beliefs and 
sentiments can be successfully, if only partially 
communicated to people holding other beliefs. 
This focus on a real and meaningful dialogue, 
based on some kind of mutual understanding, is 
crucial to notions of religious pluralism and to 
contemporary ‘postsecular’ understandings of the 
role of religious reasons in political justification. 
Chapters in this section explore the possibility for 
communication and public deliberation across 
lines of religious difference both from empirical 
and normative perspectives. 
The first two chapters deal explicitly with Jürgen 
Habermas’s concept of the institutional translation 
provisio. The institutional translation provisio 
consists of the claim that religious arguments 
should be translated into a secular language 
before entering the institutional public sphere, 
with the logic being that a secular language is one 
accessible to all. In that way, secularity is a means 
via which otherwise unintelligible religious 
reasons become intelligible to people who do not 
share the same commitments and beliefs. Thus, 
secular language mediates between people in 
order to achieve the kinds of dialogue that would 
otherwise be impossible. For religious pluralism 
to be inclusive and successful, this or alternative 
forms of translation are surely necessary. 
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Yet for Anja Hennig, Habermas’s idea of a 
translation proviso is both normative and 
contingent upon particular socio-political 
developments, including the religious pluralization 
of European societies. Her chapter ‘Habermas’s 
Translation Proviso and Conservative Religious 
Actors in the Public Sphere’ provides an 
introduction to this important area of theory, but, 
having offered a historical reassessment of it, also 
questions the extent to which Habermas’s concept 
is applicable to different empirical cases. Drawing 
on empirical research on conservative morality 
politics in Italy and Poland, she singles out the 
problem of identifying empirically religious 
arguments and of determining the conditions and 
aims of religious-secular translation. 
Marthe Kerkwijk, in ‘Lost in Translation: A 
Critique on Habermas’s Translation Proviso’, 
focuses on the question whether religious 
reasons can be translated into secular ones at 
all. Following a critique voiced by Nicholas 
Woltersdorff, she argues that the term ‘translation’ 
is a misleading metaphor, because it downplays 
the extent to which meanings are altered in the 
process of transformation from religious into 
secular language. In particular, she argues, that 
the motivational force of religious reason is lost in 
translation between the public and institutional 
sphere. Thus, religious reasons are not so much 
subject to translation as they are lost in translation, 
as the title of her chapter alludes.
Working from a normative perspective, 
the following chapter from Bouke de Vries 
examines in ‘Liberal Justificatory Neutrality 
and Mandatory Vaccination Schemes’ whether 
religious or secular reasons can be a sufficient 
ground not to justify a political decision but to 
contest the legitimacy of an otherwise publicly 
justified political decision, in this case the 
imposition of mandatory vaccination schemes 
(MVS) Some citizens contest the legitimacy of 
this policy, arguing that MVS conflict with some 
of their religious beliefs or with some of their 
secular doubts regarding the efficacy and dangers 
of vaccination. Such citizens claim that because 
MVS is not justified to them, it fails to respect 
them as equal citizens by providing good reasons 
supporting state action and therefore should 
be considered as illegitimate. De Vries adopts 
the convergence model of public justification to 
show that MVS can be publicly justified, i.e. they 
are justified for all citizens, including those who 
contest it for religious or secular reasons, and 
therefore that no exemption should be granted. 
In ‘Respect for Persons and the Restricted Use 
of Religious Reasons in Public Justification’, 
Nemanja Todorović examines the argument 
of respect for persons which has been the 
dominant liberal strategy to justify the exclusion 
of religious reasons from public justification. He 
shows that the concept is more ambiguous than 
usually acknowledged and identifies two different 
interpretations of the concept of respect: respect 
for the reflective capacity of persons, of respect 
for the actual commitments that persons have. 
Todorovic argues that both interpretations fail to 
support the exclusion of religious reasons. 
Ulrike Spohn’s chapter, ‘Challenging the Topos 
of “Religion and Violence” in Liberal Political 
Theory’ provides a broad history of religious 
pluralism and considers the roles of respect and 
critique in this history. Spohn draws attention 
to the extent to which religious pluralism is a 
relatively new phenomenon in Western Europe 
– replacing the confrontations and persecutions 
with which religious difference was negotiated 
until the Reformation. She shows why it is that, 
in Europe, working out pluralism has been done 
via political liberalism, and the influence of its 
secularist approach to pluralism. Spohn provides 
an overview of the two ways of thinking that 
have dominated this tradition: what she calls the 
‘respect argument’, in which religious reasons 
are excluded from public reason for their lack of 
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general intelligibility and acceptability; and what 
she calls the public safety argument, in which 
“special restrictions for religious reasons in public 
deliberation are needed also because religion 
bears a special potential for violence, thus posing 
a special threat to public safety”. Her chapter 
critiques both of the two approaches for their 
underlying essentialist understandings of religion. 
The chapters collected in this volume provide a 
helpful and accessible overview of political liberal 
approaches to and debates surrounding pluralism. 
Together with the ‘bibliography on religious 
pluralism’ at the end of the volume they constitute 
a valuable resource for students and scholars 
in political theory and sociology of religion. By 
bringing together papers of a theoretical nature 
with empirical and anthropological approaches, 
we wanted to demonstrate how an understanding 
of everyday exchanges in contexts of religious 
plurality may enrich theoretical accounts of 
religious pluralism. It is in relation to this dual 
form of diversity – plurality and pluralism – that we 
can make sense of Veena Das’s timely observation 
(discussed by Pasieka in this volume) that, today, 
‘religious pluralism is the normal condition in 
which religious subjectivities are formed’.9 
9 §Veena Das. “Cohabiting an Interreligious Milieu: 
Reflections on Religious Diversity.” In A Companion to 
the Anthropology of Religion, edited by Janice Boddy and 
Michael Lambek. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013: 
69-84. 
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WHAT IS RELIGIOUS 
PLURALISM?
ÉLISE ROUMÉAS
The aim of this chapter is to bring some conceptual 
clarity to the understanding of religious 
pluralism1. Such clarification appears necessary, 
given conflicting disciplinary usages and 
slippages between the factual notion of plurality 
and normative accounts of pluralism. Religious 
pluralism has at least four different meanings. The 
first meaning is theological: pluralism assumes 
that other religious paths are true. The second is 
sociological: pluralism simply means religious 
plurality or diversity. In the third, pluralism is 
a philosophical school, what is known as value-
pluralism in which values are irreducibly plural. 
Value-pluralism is not per se about religion, but 
can lead to a philosophical argument for valuing 
diversity intrinsically. Finally, a fourth conception 
of religious pluralism refers to a political ideal 
of peaceful interaction among individuals and 
groups of different religious faiths, as well as non-
believers. This paper sets out these four models.
1 I thank the editors of this volume for their useful contri-
bution to the final draft of this chapter.
THEOLOGICAL PLURALISM
The first meaning of religious pluralism is 
theological. In Christian thought, pluralistic 
theologies assume that other religions might 
be equally true2. Pluralism contrasts with two 
other related categories, namely exclusivism and 
inclusivism. Exclusivists believe that there is only 
one true faith and only one way to salvation. In 
its Catholic version, the idea is captured by the 
old Latin phrase “Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus”, 
i.e. “outside the Church there is no salvation.” 
Its Protestant counterpart emphasizes personal 
belief in Jesus Christ as the only path to salvation. 
Salvation, in this view, can only be attained 
through the Christian church or the Christian 
faith. 
Exclusivism has been challenged by inclusivism. 
Inclusivists also assume that there is one true 
religious faith and one path to salvation, but 
believe that non-Christians might be saved 
through the Christian path. The concept of 
“anonymous Christians” captures the idea that 
people who have never heard of Christ might still 
have an “implicit” faith in the real God. In this 
view, God probes all human hearts, Christian 
or otherwise, and learns who these anonymous 
2 I focus on the specific case of Christianity that has been 
much documented. Similar debates may have occurred 
in other religious traditions but remain less visible in the 
English-speaking literature. Much work remains to be 
done to shed light on the way different religious tradi-
tions relate to religious plurality. See John Hick, God Has 
Many Names (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1982); 
John Hick and Brian Hebblethwaite, Christianity and 
Other Religions: Selected Readings (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1981); John Hick and Paul F. Knitter, The Myth of 
Christian Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theology of 
Religions (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1987); John 
Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses 
to the Transcendent (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1989); Paul F. Knitter, No Other Name?: A Critical Survey 
of Christian Attitudes toward the World Religions (Mary-
knoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1985); Raimundo Panikkar, 
The Intrareligious Dialogue (New York: Paulist Press, 
1978). 
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Christians are3. Devout Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, 
or even atheists, can therefore be saved through 
the Christian faith. 
Pluralism differs from both exclusivism and 
inclusivism insofar as it questions the “myth of 
uniqueness”4. There is no such thing as one true 
faith or a unique path to salvation. Pluralists do 
not assert that all religions have equal worth, but 
assume that other religious traditions could have 
a salvific potential. Interreligious dialogue is a way 
to learn more about the religious truths present in 
other religions.  
Pluralistic theologies developed in the Christian 
tradition especially between the 1970s and 1990s. 
There are different types of theological pluralism. 
Some pluralists argue that there is a fundamental 
unity among religious traditions. One of the most 
important defenders of such unitary pluralism, and 
perhaps the most controversial, is the philosopher 
of religion, John Hick. According to Hick, religions 
are different cognitive responses to the same 
Ultimate Reality. They are different phenomenal 
manifestations of the same noumenon5. Believers 
from different faiths can therefore engage together 
in truth-seeking dialogue. Since there is ultimately 
one religious truth, they can learn from each other’s 
imperfect religious knowledge. More cautiously, 
the theologian Raimundo Panikkar postulates the 
incommensurability of different religious paths6. 
There is no such thing as a common denominator 
shared by the world religions. But even without 
a common Ultimate Reality, dialogue is possible 
insofar as believers recognize the authenticity of 
the religious faith of others. What matters most is 
not the content of beliefs, but the sincerity of the 
3 This controversial idea of “anonymous Christians” was 
introduced by the German Jesuit theologian, Karl Rah-
ner (1904-1984). 
4 Hick and Knitter, The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: 
Toward a Pluralistic Theology of Religions. 
5 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to 
the Transcendent.
6 Panikkar, The Intrareligious Dialogue.
faith. Interreligious dialogue becomes interfaith 
dialogue7.
Thus, the theological meaning of religious 
pluralism refers to a certain attitude towards 
religious plurality. It is a religious response to the 
fact of diversity that calls for an equal recognition 
of religious difference. Yet pluralistic theologies 
have been very controversial and received a fair 
amount of criticism within Christian circles8.
SOCIOLOGICAL “PLURALISM” OR 
PLURALITY
The second meaning of religious pluralism is 
sociological9. Pluralism refers here to the social 
phenomenon of religious plurality or diversity. 
This is an empirical fact, or rather a dynamic 
of pluralization, that deserves to be described 
and explained. To avoid any confusion, such 
sociological pluralism should be referred to as 
plurality. 
Religious plurality is not a new phenomenon10. In 
pre-reformation Europe, the Catholic Church was 
already dealing with “infidels” (Jews and Muslims), 
and the Orthodox Church of Eastern Europe. 
7 Interfaith dialogue often includes non-religious beliefs, 
such as agnostic or atheist views. Such opinions are 
interpreted as specific kinds of faith.
8 See Gavin D’Costa, Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered: 
The Myth of a Pluralistic Theology of Religions (Maryk-
noll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1990).
9 Sociological pluralism (or “plurality”) refers here to 
a descriptive account of diversity. This does not imply 
that all sociologists use the notion in a purely descrip-
tive fashion. James Beckford, for example, is critical of 
the conflation between descriptive and normative usages 
of “pluralism” in sociology. As a matter of “conceptual 
hygiene”, he writes, “it is preferable to associate ‘plu-
ralism’ with ideological and normative positions”. See 
James A. Beckford, Social Theory and Religion (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 79.
10 Benjamin J. Kaplan, Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict 
and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe 
(Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2007).
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In a context of superposition between religious 
and political entities, “heresy” was perceived as a 
crime against the political body, and the struggle 
against heretics was fierce. One group of dissidents 
succeeded in establishing themselves, namely the 
Hussites of Bohemia, in the fifteenth century. The 
subsequent reformations of the sixteenth century 
brought about unforeseen religious divisions – not 
only, that is, between Catholics and Protestants 
but also within Protestantism itself. Protestantism 
was soon divided into rival congregations, such 
as Lutherans, Reformed (or “Calvinists”), and 
Anabaptists. This new diversity shows how 
religious disagreements and cleavages frequently 
cut across religious traditions. 
The sociological phenomenon of religious 
pluralism has acquired new scope in recent 
decades, both in Western Europe and the United 
States11. This religious diversity encompasses 
not only Christians, Jews, and Muslims, but 
also non-Abrahamic religions, such as Hindus, 
Buddhists, new religious movements and, of 
course, a growing number of non-believers12. 
Globalization and migration play a significant 
role in the pluralization of Western societies. 
Through these processes, modernity has not led 
to the disappearance of religion, as some theories 
of secularization predicted, but to a deep plurality. 
Not only do various religions coexist but religion 
itself undergoes a process of internal pluralization. 
French sociologist Danièle Hervieu-Léger speaks 
of “exploded religion” (religion éclatée) in order to 
describe this contemporary religious landscape13. 
In it, religion becomes increasingly subjectivized 
and individual believers tend to come up with their 
11 Thomas F. Banchoff, Democracy and the New Religious 
Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
12 The question of the inclusion of non-believers within the 
concept of religious plurality is an interesting one. Here 
I include also non-religious beliefs (such as atheism and 
agnosticism). Even if they are arguably not religious per 
se, they define themselves in relation to religion. 
13 Danièle Hervieu-Léger, Le Pélerin et le converti: la reli-
gion en mouvement. (Paris: Flammarion, 1999): 29.
own bricolage — they pick and choose what they 
find appealing in different religions14. This process 
of customization of religion reflects what Peter 
Berger calls the “heretical imperative”, namely the 
prominent place of “choice” in modern beliefs15. 
In these ways, many sociologists argue that 
modernity and pluralization go hand in hand. As 
Charles Taylor puts it: 
the present scene, shorn of the 
earlier forms, is different and 
unrecognizable to any earlier 
epoch. It is marked by an unheard 
of pluralism of outlooks, religious 
and non- and anti-religious, in 
which the number of possible 
positions seems to be increasing 
without end16.
The question of religious plurality becomes more 
complex when one considers not only the diversity 
of religious traditions, but also the variety of 
religious movements within and outside these 
traditions, as well the diversity of unbeliefs. Some 
religions are monotheist, others polytheist, and 
some are Godless. There is even some doubt 
about the relevance of the concept of religion 
to encompass all these phenomena17. Religious 
plurality is not only about the one and the many, 
it is a multifaceted diversity that requires constant 
interpretation.
14 Ibid., 18.
15 Hairesis in Greek means choice. See Peter L. Berger, 
The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities of 
Religious Affirmation (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, 
1979).
16 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2007): 437.
17 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Reli-
gion (Minneapolis, Minn: Fortress Press, 1991). See 
chapter 2: “‘Religion’ in the West”.
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PHILOSOPHICAL PLURALISM
The third meaning of pluralism is philosophical. In 
liberal political theory, diversity can be envisaged 
either as a fact or as an instrumental value18. On 
the one hand, the liberal state must ensure that 
diversity does not threaten the stability of the 
system. When John Rawls speaks about “the fact 
of pluralism”, he is referring to the sociological 
phenomenon19. He could be speaking about 
plurality instead. However, he gives a specific 
interpretation of pluralism, through the idea of 
reasonable pluralism. Reasonable pluralism refers 
to the irreducible diversity of religious, moral, 
and philosophical comprehensive doctrines, both 
incompatible and reasonable20. Diversity (including 
religious diversity) is envisaged as a natural 
consequence of the exercise of autonomous reason 
18 William A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism: The Implica-
tions of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 
27. Galston associates the first with John Rawls and the 
second with John Stuart Mill and James Madison.
19 John Rawls, Political liberalism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2005).
20 Rawls does not define reasonableness as such, but he 
does specify some aspects of a “reasonable person” (Ibid., 
48-63). One aspect is the willingness of individuals to 
propose and abide by principles and standards as fair 
terms of cooperation, to the extent that others recipro-
cate. Another aspect is the readiness of individuals to 
recognize and accept the consequences of the burdens 
of judgment. Burdens of judgment are the reasons why 
reasonable and sincere persons disagree on moral, reli-
gious, or philosophical issues (Rawls, Political liberal-
ism, 56-57): (1) Evidence is conflicting and complex and 
therefore hard to assess and evaluate; (2) We disagree 
about the weight that should be given to the same con-
siderations; (3) Conceptual indeterminacy forces us to 
rely on differing judgments and interpretations; (4) Our 
assessment of evidence depends upon our life experience 
(position in society, ethnicity, etc.); (5) There are differ-
ent normative considerations to both sides of an issue; 
(6) Some selection of values must be made since a system 
of social institution is limited in the values it can admit. 
Because of the burdens of judgment, the careful use of 
reason does not lead to the same conclusions. Reason-
able persons hold different comprehensive doctrines and 
pluralism prevails.
in a democratic regime. For Rawls, autonomy and 
diversity are compatible and complementary. The 
valorization of autonomy by liberalism provides 
the conditions for diversity to thrive. On the 
other hand, diversity is instrumentally valued by 
some liberals because it benefits individuals and 
society. John Stuart Mill, for example, argues that 
the diversity of opinions and beliefs serves the 
quest for truth. In addition, the variety of ways of 
life is linked to the development of individuality 
which is crucial to social progress. We have good 
instrumental reasons, according to Mill, to value 
diversity21.
There is, however, a third way between a 
factual account and an instrumental defense of 
diversity. Philosophical pluralism values diversity 
intrinsically. Pluralism here is a theory of value 
— value-pluralism — whose metaphysical 
assumptions are contested. This kind of pluralism 
contrasts with monism, the idea that values can 
be harmonized in a unified system or reduced 
to a common denominator. According to Isaiah 
Berlin, pluralism is: 
the conception that there are many 
different ends that men may seek 
and still be fully rational, fully men, 
capable of understanding each other 
and sympathizing and deriving 
lights from each other, as we derive 
from reading Plato or the novels of 
medieval Japan — worlds, outlooks, 
very remote from our own22.
In this view, pluralism differs from a vulgar 
relativism (or subjectivism) which would say: 
“I prefer coffee, you prefer champagne. We 
have different tastes. There is no more to be 
21 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1991). See “On Liberty”, chap-
ter 3: “Of Individuality, as One of the Elements of Well-
being”.
22 Isaiah Berlin and Henry Hardy, The Crooked Timber 
of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas (London: 
Murray, 1990): 11.
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said”23. Contrary to relativism thus construed, 
pluralism asserts that values are objective, and 
that humans pursue them as ends in themselves. 
Such values can be in conflict, which means 
that they are incompatible with each other and 
incommensurable. As a result, “[we] are doomed to 
choose, and every choice may entail an irreparable 
loss”24. The choice between incompatible values 
implies a moral cost. 
For Joseph Raz, autonomy is intimately linked 
to pluralism25. Autonomy indeed requires the 
possibility to choose between a diversity of 
worthwhile choices. William Galston, on the 
other hand, argues that liberalism should not be 
centrally concerned with autonomy, but rather 
with “the protection of legitimate diversity”26. 
A diverse society is one where individuals can 
choose freely among a plurality of conceptions 
of the good life. Diversity provides the necessary 
conditions for the exercise of autonomy, but also 
for “expressive liberty” which allows individuals 
and groups to lead their lives in conformity with 
their convictions, although these convictions do 
not always reflect the value of autonomy 27.
Value-pluralism concerns first of all goods, and 
not ways of life, cultures, or religions28. However, 
the metaphysical premise of an irreducible 
plurality of value can easily be translated into a 
principle of “respect for plurality” insofar as it 
reflects the plurality of goods29. George Crowder 
adds that pluralism should not only value the 
diversity of cultures, but diversity within cultures, 
insofar as it favors autonomy. If value-pluralism is 
23 Ibid., 11.
24 Ibid., 16.
25 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford [Oxford-
shire]: Clarendon Press, 1986).
26 Galston, Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value 
Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice, 23.
27  Ibid., 28.
28 George Crowder, “Two Concepts of Liberal Pluralism”, 
Political Theory 35 (2007): 133.
29 Ibid.,132
not properly speaking about religion, it can justify 
a normative position in favor of the valorization of 
diversity, including religious diversity30.
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AS A 
POLITICAL IDEAL
In its fourth sense, pluralism does not take a 
theological stance about religious truth, nor does 
it make a metaphysical claim about the nature of 
value. Pluralism is also not to be confused with 
mere plurality or diversity. Rather, it refers to a 
political ideal of peaceful interaction of individuals 
and groups of different religious traditions and 
confessions, as well as non-believers. Pluralism 
portrays a world that has moved “beyond mere 
toleration” toward the active engagement with 
religious difference. 
How does pluralism relate to toleration? Toleration 
can be understood in many different ways31. Let 
us define it quite narrowly as an attitude of self-
restraint when confronted with beliefs or behaviors 
judged to be reprehensible. To be tolerant is to 
refrain from acting to eradicate what is perceived 
as wrong. Toleration presupposes some kind of 
moral judgment, but accepts a resignation in the 
face of evil. This kind of toleration leads, at best, to 
peaceful coexistence. By contrast, the pluralistic 
attitude points to recognition and promotes the 
enthusiastic endorsement of difference. Difference 
should not be deplored, but celebrated as a facet of 
the inherent diversity of a free society. 
30 See Michael Jinkins, Christianity, Tolerance, and Plural-
ism: A Theological Engagement with Isaiah Berlin’s Social 
Theory (London: Routledge, 2004).
31 According to Michael Walzer, several attitudes can be 
encompassed under the umbrella of toleration, ranging 
from mere resignation to enthusiasm. I believe that the 
enthusiastic endorsement of differences should no longer 
be labeled toleration, but rather a pluralistic attitude. See 
Michael Walzer, On Toleration (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1997): 10-11. 
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Here, pluralism goes beyond toleration — that 
leads to mere coexistence — to refer to active 
engagement across boundaries of faith — 
interfaith cooperation. 
This understanding of religious pluralism is 
consistent with the definition of Courtney Bender 
and Pamela Klassen, namely as “a commitment to 
recognize and understand others across perceived 
or claimed lines of religious differences”32. It 
is also very close to Thomas Banchoff et al.’s 
definition in which religious pluralism refers to 
“patterns of peaceful interaction among diverse 
religious actors — individuals and groups 
who identify with, and act out of, particular 
religious traditions”33. Why speak of “peaceful” 
interaction? Because, says Banchoff, the ideal of 
religious pluralism “ends where violence begins”34. 
Such conceptions of religious pluralism do not 
contradict the fact that religious plurality pertains 
to differences, disagreements, and conflicting 
interests. Pluralism does not deny the existence 
of strong controversies within religions, between 
religions, and between religions and the secular; 
instead, pluralism poses an ideal of the regulation 
of conflicts through peaceful interaction.
32 Courtney Bender and Pamela E. Klassen, After Plural-
ism: Reimagining Religious Engagement (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010): 2.
33 Thomas F. Banchoff, Religious Pluralism, Globalization, 
and World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008): 4.
34 Ibid., 5.
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POLITICAL-THEOLOGICAL 
PLURALISM 
JOHN WOLFE ACKERMAN
Present day political-philosophical debates are 
characterized by a paradox: on the one hand, the 
religious and cultural plurality of contemporary 
societies is celebrated and endorsed through a 
commitment to pluralism, on the other hand, 
this commitment to pluralism is narrowed down 
to basically one admissible answer: political 
liberalism. Such narrowing down of the range of 
political-philosophical responses to the challenge 
of pluralism is problematic for two reasons: 
first, it universalizes one philosophical tradition, 
secular liberalism, as the valid response to modern 
pluralism; and second, it sidelines other potential 
philosophical approaches which offer different, 
and maybe more adequate, ways of thinking about 
religious pluralism in contemporary society In 
this article, I propose to explore a hitherto under-
researched branch in political philosophy which, 
I will argue, could itself represent an untapped 
resource for pluralizing the political-philosophical 
tradition: political theology. Political theology is 
usually understood in the terms of debate set by 
Carl Schmitt in his landmark text Political Theology: 
Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (1922) 
as being about sovereignty, the Rechtsstaat, and 
the appeal to theological absolutes to shore up 
mundane political power.1 
1 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on 
the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1985). For historical 
background and current debates, see Hent de Vries, 
“Introduction: Before, Around, and Beyond the 
Theologico-Political,” in Political Theologies: Public 
Religions in a Post-Secular World, ed. Hent de Vries and 
Lawrence E. Sullivan (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2006), 1–88, and Miguel Vatter, “Introduction: 
Crediting God with Sovereignty,” in Crediting God: 
Sovereignty and Religion in the Age of Global Capitalism, 
ed. Miguel Vatter (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2011), 1–25. 
But recent debates have also pointed to the limits 
of Schmittian political theology as emphatically 
Christian (and specifically Roman Catholic) in 
both its lineage and polemical thrust.2 
As Cécile Laborde has observed in a reflection 
on the possible relevance of Schmittian political 
theology, Schmitt’s thinking can be interpreted 
promisingly as “a reminder of the structurally 
Christian nature of the secular state”, that is, of 
the fact that the secular state is actually “deeply 
implicated in a particular (Christian) political 
theology.”3 According to Laborde, what must then 
be addressed in response is “the extent to which 
the basic categories of secular liberal theory are 
themselves dependent … on a problematically 
ethnocentric conception of the individual and of 
the state” 4. Laborde’s answer would seem to be that 
basic secular conceptions can hold up normatively 
even if they are permeated by (Christian) religious 
notions. Laborde, therefore, admits to the paradox 
noted in the beginning but finds a way around it 
by arguing for the normative superiority of the 
secular liberal tradition. In this short chapter, I 
propose an alternative: rather than continuing to 
project a single, narrow view of the relationship 
between historical Western Christianity and the 
saeculum (in the form of pre-modern sovereigns 
ruling by divine right) onto the intersection of 
theology and politics in late modernity, we might 
instead today enlist a more expansive conception 
of political theology—one attentive to the fact of 
religious pluralism and the very wide range of 
possible relationships between divine and human 
political power that this religious diversity may 
encompass—in the service of a more adequately 
2 See also Judaism, Liberalism, and Political Theology, ed. 
Randi Rashkover and Martin Kavka (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 2014).
3 Cécile Laborde, “Three Theses About Political Theology: 
Some Comments on Seyla Benhabib’s ‘Return of 
Political Theology,’” Critical Review of International 
Social and Political Philosophy 17, no. 6 (2014): 693, doi: 
10.1080/13698230.2014.930782.
4  Laborde, “Three Theses”, 695.
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pluralistic understanding of contemporary 
politics. In order to initiate such an effort, we 
might begin by registering that the “political 
theology” inherited from Schmitt itself came into 
existence in tandem with other political theologies 
that were resistant to and critical of it—and critical 
as well of the distinct role that Christian political 
theologies had played in the rise of the modern 
state in Europe, and of the forms of state politics 
that these particular political theologies continue 
to underwrite. 
This chapter focuses on the modern German 
iteration of the European state tradition within 
which Schmitt wrote: on its theory of the 
Rechtsstaat, that state of “right” that is understood 
as both a set of governing institutions and a system 
of law conceived as an alternative to mere laws, 
which has come to be seen as an end in itself in 
Western politics—and on the historical resistance 
to this German tradition of state-thinking that 
was generated out of its encounter with Jews and 
Judaism in the German-speaking realm, from 
the late eighteenth to the twentieth centuries.5 
This encounter was shaped decisively by the 
Christian anti-Judaism of both German theology 
and philosophy, but was also characterized by 
varied forms and moments of friction, dissent, 
and challenge to this anti-Judaism. Alternative 
political theologies were among the results of 
these confrontations. In this article, I present one 
small sample indicative of a larger picture, by 
focusing all too briefly on two confrontations that 
occurred in the wake of the First World War and 
the period of the Weimar Republic when debates 
around political theology reached a particular 
apex, with Schmitt at their center. First, in the 
underappreciated reading of Hegel’s theory of 
5 Both German-Christian perceptions of Judaism and 
German-Jewish assessments of Judaism and Christianity 
have also been shaped in and by their perceptions of 
Islam, but this paper leaves this dimension of these 
confrontations to the side here. On these entanglements, 
see especially the recent work of Gil Anidjar and 
Susannah Heschel. 
the state by Jewish philosopher-theologian, Franz 
Rosenzweig, and the Jewish writings, particularly 
The Star of Redemption, that he produced on its 
heels; and, second, in the more direct but largely 
overlooked challenge by political theorist, Hannah 
Arendt, to Schmitt’s particular version of political 
theology.6
Franz Rosenzweig is typically portrayed as a scholar 
who studied Hegel and the German political-
philosophical tradition before turning away 
from it to commit himself instead to a renewal of 
German Judaism—a development that is typically 
figured as a turning inward to Jewish ritual 
tradition and communal life.7 But Rosenzweig can 
also be read as exemplary of a wider phenomenon 
of German-Jewish political theology, and of the 
challenge this Jewish political theology posed and 
still poses to both Christian political theology and 
the political-philosophical tradition to which it 
was intimately connected. He was educated, as 
a student of Friedrich Meinecke, at the forefront 
of the emerging German intellectual history and 
its particular attention to the development of the 
nation-state. In writing, on the eve of the war, 
the first great study of Hegel’s theory of the state, 
its development and influence on the century 
that followed, Rosenzweig subsequently rebelled 
against this world and the ideological constellation 
that undergirded it. In doing so, he called into 
question the German tradition’s long-established, 
deprecatory view of Judaism in order to discover 
new resources in it that could answer some of that 
tradition’s most urgent shortcomings. 
6 I give a far more extended reading of this constellation 
in Ackerman, “The Politics of Political Theology: 
Rosenzweig, Schmitt, Arendt” (PhD diss., Northwestern 
University, 2013). 
7 Cf. Franz Rosenzweig, Hegel und der Staat [1920], new 
ed., ed. Frank Lachmann (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2010), 
and Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption [1921], 
trans. William W. Hallo (Boston: Beacon, 1964).
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Rosenzweig’s reading turned on his explication 
of Hegel’s famous statement in the preface to 
the Philosophy of Right—“What is rational is 
actual, and what is actual is rational”—as Hegel’s 
concise expression of the historical and political 
transformation that occurred with the advent of 
Christianity.8 According to Hegel, it was in God’s 
becoming man in Christ that reason became 
actual in the world as human matter. Through 
this event, the political state had been endowed, 
in Hegel’s view, with the task of the continuing 
actualization of reason in the world, a task that 
found embodiment in the person of the human 
sovereign and the power of decision lodged on his 
person. Thenceforth to be played out on the stage 
of world history, the Christian task of realizing 
reason in the world was also destined to lead to 
ever-renewed wars.
Against this understanding, Rosenzweig’s turn 
to Judaism did not represent a turn away from 
politics and withdrawal from the world. It entailed 
the articulation of a different politics based on a 
different theology in which God has not become 
man. It too is a political theology, but one which 
takes its alternate starting point from the revelation 
of the commandment: of a law that is given, not 
8 “Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich; und was wirklich 
ist, das ist vernünftig”. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy 
of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 20; 
Hegel, Werke, vol. 7: Grundlinien der Philosophie 
des Rechts (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986), 24. See 
Rosenzweig, Hegel und der Staat, 355; Hegel, Philosophy 
of Right/Philosophie des Rechts §279, §328. Cf. also the 
readings in Michael Theunissen, Die Verwirklichung der 
Vernunft: Zur Theorie-Praxis-Diskussion im Anschluß an 
Hegel, Beiheft 6, Philosophische Rundschau (Tübingen: J. 
C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1970) and Emil Fackenheim, 
“The Actuality of the Rational and the Rationality of 
the Actual,” in The God Within: Kant, Schelling and 
Historicity, ed. John Burbridge (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1996), 164–71. (Cf., further, Theunissen, 
Hegels Lehre vom absoluten Geist als theologisch-
politischer Traktat [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 
1970] and Fackenheim, The Religious Dimension in 
Hegel’s Thought [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1982].)
the product of human fabrication. It reads the 
command to love God as an incitement to ongoing 
acts of love of neighbor, locating these acts in the 
everyday agonistic encounters and interactions 
in the world in which the “given” law finds its 
enactment, and apart from which it would remain 
ineffective.9 It locates politics not primarily in any 
undertakings of states but rather, in the conflicts 
and negotiations entailed in these everyday 
encounters with manifold neighbors and in the 
concerted action these encounters generate which 
has neither a realization nor an ultimate decision 
as its end. It thus generates what Rosenzweig calls 
a “messianic politics”, one that operates in another 
time than “world history”—and according to a 
critique, not just of Hegel, but also avant la lettre 
of what Schmitt would shortly define as political 
theology.10 By preserving the alterity of God 
and the givenness of the divine commandment, 
Rosenzweig’s Jewish political theology resists the 
becoming absolute of the human sovereign who 
has assumed powers that once belonged to God.  
Schmitt’s political theology is the object of a more 
direct critique in Hannah Arendt’s Weimar and 
post-Weimar writings. This critique parallels 
Rosenzweig’s in key ways, drawing similarly 
on Jewish resources to resist the statist political 
theology of the German-Christian tradition. It 
begins in Arendt’s doctoral dissertation on the 
concept of love in the writings of Augustine where, 
without naming Schmitt, Arendt cites both his 
Political Theology and his 1927 “The Concept of the 
Political” in order to argue that in their respective 
pursuits of order in the world, both Augustine and 
Schmitt block the very encounter with the other 
that would make love of neighbor possible or, for 
that matter, political friend-enemy judgments of 
9 Rosenzweig’s political theology was first articulated in 
the second half of The Star of Redemption, published one 
year after Hegel and the State.
10 See Schmitt, Political Theology, e.g., 5, 10, 55–56, 65–66.
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the sort Schmitt famously advocated.11 Arendt 
began to formulate an alternative in her next 
project on the Jewish Berlin salonnière, Rahel 
Varnhagen, in which she sought to recover the 
Jewish trait of gratitude for that which is given 
as a positive resource for encounter with and 
inhabitation of the world from which Rahel, 
under the pressures of Prussian antisemitism, 
had fled.12 Indeed, it was the elimination of the 
very possibility of encounter that accounted for 
the destruction of politics by totalitarianism 
in Arendt’s acclaimed post-war analysis of the 
catastrophes of the mid-twentieth century. In 
The Origins of Totalitarianism, she prescribed the 
rekindling of gratitude for the individual’s time 
in the world as a prerequisite for the re-founding 
of a common world or worlds in which politics 
might again become possible.13 This thread carries 
through all the way to her theorization of a new 
mode of foundation in On Revolution.14 There, 
she countered Schmitt’s depiction of popular 
constituent power as a secularization of the divine 
power of creation, with an alternate theological 
11 Hannah Arendt, Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin 
(Berlin: Springer, 1929); Carl Schmitt, “Der Begriff 
des Politischen,” Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und 
Sozialpolitik 58, no. 1 (1927): 1–33. See also John Wolfe 
Ackerman, “The Memory of Politics: Arendt, Schmitt 
and the Possibility of Encounter,” in Concentrationary 
Memories: Totalitarian Terror and Culture Resistance, 
ed. Griselda Pollock and Max Silverman (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2013), 31–43.
12 Rahel identified her gratitude in her memoirs as one of 
her defining and also her most “hideous” traits, a positive 
trait that under conditions in Prussia had been perverted 
into its opposite. See Hannah Arendt, Rahel Varnhagen: 
Lebensgeschichte einer deutschen Jüdin aus der Romantik 
(Munich: Piper, 1959), 20. Cf. Hannah Arendt, Rahel 
Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess, ed. Liliane Weissberg, 
trans. Richard and Clara Winston (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1997), 87.
13 See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951), 438 (from the 
original Concluding Remarks, reprinted also in the 
2004 Schocken ed.). See also Ackerman, “The Memory 
of Politics”.
14 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking, 
1965).
conception of a continuing creation in which the 
plurality of creation participates. It is this account 
that forms the basis for Arendt’s revolutionary 
constitutionalism of ongoing new beginnings, 
nourished by the continual plural encounter with 
given difference. 
These components—gratitude for the given, 
everyday encounters with the neighbor, and 
ongoing, agonistic negotiation of law that is never 
simply the product of human autonomy—together 
constitute an alternate Jewish political theology 
that emerges in the writings of Rosenzweig 
and Arendt . Their work examined the German 
philosophical tradition’s thinking of the state and 
its intertwinement with Christian theology—in 
critical confrontation with both that tradition 
and with Schmitt’s particular version of political 
theology.
In contrast to the Christian political theology of 
the German philosophical tradition, this Jewish 
political-theological alternative affirms plurality 
and contest as constituent elements of both religion 
and politics, including where they inevitably 
intersect. Its existence reflects the fact that the 
modern Western political tradition emerged 
against a background of religious pluralism 
(even if highly constrained by the dominance 
of Christianity) and was always already part 
of the confrontation this entailed. Discussions 
on political theology in the twentieth century 
encompassed positions that sought to reinforce 
Christianity’s influence on the European political 
tradition and ones that countered it. But the latter 
did so, it is important to recognize today, not just 
in the name of secularism but also on behalf of 
alternatives that drew on other religious and 
theological resources in the service of other types 
of politics which might just be more pluralistic 
than the more familiar Christian political theology 
of a unified state. In the context of contemporary 
discussions on how to accommodate religious 
pluralism, and in the face of the many voices 
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insisting that Western democracies should not 
compromise the fundamental principles of secular 
liberalism in the face of challenges posed by 
religious sensibilities, this example suggests that we 
would do well to look more closely to the recurrent 
moments of friction between the Christian 
fundaments of the political-philosophical 
tradition inherited by the West and its minoritized 
religious and theological Others. Such action will 
yield insights into how we might yet cultivate 
a politics of robust engagement across the fluid, 
permeable, often overlapping lines of religious 
and theological difference that have long animated 
the societies and the world in which we live. In 
fact, contrary to expectations, political theology 
can be a powerful resource for such a project. 
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ITALY AND CONTROVERSIES 
AROUND RELIGION-RELATED 
ISSUES: OVEREMPHASIZING 
DIFFERENCE
LUCA OZZANO 
ALBERTA GIORGI
 1. INTRODUCTION: RELIGIOUS 
PLURALISM AS A SOCIO-POLITICAL 
CONSTRUCTION
For most of the twentieth century, the role of 
religion and especially religious values in politics 
has been neglected by political science and 
political sociology. This was largely a consequence 
of the adoption of the so-called ‘secularization 
paradigm’1, as well as the fact that most analysis 
of religion in society was typically a field for 
specialists2. Only since the 1980s has religion 
‘returned’ into the public sphere and been framed 
as an issue for discussion3.
1 William H. Swatos and Kevin J. Christiano, “Introduc-
tion — Secularization Theory: The Course of a Concept”. 
Sociology of Religion 60, no. 3 (1999): 209–28; Rodney 
Stark, “Secularization, R.I.P.”, Sociology of Religion 60, 
no. 3 (1999): 249–73; Steve Bruce, “Did Protestantism 
Create Democracy?” Democratization 11, no. 4 (2004): 
3–20.
2 James A. Beckford, “‘Start Together and Finish Together’: 
Shifts in the Premises and Paradigms Underlying the 
Scientific Study of Religion”. Journal for the Scientific 
Study of Religion 39, no. 4 (2000): 481–95.
3 Gilles Kepel, La Revanche de Dieu : Chrétiens, juifs et 
musulmans à la reconquête du monde (Paris: Seuil, 1991); 
José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
A growing scholarship, besides the specialist 
field, has developed on a number of topics, such 
as: religion and democratization4 religiously-
oriented political parties5, religion in international 
4 Alfred C. Stepan, “Religion, Democracy, and the ‘Twin 
Tolerations’” Journal of Democracy 11, no. 4 (2000): 
37–57; Alfred C. Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson, “Arab, 
Not Muslim, Exceptionalism,” Journal of Democracy 
15, no. 4 (2004): 140–46; Carsten Anckar, Religion and 
Democracy: A Worldwide Comparison (Routledge, 2011); 
Luca Ozzano, “Religion, Political Actors, and Democra-
tization: The Turkish Case,” Politics and Religion 7, no. 
03 (2014): 590–612; Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Mer-
one, “Moderation through Exclusion? The Journey of the 
Tunisian Ennahda from Fundamentalist to Conservative 
Party,” Democratization 20, no. 5 (2013): 857–75; Mirjam 
Künkler and Julia Leininger, “The Multi-Faceted Role of 
Religious Actors in Democratization Processes: Empiri-
cal Evidence from Five Young Democracies,” Democ-
ratization 16, no. 6 (2009): 1058–92; Manfred Brocker 
and Mirjam Künkler, “Religious Parties Revisiting the 
Inclusion-Moderation hypothesis – Introduction,” Party 
Politics 19, no. 2 (2013): 171–86; Olivier Roy, La laïcité 
face à l’islam (Paris: Stock, 2005).
5 Sultan Tepe, Beyond Sacred and Secular: Politics of Reli-
gion in Israel and Turkey (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2008); Nancy L. Rosenblum, “Religious Parties, 
Religious Political Identity, and the Cold Shoulder of 
Liberal Democratic Thought”, Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice 6, no. 1 (2003): 23–53; M. Hakan Yavuz, Secu-
larism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009); Luca Ozzano, “The 
Many Faces of the Political God: A Typology of Reli-
giously Oriented Parties”, Democratization 20, no. 5 
(2013): 807–30; Luca Ozzano and Francesco Cavatorta, 
eds., Religiously Oriented Parties and Democratization 
(Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2014); Stathis N. Kaly-
vas, The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe (Cornell 
University Press, 1996); Stathis N. Kalyvas, “From Pul-
pit to Party: Party Formation and the Christian Dem-
ocratic Phenomenon”, Comparative Politics 30, no. 3 
(1998): 293–312; Asher Cohen, “The Religious Parties in 
the 2006 Election”, Israel Affairs 13, no. 2 (2007): 325–
45; Payam Mohseni and Clyde Wilcox, “Religion and 
Political Parties”, in Routledge Handbook of Religion and 
Politics, by Jeffrey Haynes (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 
211–30.
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relations6, or the public debate on ethical-religious 
issues, variously approached7: this latter is the 
specific focus of this short paper.
6 Jeffrey Haynes, An Introduction to International Rela-
tions and Religion (Harlow: Pearson, 2007); Jeffrey 
Haynes, “Transnational Religious Actors and Interna-
tional Politics”, Third World Quarterly 22, no. 2 (2001), 
143-158; Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, Bringing 
Religion Into International Relations (New York: Pal-
grave MacMillan, 2006); Jonathan Fox, “Integrating 
Religion into International Relations Theory”, in Rout-
ledge Handbook of Religion and Politics, edited by Jeffrey 
Haynes (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 273–92; Giorgio 
Shani, “Transnational Religious Actors and Interna-
tional Relations”, in Routledge Handbook of Religion and 
Politics, edited by Jeffrey Haynes (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2009), 308–22; Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civi-
lizations and the Remaking of World Order (Simon and 
Schuster, 1996); Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito, 
eds., Religion in International Relations: The Return from 
Exile (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
7 Jean-Paul Baubérot and Micheline Milot, Laïcités sans 
Frontières (Parigi: Seuil, 2011); Isabelle Engeli, Christof-
fer Green-Pedersen, and Lars Thorup Larsen, Morality 
Politics in Western Europe: Parties, Agendas and Policy 
Choices (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012); Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and 
Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004); Grace Davie, Reli-
gion in Britain Since 1945: Believing Without Belonging 
(Oxford ; Cambridge, Mass: John Wiley & Sons, 1994); 
Isabelle Engeli, “The Challenges of Abortion and Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies Policies in Europe”, Com-
parative European Politics 7, no. 1 (2009): 56–74; Charles 
Taylor and Amy Gutmann, Multiculturalism: Examin-
ing the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 1994); Jürgen Habermas, “Notes on 
Post-Secular Society”, New Perspectives Quarterly 25, no. 
4 (2008): 17–29; Jeff Haynes and Anja Hennig, eds., Reli-
gious Actors in the Public Sphere: Means, Objectives, and 
Effects (Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 2013); Eugenio 
Lecaldano, Bioetica. Le scelte morali (Roma; Bari: Lat-
erza, 2005); Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic 
Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton, N.J: Prince-
ton University Press, 2005); Claudia Mancina, “Laicità e 
politica”, in Laicità. Una Geografia Delle Nostre Radici, 
ed. Giovanni Boniolo (Torino: Einaudi, 2006), 5–26; 
Michael Minkenberg, “Religion and Public Policy Insti-
tutional, Cultural, and Political Impact on the Shaping 
of Abortion Policies in Western Democracies”, Compar-
ative Political Studies 35, no. 2 (2002): 221–47; Michael 
Minkenberg, “The Policy Impact of Church–state Rela-
tions: Family Policy and Abortion in Britain, France, 
and Germany”, West European Politics 26, no. 1 (2003): 
195–217; Linda Woodhead, “Gendering Secularization 
Theory”, Social Compass 55, no. 2 (2008): 187–93; Rob-
ert Wuthnow, Rediscovering the Sacred: Perspectives on 
Religion in Contemporary Society (Grand Rapids, Mich: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1992).
In Italy, as in other European countries, the 
last decades have been characterized by deep 
controversies around religion-related issues. 
Among these, some have revolved around how 
to deal with non-Catholic religions: being Italy 
a religious quasi-monopoly, the debate is indeed 
intertwined with the debate about migration. 
Other discussions were instead focused on issues 
related to the role of Christian values in the 
secular public sphere, and particularly on religious 
symbols, bioethics and sexuality 8.
The analysis of the controversies shows that in the 
political sphere ‘religious pluralism’ has neither 
a single definition, nor acknowledged and stable 
characters. For example, during the controversy 
on the role of religious teaching in the public 
education system, non-Catholic religions were 
acknowledged as possible actors in the debate, 
thus taking into account Italian society’s religious 
plurality. On the other side, in dealing with 
medically-assisted procreation, religious pluralism 
only concerned the differences between Catholic 
and secular attitudes toward the issue. Besides 
being a meaningful social reality thus, religious 
pluralism also plays an important role as a socio-
political construction. Among the many possible 
scientific perspectives, therefore, we chose to adopt 
a socio-constructivist approach, focusing on what 
actors mean by religious pluralism and how they 
argue for, or against, its role in the political sphere.
8 Stefano Allievi and Jørgen S. Nielsen, Muslim Networks 
and Transnational Communities in and Across Europe 
(Leiden: Brill, 2003); Luca Diotallevi, “Internal Compe-
tition in a National Religious Monopoly: The Catholic 
Effect and the Italian Case”, Sociology of Religion 63, no. 
2 (2002): 137–55; Garelli, Franco. Religione all’italiana. 
(Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011); Garelli, Franco. “Religion 
and Politics: The Italian Case”. Annual Review of the 
Sociology of Religion, 2 (2011a): 216–244; Lecaldano, 
Bioetica; Mancina, Laicità; Pace, Enzo. Vecchi e Nuovi 
Dei. La geografia religiosa dell’Italia che cambia. (Milano: 
Edizioni Paoline, 2011); Pace, Enzo. “Achilles and the 
Tortoise. A Society Monopolized by Catholicism Faced 
with an Unexpected Religious Pluralism”. Social Com-
pass 60, 3 (2013): 315-331;  Gian Enrico Rusconi, Come se 
Dio non ci fosse: i laici, i cattolici e la democrazia (Torino: 
Einaudi, 2000).
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In this short paper we focus on how ‘religious 
pluralism’ is constructed by political actors by 
comparatively analyzing controversies around 
religion-related issues that took place in Italy 
between 2001 and 2013. The paper draws on the 
results of four years of research on the Italian 
ethical-religious debates, based on the analysis 
of a wide database of printed media9. It pays 
particular attention to how the debates have been 
framed by the different actors and how their 
coalitions changed over time and according to 
the various issues. In relation to the meaning of 
religious pluralism in contemporary Italy, the 
research shows on the one hand that political 
actors have different views of issues related to 
pluralism according to the values founding their 
worldview; on the other, they are ready to shift 
their allegiances and seek a compromise or rather 
frame the debates as struggles between non-
negotiable values according to their perception 
of short-term political interests. In other words, 
it is clear that the setting influences the forms of 
political debates and their outcomes. In addition, 
we identify three meanings of religious pluralism 
that emerge in the Italian public sphere: pluralism 
within the majority religious tradition; pluralism 
in relation to the dichotomy religion v secular; and 
pluralism in relation to the growing pluralization 
and hybridization of the religious landscape.
9 Luca Ozzano and Alberta Giorgi, European Culture Wars 
and the Italian Case: Which Side Are You On? (London: 
Routledge, 2015, forthcoming).
2. THREE DIMENSIONS OF ITALIAN 
RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY
The meanings of religious pluralism in the Italian 
political debate are grounded on three dimensions 
of religious diversity. A first dimension of Italian 
religious diversity is related to the heterogeneity of 
the Italian Catholic tradition. Although Italy can 
be categorized as a religious quasi-monopoly10, 
many scholars have pointed out that, far from being 
homogeneous, Italian Catholicism has always 
been characterized by a high degree of internal 
and geographical difference11. Catholicism’s 
internal differences have increased in the last 
decades, affecting, for example, the identity of the 
Catholic Church, whose contemporary image has 
been described as a “sectarian Church”12.
The second dimension of Italian religious pluralism 
concerns the role of religion and religious values 
in a secular and democratic public sphere. Recent 
studies show that Italian society is increasingly 
secularized13. While Catholicism has maintained 
its importance in Italian society, as an ‘influential 
10 Diotallevi, “Internal Competition in a National Reli-
gious Monopoly”.
11 Roberto Cartocci, Geografia dell’Italia cattolica. 
(Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011); Ivo Colozzi and Stefano Mar-
telli. L’arcipelago Cattolico. Analisi sociologica dell’as-
sociazionismo ecclesiale a Bologna. (Bologna: EDB, 
1988);  Diotallevi, “Internal Competition in a National 
Religious Monopoly”; Enzo Pace, L’unità dei cattolici in 
Italia. (Milano: Guerini e Associati, 1995); Paolo Segatti 
“Religiosità e territorio nel voto alla Democrazia Cris-
tiana dal 1948 al 1992”. Polis 13, 1 (1999): 45-65.
12 Marco Marzano. “The ‘sectarian’ Church. Catholicism 
in Italy since John Paul II”. Social Compass 60, 3 (2013a): 
302-314
13 Cartocci, Geografia; Garelli, Religione all’Italiana; 
Marco Marzano. Quel che resta dei cattolici. (Milano: 
Feltrinelli, 2013); Marco Marzano. Il cattolicesimo 
magico. Un’indagine etnografica. (Milano: Bompiani, 
2009); Paolo Segatti, and Gianfranco Brunelli “L’Ita-
lia religiosa. Da cattolica a genericamente cristiana”. Il 
Regno 10 (2010): 337–351.
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minority’14, its role is highly controversial. Indeed, 
in the last decades the Italian public and political 
spheres have been marked by heated debates about 
the role of religion in the secular public sphere, 
particularly in relation to religious symbols, 
bioethics and sexuality. 
The third dimension of Italian religious pluralism 
is related to the increased presence of non-Catholic 
religions in Italy, both in terms of numbers and 
public visibility. The pluralization of the Italian 
religious landscape15 is driven, as it is in the rest of 
Europe, by ongoing secularization and migration 
processes. Non-Catholic religions are nowadays 
involved in Italian society, and make public claim 
for gaining acknowledgement and visibility. At the 
same time, public visibility increased the political 
attention towards this latter form of religious 
pluralism16. 
Given these three dimensions of Italian religious 
pluralism, Pace advises that scholars must go 
“beyond the ethno-centrism (or Catholic-centrism 
that has inevitably characterized our research on 
our predominantly Catholic society)”17. Despite 
increasing religious pluralism, Catholicism 
maintains a crucial symbolic role in Italian public 
and political debates, both as an actor and cultural 
reference. In fact, the religious cleavage between 
the Catholic Church and the Italian State had a 
crucial role in shaping the Italian political system 
14 Luigi Ceccarini and Ilvo Diamanti, “Catholics and 
Politics after the Christian Democrats: The Influential 
Minority”, Journal of Modern Italian Studies 12, no. 1 
(2007): 37–59.
15 See the maps of Italian religious diversity in Pace “Achil-
les and the Tortoise”; see also Pace Vecchi e Nuovi Dei.
16 Renzo Guolo, Chi Impugna La Croce. Lega e Chiesa 
(Roma/Bari: Laterza, 2011); Anna Triandafyllidou, 
“Religious Diversity and Multiculturalism in Southern 
Europe: The Italian Mosque Debate”, in Multicultural-
ism, Muslims and Citizenship. A European Approach, 
edited by Tariq Modood, Anna Triandafyllidou, and 
Ricard Zapata-Barrero (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 
117–42.
17  Pace, Achilles and the Tortoise, 330.
until the early Nineties18. The changes affecting 
the political system and cultural landscape of 
contemporary Italy placed religious pluralism 
among the discussion topics in the public sphere, 
and different political actors variously mobilized 
different understandings of religious pluralism in 
the country.
3. RELIGIOUS PLURALISMS
Scholars have analyzed different aspects of Italian 
religious pluralism, including how it is represented 
by the mass media and in the public and political 
spheres. In our research, we specifically focused 
on political controversies that have taken 
place around religion-related issues. We used a 
qualitative (frame-analysis) approach, collecting, 
coding, and analyzing texts from 7,134 articles 
from a wide range of Italian daily newspapers. The 
objective of this work was to question the binary 
image of Italy, often represented as being stuck in 
a war between secular and religious factions. This 
work, therefore, analyzed controversies around 
this dynamic, drew attention to the processes 
of constructing the discursive space and norms 
for public discussion, and showed the variety in 
frames and counter-frames around religion and 
religion-related issues. 
Our research shows several interesting features of 
Italy’s religious pluralism, not only in relation to 
the identity of actors engaged in the public sphere 
and their perception of religious pluralism, but 
also (and often especially) in relation to the way 
identities and images of pluralism are constructed 
by the different actors in different times and in 
relation to different debates19. We focused on the 
national printed press: newspapers usually present 
18 Ceccarini and Diamanti, “Catholics and Politics after 
the Christian Democrats”.
19 Courtney Bender and Pamela E. Klassen, eds. After Plu-
ralism. Reimagining Religious Engagement. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010).
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the mainstream discourse and dominant frames20, 
and are the arenas in which public visibility, 
resonance, and legitimacy must be gained21. More 
specifically, we focused on the political discourses 
as reported by print media. Indeed, the Italian 
media sphere is mostly not an independent actor, 
but rather strictly intertwined with politics: the 
national mainstream newspapers are connected 
to powerful economic groups, while political 
newspapers are financed by political parties or 
groups addressing different political audiences. 
Therefore, we divided print media according to 
political ideology 22. 
Firstly, our research shows that while most actors 
seem to fully accept religious pluralism, others 
do not. This is the case with Italy’s Radical Party 
and some fringes of the Marxist left, whose idea 
of state secularism often seems to go beyond 
the separation of Church and State to reject any 
presence of religion (also in terms of values) in the 
public sphere. However, it is especially the case of 
the Lega Nord party, which – despite its adoption 
of neo-pagan symbols and rituals in the 1980s 
and 1990s – in recent years has been increasingly 
marked by an identity-based, civilizational and 
intolerant agenda based on a peculiar vision 
of Christian identity23. According to this view, 
Catholic values, symbols and places of worship 
– strongly intertwined with Italian and Western 
20 Gerlinde Mautner. “Analyzing Newspapers, Magazines, 
and Other Print Media.” In Qualitative Discourse Analy-
sis in the Social Sciences, edited by Ruth Wodak and 
Michal Krzyzanowski: 30-53.London; (New York: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2008).
21 Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham eds. The Making of 
a European Public Sphere. Media Discourse and Political 
Contention. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010).
22 Ozzano and Giorgi, European Culture Wars and the Ital-
ian Case.
23 This emerges even while debating issues apparently 
unrelated to ethno-cultural identity, such as abortion 
which is often stigmatized by the Lega Nord, not out of 
theological concerns but in relation to Italian population 
decline and immigration flows
ethno-cultural identity – are the only legitimate 
religious presence in the public sphere. 
In general, other actors accept religious pluralism, 
although they range in terms of a concomitant 
preference for Catholicism. What is striking, 
in this case, is the paradoxically-shrinking 
number of political actors who clearly embrace 
the state’s neutrality towards religions: this is 
shown particularly by the debate concerning the 
presence of the crucifix in public schools which 
was rejected by only a minority of actors, even 
in the center-left. On the other hand, in relation 
to other issues, the center-right was apparently 
often uncertain between the adoption of a Lega 
Nord-style identity approach and a ‘republican’, 
more secularly-oriented view of citizenship and 
pluralism.
If we look instead at religious actors, there are at 
least two relevant features to point out. On the one 
hand, non-Catholic religious actors are afforded 
virtually no voice in the debates, even when the 
discussion is related to their presence in the public 
sphere, as in the cases of the veil and localization 
of mosques. On the other hand, we see that 
the Catholic Church itself is torn between an 
exclusivist identity-based approach and a pluralist 
one emphasizing the absolute right to freedom of 
worship and belief. This is particularly evident in 
the debate relating to Muslim places of worship, 
the visible presence of which in the Italian physical 
and symbolic landscapes is accepted by some 
and rejected by others among both the Vatican’s 
hierarchies and the grassroots clergy.
This complex scenario is further enriched if we 
take into account the process of the debate (in 
which the positions of actors are not fixed, but 
rather constructed in relation to the stances of 
others) and the strategic attitudes of many actors. 
A striking example of the changing construction 
of problems is the debate on the veil. In the early 
2000s, when the discussion was constructed in 
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relation to the Middle-East, the debate in the 
center-left was dominated by a secular approach 
rejecting the veil as an instrument of male 
domination, while the center-right appeared much 
more supportive of tradition. On the other hand, 
in the second half of the decade when the debate 
revolved around the presence of the veil in the 
Italian public sphere and educational institutions, 
the center-right adopted a pro-ban approach, 
while for the center-left multiculturalist concerns 
became predominant, in opposition to the Lega 
Nord’s xenophobic stances. There are, however, 
other cases in which changes are not related to 
different constructions of a problem, but are clearly 
strategic in nature. This is the case, for example, 
of the discussion on the legalization of same-sex 
partnerships: while in the second half of the 2000s, 
the center-right was very firm in its emphasis on 
traditional Catholic-based values which implied 
a rejection of any official recognition of same-sex 
couples, in the early 2010s, facing the competition 
of Mario Monti’s centrist coalition, center-right 
leaders signaled their willingness to a compromise 
on the issue.
Broadly speaking, we can observe that at least 
two major problems related to religious pluralism 
emerge from our analysis. First, in relation to 
bioethics and sexuality, the alignment of the 
Catholic Church and the political center-right 
encourages the construction of the debate as a 
zero-sum struggle in which both religiously- and 
secularly-oriented actors present their values 
as non-negotiable. This, in turn, means that a 
compromise is less easy to reach. On the other 
hand, when the discussion revolves around non-
Catholic religious minorities, especially Muslims, 
they are often implicitly regarded as second-class 
citizens without the right to voice in a debate 
dominated by political actors. This is not only 
the case of organizations mainly representing 
immigrants without Italian citizenship, but also 
of groups such as the COREIS whose members 
are Italian converts: which precisely shows that 
this discrimination has a religious, and not ethno-
cultural, grounding.
Our analysis also proves, however, that such 
cleavages and discriminations can change, or 
at least be circumvented, as a consequence of 
the strategic face of actors, and the interactional 
dynamics of the debate which can alter the 
construction of religious pluralism in the public 
debate. Thus, for example, the center-right’s 
emphasis on ‘non-negotiable values’ has softened 
in the early 2010s, mainly as a consequence of 
party system changes, alleviating the intensity 
and tone of some debates; while in some local 
contexts, religious minorities have been able to 
break free from exclusion and stigmatization 
thanks to organizational change and participative 
processes enhanced by local administrations.
CONCLUSION
Broadly speaking, this research addresses 
religious diversity and pluralism from a socio-
constructivist perspective. We have argued that 
political actors variously frame the different 
dimensions of religious diversity in a wide 
variety of ways, and propose different meanings 
of ‘religious pluralism’ in the public sphere. 
On the whole, our results show that there is a 
broad agreement on the importance of religious 
pluralism in Italian politics. Nonetheless, our 
results also show that despite this political support, 
controversies emerge especially in relation to 
the actual meaning of religious pluralism and its 
policy implications in relation to different issues. 
Finally, we showed how the discourse on religious 
pluralism is clearly influenced by changes in the 
political sphere and the strategic behavior of 
actors within it. Our general conclusion from this 
study is that, when addressing religious pluralism, 
social scientific analysis must reckon with the 
multiplicity of meanings which actors attach to 
terms that, at first glance, appear unequivocal. 
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WHAT AND WHERE IS 
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN 
LITHUANIA? 
MILDA ALIŠAUSKIENĖ
The aim of this paper is to analyze the form of 
religious pluralism that has arisen in contemporary 
Lithuania and its impact on society in general and 
minority religions in particular. This paper also 
contributes to the broader understanding of the 
forms of religious pluralism that have emerged in 
the post-socialist societies of Central and Eastern 
Europe, and reveals the peculiarities of these 
pluralisms in relation to the theories of pluralism 
outlined by sociologist James A. Beckford and 
by historian William A. Hutchison1 – Beckford’s 
notion of pluralism as ideology, and Hutchison’s2 
analysis of the development of religious pluralism 
in the United States through three stages: 
toleration, inclusion/belonging and participation/
cooperation. Though his analysis focuses on the 
role of the state, the historical stages described by 
Hutchison may serve as ideal for socio-historical 
analysis of implementation of religious pluralism 
in Lithuania. This chapter proceeds by providing 
a portrait of diversity and pluralism in Lithuania 
today, before situating this picture in relation to 
the history of religious pluralism implemented in 
Lithuania in the early Nineties, its historical roots 
and social consequences for contemporary society 
and minority religions. It argues that pluralism 
in Lithuania today is in a phase of toleration as 
outlined by Hutchison.
1 William R. Hutchison, Religious Pluralism in America 
(New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2003).
2 Ibid., page number? The whole book is about these types, 
I cann’t indicate the page number here.
LITHUANIA AND RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 
Historical and legal analyses provided in the 
following chapter suggest that the Lithuanian 
pattern of religious pluralism rests on three ideas. 
These are that: 1) the Roman Catholic Church 
is the most important religious community in 
the country; 2) the State is a proactive agent in 
religious life, and supports it; 3) the State, Roman 
Catholic Church and some traditional religious 
communities have an interest in maintaining the 
hierarchy of religious communities. 
Lithuania in Northern Europe is one of three 
Baltic states, bordering with Russia (Kaliningrad), 
Poland, Belarus and Latvia. The country’s 
population is around three million, comprised 
largely of ethnic Lithuanians (84.1 %). The data of 
the 2001 and 2011 censuses states that a majority 
of the Lithuania’s population belong to the 
Roman Catholic faith (77.2 %). The other largest 
denomination was Orthodox Church (4.2 %), and 
about one fifth of population (16%) did not declare 
a religious affiliation or state that they belonged 
to any religious group. These data also revealed 
that, while the population belonged to 28 religious 
communities in 2001, this number had doubled by 
2011, reaching 59 in total3.
At first glance the religious composition of 
Lithuania’s population does not appear to 
provide grounds for much discussion of religious 
pluralism, although statistics do not always give 
an exact picture of social realities. However, 
British sociologist James A. Beckford4 gives five 
indicators of religious diversity, with three of these 
being applicable to the Lithuanian case: 
3 The Data of 2011 Census of Lithuanian Population. Official 
Website of Department of Statistics of Republic of Lithu-
ania. https://osp.stat.gov.lt/documents/10180/217110/
Gyv_kalba_tikyba.pdf/1d9dac9a-3d45-4798-93f5-
941fed00503f
4 James R. Beckford, Social Theory and Religion (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 80.
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1) a high number of religious traditions and 
religious communities; 2) a high number of 
individuals who match elements of various 
religious traditions; and 3) the representation 
of world religions like Christianity, Judaism, 
and Islam. Religiously-diverse societies demand 
some kind of religious pluralism, but this in turn 
requires reflexivity. From a sociological point of 
view, Beckford states therefore that it is important 
to take account of the forces that shape the forms 
which have been taken throughout history by 
religious pluralism, as an ideological position. He 
defines religious pluralism as “a term denoting 
a normative or ideological view holding that the 
diversity of religious outlooks and collectivities 
is, within limits, beneficial and that peaceful 
coexistence between religious collectivities is 
desirable”5. 
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN LITHUANIA 
BEFORE AND AFTER WWII
Religious pluralism is becoming a political 
concern for contemporary societies dealing with 
migration and mobility trends, and also coping 
with geopolitically-determined conditions such 
as membership into international organizations 
and political and economic alliances. Lithuanian 
society is no exception. The geographical position 
of the country and its history have determined 
that diverse religious beliefs and practices have 
had to coexist in one state and its territory, be it the 
Poland-Lithuania Commonwealth, the Russian 
Empire, the First Republic of Lithuania, the Soviet 
Republic of Lithuania or the State of Lithuania 
(and European Union member). 
The legal foundations of the regulation of religious 
communities were laid during the period of the 
First Republic of Lithuania (1918-1940).
5 James R. Beckford, Social Theory, 80-81.
According to historian Regina Laukaitytė6, the 
state was an active agent in the religious life 
of Lithuania over this time. It differentiated 
religious communities, indicated which were 
“recognized” and which were eligible to receive 
certain privileges. Between 1918 and 1940, the 
state recognized eight religious communities: 
Roman Catholics, Orthodox, Old Believers, 
Evangelical Lutherans, Reformed, Jews, Muslims 
and Karaites7. This list of recognized religious 
communities was largely inherited from the 
Russian Empire but the Lithuanian state added the 
Old Believers community which was prohibited 
and persecuted under Russian rule. Salaries for 
the clergy, allowances, and loans from the state for 
prayer houses were privileges for state-recognized 
religious communities. They had army chaplains 
and were allowed to administer civil registry. This 
function delivered to religious communities also 
contributed to the partial transformation of the 
status of clergy from religious leadership to state 
office. The mainstream Roman Catholic Church 
(RCC) influenced the religious ‘field’, and its clergy 
had an impact on decisions regulating various 
aspects of the activities of religious communities8. 
During the Soviet annexation of Lithuania, 
religion was eliminated from its public life 
and the majority of religious communities 
experienced restrictions of their activities and 
nationalization of property. However, in 1990, 
after independence was declared, a new passage 
of legal acts regulating religious issues began. 
Two articles of the 1992 Constitution of the 
Republic of Lithuania addressed religion and its 
6 Regina Laukaitytė, Lietuvos religinės mažumos 
1918-1940 m. valstybės globoje. Religija ir visuomenė 
nepriklausomoje Lietuvoje (1918-1940 m.), sud. Arūnas 
Streikus, (Vilnius: Lietuvių katalikų mokslo akademija), 
243-270. 
7 Karaites are the adherents of Karaism, a form of Juda-
ism that does not accept the authority of Talmud and fol-
lows only the Torah. Karaism was brought to Poland and 
Lithuania in the 14th century.
8 Regina Laukaitytė, Religinės mažumos, 243-270.
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place in society9: Article 26 outlined freedom 
of conscience, religion, and belief; Article 43 
addressed “Church-State” relations, highlighting 
that there was no state religion and regulating the 
recognition of so-called “traditional” churches 
and religious organizations. The adoption of the 
article addressing Church-State relations had been 
preceded by complex discussions among lawyers, 
priests, and politicians about the meaning of the 
concept “traditional religious community”. In 
2007 the Constitutional Court ruled that such a 
title indicates that it has been present in Lithuania 
for more than two generations. A list of “traditional 
religious communities” was provided in the 1995 
Law on Religious Communities and Associations 
(LRCA)10. It also presented a more concrete legal 
framework for recognizing religious communities 
and identifying traditional, state-recognized 
- and other religious communities - and their 
different legal statuses. Traditional and state-
recognized religious communities were entitled 
to state subsidies, tax exemption, recognition of 
marriages, prison and hospital chaplaincy, and 
religious education in state and municipal schools. 
Today, the status of state-recognized religion 
requires that a religious organization has been 
legally registered for at least 25 years, has support 
within society, and that its teaching and practices 
are not in conflict with the law and public morals. 
In such cases the Lithuanian Parliament may 
grant the status of state-recognition based on the 
positive conclusion of the Ministry of Justice. In 
2002, this status was awarded to the Association 
of Evangelical Baptist Churches and later, in 2008, 
to the Seventh Day Adventist Church. There are 
9 Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucija. (The Constitution 
of the Republic of Lithuania). 1992. http://www3.lrs.lt/
home/Konstitucija/Constitution.htm.
10 LR religinių bendruomenių ir bendrijų įstatymas. (Law 
on Religious Communities and Associations). 1995. in 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_
id=21783. There are nine “traditional” religious com-
munities: the Roman Catholic Church, Greek Catho-
lic Church, Russian Orthodox Church, Old Believers, 
Judaism, Karaism, Sunni Islam, Evangelical Lutheran 
Church, and the Reformed Evangelical Church. 
pending applications for the Pentecostal and 
New Apostolic Church, favorably received by the 
Ministry of Justice but awaiting a decision from 
the Lithuanian Parliament. The last decade has 
been marked by various efforts to correct the 
1995 LRCA and include new requirements for 
the status of state recognition, i.e. to increase it 
from 25 to 50 years according to the decision of 
the Constitutional Court11. Nevertheless, despite 
these efforts, such corrections have not reached 
Parliament and the LRCA has not been changed.
After the ratification in 2000 of three international 
agreements between the Holy See and the Republic 
of Lithuania, the place and role of Roman Catholic 
Church (RCC) was actually strengthened and, 
while the Lithuanian Constitution enables the 
state to have agreements with other traditional 
religious communities, this has never actually 
happened. Public discussions have been held 
regarding how to implement these agreements in 
law and in the relationship between the state and 
other religious communities. Between 2005 and 
2008, these discussions were mostly initiated by 
traditional religious communities which sought to 
ensure their special status in the Lithuanian society 
by strengthening it through the agreements with 
the state following the example of agreements 
between the Holy See and the Republic of 
Lithuania. While these efforts were not successful, 
they drew attention to the idiosyncratic position 
of the RCC in Lithuania.  
To sum up, the type of religious pluralism adopted 
by the state in Lithuania in the early Nineties 
was a hierarchical one: the RCC enjoys a special 
position due to the fact that the majority of the 
population identifies as members, and because 
of the sociopolitical power it gained during the 
Soviet era when it was underground, becoming 
11 Glodenis, Donatas, “Administrative and Financial Mat-
ters in the Area of Religious Freedom and Religious 
Communities: Case of Lithuania” in Legal Aspects of 
Religious Freedom, ed. Drago Cepar (Ljubljana: Office of 
the Government of the Republic of Slovenia for Religious 
Communities, 2008), 392-408.
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again an important agent in public life after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. The type of religious 
pluralism that was implemented in Lithuania’s 
legal system, therefore, maintained the historic 
patterns of religious community differentiation 
that existed during the period of the First Republic 
and was inherited from the Russian Empire. 
According to historical research, the politicians 
of both Republics did not question the idea of 
differentiating religious communities along these 
lines and in many cases evaded questions about 
religion altogether, often forwarding them to the 
RCC and its clergy. 
LIMITATIONS OF CONTEMPORARY 
LITHUANIAN PLURALISM 
In the following section, I present two sets of 
empirical data that provide insights into the 
consequences of this particular form of religious 
pluralism for Lithuanian society and particularly 
for minority religions12. 
Firstly, qualitative research conducted among 
members of minority religions in 2007, 2009 
and 2014 reveals that members are stigmatized 
through being labeled ‘sectarian’ and their 
religious organizations labeled as ‘sects’13. In 
public discourse, the terms ‘sect’ and ‘sectarian’ 
are equivalent to the ‘non-traditional religious 
communities’ status. This research also shows that 
minority religions are marginalized, even those 
that enjoy state recognition. This is due to their 
exclusion from the working groups involved in 
consultations about the renewal of laws on religion 
and the adoption of the notions of international 
agreements between the Republic of Lithuania 
and the Holy See. 
12 By the term “minority religions”, I refer to the so-called 
non-traditional religious communities that are not 
included in the list of traditional religious communities 
in 1995 LRCA.
13 Ališauskienė, Milda. (sud.) Religinių mažumų lygių 
galimybių užtikrinimas Lietuvoje: problemos ir rekomen-
dacijos. (Vilnius: Naujųjų religijų tyrimų ir informacijos 
centras, 2014).
Secondly, in 2012 the Lithuanian minority religions 
survey (N=362) showed the sources associated 
with religious discrimination in the country14. The 
first source of religious discrimination described 
by respondents in this research was the Roman 
Catholic Church (52%). The second was mass 
media (43%) while the third was the law (32%). 
These answers show that respondents were critical 
to the state pattern of religious pluralism and the 
role of RCC within it. 
Despite these phases of transition, religious 
pluralism in Lithuania is closest to the first stage 
of religious pluralism described by Hutchison 
– toleration. Very few religious communities in 
the country benefit from this type of religious 
pluralism – only those identified in the list of 
traditional religious communities. Moreover, 
the common interest of the state and RCC in 
maintaining the form of hierarchical pluralism 
does not suggest that the situation will change in 
the near future at macro level. However, it is also 
possible that the changing society and its attitudes 
to different religious beliefs and practices might 
create more favorable conditions for religious 
minorities to exist at the individual level.
14 Ališauskienė, Milda, Glodenis, Donatas. Iššūkiai religi-
nei įvairovei Lietuvoje: religinių mažumų perspektyva. 
Mokslo studija. (Vilnius: Naujųjų religijų tyrimų ir 
informacijos centras, 2013).
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CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this paper was to analyze the form of 
religious pluralism that has arisen in contemporary 
Lithuania and its impact on society and minority 
religions in particular. The empirical data 
presented here show that the form implemented 
in the early Nineties is imbalanced and influences 
public attitudes towards minority religions. These 
groups feel that they are discriminated against as 
a result of the influence of the Roman Catholic 
Church and laws that have created hierarchical 
religious pluralism. 
The analysis of religious pluralism in Lithuania 
reveals the difficulties encountered by some post-
socialist societies in which so-called “national 
churches” had, and continue to have, sociopolitical 
power in public life. Such power was acquired by 
the binding relationship between state and church 
that is considered part of national identity and 
politics. This continuous binding relationship 
inhibits the implementation of religious pluralism 
in general, and raises questions about what it 
should be and who should profit from it: every 
religious community or only some?
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RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AND 
LIVED RELIGION: 
AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVE
AGNIESZKA PASIEKA
Recent scholarship on religion has increasingly 
engaged with the issue of religious pluralism, 
and in so doing it has moved beyond the mere 
acknowledgement of religious pluralism as 
a particular feature of modern society to a 
recognition that “religious pluralism is the 
normal condition in which religious subjectivities 
are formed”1. Numerous social scientists, 
anthropologists among them2, have demonstrated 
1 Das, Veena, “Cohabiting an Interreligious Milieu: 
Reflections on Religious Diversity”. A Companion to the 
Anthropology of Religion, ed. Janice Boddy and Michael 
Lambek (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 82.
2 In classical anthropological writings, the discussion 
on pluralism served the purpose of developing analyti-
cal tools for the study of “plural societies”. In his semi-
nal study, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative 
Study of Burma and Netherlands India, John Sydenham 
Furnivall proposed (1948:305) to distinguish “societies 
with plural features” from “plural societies”, the former 
being characterized by a mixed population and a com-
mon tradition (such as the US or Canada), while the lat-
ter refer to colonial and postcolonial societies (in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America), which were the objects of 
anthropological inquiry at the time. The label of “plural 
society” was thus applied by anthropologists who stud-
ied societies characterized by different forms of insti-
tutionalized inequalities between ethnic, religious and/
or racial groups (see Furnivall, 1948); Kuper and Smith 
1969; van den Berghe 1973). The plural society theory 
was later overtaken by theories of cultural pluralism, 
promoting the idea that cultural differences among peo-
ple should be respected by a legal order which assures 
them equal rights within a society. In recent decades, 
anthropological studies of cultural, ethnic and religious 
diversity – which tend to be closely interrelated - have 
reached for different terminology while discussing plu-
ralism. Steven Vertovec’s (1999) call for a contemporary 
“anthropology of cultural complexity” suggests anthro-
pologists’ engagement with the ideas of “new pluralism”, 
“multiculturalism”, “the politics of difference” and “the 
politics of recognition”, and thus a closer dialogue with 
other disciplines.  
that comparative research enables us to look 
at present day phenomena in a longer and 
broader – cross-temporal and cross-cultural – 
perspective and interrogate what we perceive as 
“new” or “specific.” Simultaneously, initiatives 
and programs that highlight the importance of 
endorsing and committing ourselves to pluralism 
have been flourishing. However, while such a 
commitment is often considered admirable and 
desirable, the extent to which the dominant 
doctrines and programs of pluralism help to 
achieve this goal is less certain. Many studies of 
pluralism carry with them – intentionally or not – 
normative assumptions: they approach pluralism 
as a widely recognized social ideal, a communal 
goal, and even as synonymous with “non-
conflictual relations”. Relatedly, scholars have 
pointed out ambiguities inscribed into discourses 
surrounding religious pluralism, such as, the ways 
in which religious pluralism may also constitute 
a threat to liberalism, even while being seen as an 
achievement of liberal thought3.
This paper also contributes to this discussion by 
identifying yet another ambiguity in the concept of 
pluralism: namely, the manner in which pluralism 
tends to encompass certain hierarchical relations 
around ideas of normalness. In discussing this 
problem, I also aim to interrogate the following 
question: what is special about religion and how 
does religion make pluralism special? In order to 
address these queries, I present some of the findings 
of my year-long ethnographic study, undertaken 
in a multi-religious community in rural Southern 
Poland between 2008 and 20094. What I hope 
to convey is the importance of people’s own 
conceptualizations and experiences of religious 
pluralism, the scrutiny of which invites us to go 
back to the theory and revisit the concepts we use. 
3 Klassen, Pamela and Courtney Bender, “Habits of Plu-
ralism”. In: After Pluralism, Courtney Bender and 
Pamela Klassen (eds.), New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1-28, 2010.
4 Pasieka, Agnieszka, Hierarchy and Pluralism. Living 
Religious Difference in Catholic Poland. (New York: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2015).
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Such an approach lies at the heart of numerous 
anthropological contributions which emphasize 
the importance of “pluralism from below”5 and 
“theorizing not about pluralism, but theorizing 
from it”6. 
PLURALITY IN POLAND?
Foregrounding these discussions, we must ask: 
is it possible to study pluralism in a country 
like Poland? A by and large exceptionally 
homogenous country, roughly 95% of its citizens 
define themselves as Catholics and 97% as ethnic 
Poles. Moreover, due to the fact that around 40% 
of Church members regularly attend religious 
services, Poland’s ethno-religious landscape tends 
to be described as special or even unique in the 
European context. Textbooks on the sociology of 
religion tend to associate Poland” with notions 
such as “confessional nationalism,” “Catholic 
nation,” “close church and state relations”. To 
many, “secularization in Poland” sounds like an 
oxymoron, as does the idea of “religious pluralism 
in Poland”7. While it would be difficult to claim 
that Poland is a highly diverse country, it is 
however important to bear in mind that notions 
like “pluralism”, “secular” or “religion” can be 
variably understood. Pluralism not only refers to 
interreligious relations but also to internal plurality 
5 abian, Johannes, “Religious pluralism: An ethnographic 
approach”, In: Theoretical explorations in African reli-
gion, ed. Wim van Binsbergen and Matthew Schoff-
eleers, (London: KPI, 1985).
6 Peletz, Michael, Gender pluralism: Southeast Asia since 
early modern times (London: Routledge, 2009). See also 
Gold, Ann Grodzins, “Sweetness and light: the bright 
side of pluralism in Rajasthan town” In Religious plural-
ism, state and society in Asia, ed. Clara Formichi (Lon-
don: Routledge, 2002). 
7 This is not only due to the perception of the Catholic 
Church’s position as an obstacle to diversity but also 
due to the propensity to link decreasing religious vital-
ity with pluralism; for a critique, see Chaves and Gorski 
2001.
within groups and even within individuals8; 
secularization processes may differ dramatically 
on macro, meso and micro levels9; and the very 
idea of religion carries so many different meanings 
and functions that taking religious attendance 
and self-classification to be the only proofs of its 
relevance in a society offers only a partial picture. 
As Josè Casanova10 observes, there still exists a 
tendency to essentialize not only “‘the religious,’ 
but also ‘the secular’ or ‘the political,’ based on 
problematic assumptions of what ‘religion’ is or 
does”.
Against this background, I strive through my 
research to demonstrate that we can better 
understand pluralism if we examine how it is 
actually lived and experienced within a context 
that scholars have until now for the most part 
ignored: a society that is largely homogeneous. 
PLURALISM IN PRACTICE
This study was carried out in a rural district 
inhabited by seven religious communities: 
Roman Catholicism, Greek Catholicism, Eastern 
Orthodoxy, Seven Day Adventism, Pentecostalism, 
Jehovah Witnesses, and Buddhism. Even though 
Roman Catholics are a dominant group (75% 
of the population) and some communities have 
only a handful of adherents, religious diversity is 
strongly emphasized by inhabitants of the district 
and experienced on an everyday basis through 
interactions among neighbors, coworkers, and 
schoolmates. Inhabitants support each other in 
farming, cooperate in local councils, and socialize 
around visits to the village shop. On Saturday or 
8 Lamine, Anne-Sophie, “Singular pluralities: a critical 
review of religious pluralism”, Religion and Society 4 
(2013).
9 Dobbelaere, Karel. Secularization: an analysis at three 
levels (Bruxelles: PIE Lang, 2002)
10 Casanova, Josè, “The secular and secularisms,” Social 
compass 76 (2009).
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Sunday they head to different religious shrines 
and, on the occasion of one community’s religious 
festivities, they refrain from work in the field since, 
as they like to say, “neighbors deserve to celebrate 
in peace”. On the one hand, villagers describe local 
diversity as something special, as a feature that 
makes their community different from the rest of 
Poland. On the other, they are likely to say that a 
peaceful and respectful coexistence is something 
obvious and normal as they are an open-minded, 
civic community. Similarly, while they tend 
to claim respect for the religious traditions of 
their neighbors and friends, they are also likely 
to highlight that they respect their co-villagers 
because they’re good folks, good neighbors, good 
friends, and that their religious belonging comes 
second. Hence, a foundation of local interreligious 
sociability may be simply described as their ability 
to cooperate and establish relationships and 
friendships without denying religious difference. 
However, I also observed a myriad of situations 
in which local religious pluralism was contested 
and in which good relations between neighbors 
and friends were put to the test. I saw “good 
neighbors,” “Orthodox friends” and “dear 
Pentecostal fellows” transform into enemies 
overnight. Such situations usually, but not always, 
involved conflicts and debates among the Roman 
Catholic majority and minority communities. 
They could be characterized as the Catholic 
majority’s efforts to set the limits of pluralism by 
reasserting their dominance and setting the rules, 
and minority communities’ attempts to negotiate 
their rights and demand equal treatment – to 
transgress the taken-for-granted order of things 
which establishes the connection between being 
Polish and being Catholic as something “normal”. 
Local disputes that I observed centered around the 
minority rights to be visible in the public sphere 
during religious celebrations, to offer children 
more than Roman Catholic religious classes in the 
school curriculum, and to call attention to the fact 
that, as one of my Orthodox informants put it, “it 
is our country, too”.  
CONTESTING PLURALISM
In light of the above, it seems important to ask once 
again: can we actually talk about “pluralism” here 
– pluralism which I understand, following Michael 
Peletz11, “as diversity accorded legitimacy”? 
In order to answer this, it is necessary to probe 
deeper into how local people actually understand 
and define ‘pluralism’. 
When talking to me, locals frequently drew on the 
notion of “ecumenism.” They used this notion to 
refer to the multiplicity of religions and (desired) 
attitudes towards diversity. The villagers adopted 
the term for their own use, transforming it into 
a polyvalent concept denoting the different 
experiences of “living together”. Depending on the 
speaker’s assessment of interreligious relations, 
the term can be invoked proudly, affirmatively, 
bitterly, critically, or even cynically. The point is 
not that some people view ecumenism positively 
and others negatively, or that some place hope in 
it while others are completely disillusioned. In the 
local understanding, ecumenism – or pluralism – 
is not good or bad, but both. And this recognition 
of pluralism’s multivocality is precisely what 
permits the local community to carry on. 
These observations led me to develop the concept 
of “hierarchical pluralism”. Drawing on the 
scholarship of Pierre Bourdieu12, Louis Dumont13 
and Edmund Leach14, I define it as a changeable 
configuration of social relations that allows and 
acknowledges diversity while at the same time 
making clear which ethnic and/or religious 
group is dominant. I argue that the foundation 
11 Peletz, Michael, Gender pluralism, 2009. 
12 Bourdieu, Pierre, Outline of a theory of practice (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); The logic 
of practice (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 
1992).
13 Dumont, Louis, Homo hierarchicus (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1980); Essays on individualism (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).
14 For a more detailed discussion on respective theories 
in relation to the idea of “hierarchical pluralism”, see 
Pasieka, Hierarchy and Pluralism (2015).
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of hierarchical pluralism is the “normalcy” 
and taken-for-grantedness of the idea of “Pole-
Catholic” – which constitutes a “doxa”15. This 
doxa is promoted and reinforced by different 
state and Church policies, and at once deeply 
internalized and referred to by minority groups. 
In introducing this notion, I highlight a situation 
in which declared equality serves to mask factual 
inequality. Yet, it is not the perpetuation of uneven 
relations that is most important here; rather, I 
find it crucial to emphasize that pluralism thus 
conceived is characterized by a constant tension 
between the opposing poles of pluralism and of 
hierarchy, between those practices and discourses 
which emphasize equal rights of different 
religious confessions and those which reinforce 
the majority’s dominance. 
And the dynamic configuration of pluralism does not 
mean that “hierarchical pluralism” is exclusively a 
product of relations between the Roman Catholic 
majority and minority communities. Religious 
minorities who inhabit the district no doubt see 
their position as precarious. In criticizing the 
dominant group, each minority expresses certainty 
that it would do better as a majority: the Orthodox 
claim that they would show the importance of the 
Christian message, Adventists suggest that they 
would pray for politicians rather than putting 
pressure on them, and Buddhists aver that they 
would ensure the power of human reason. Most 
importantly, however, the communities which 
demand recognition for themselves do not always 
grant it to others. In expressing their views on 
other religious communities, minorities also 
tend to “set the limits” of interreligious dialogue, 
defining some “religious others” as non-desirable 
actors in local religious landscapes, questioning 
15 Pierre Bourdieu defines (1977:167) “doxa” as a taken-for-
granted view of the world which makes the social order 
self-evident so that it “goes without saying because it 
comes without saying”. According to Bourdieu, “doxa” 
does not only make the social order appear natural, but 
also provides people with an understanding of what is 
proper for their position.
not only their dogmas or practices, but also 
their existence. In doing so, they reach for the 
vocabulary of the dominant discourse, unwittingly 
reproducing it and asserting hierarchies. They too 
establish what kind of interreligious relations are 
to be considered normal or reasonable and who 
can be accommodated within their vision of 
religious pluralism. Such considerations invite us 
to move beyond the recognition of the “special” 
Polish-Catholic case and reflect on the emergent 
properties of theirs being a dominant religion.
IS RELIGION SPECIAL?
This brings us back to the initial question: what is 
special about religion and how does religion make 
pluralism special? Would hierarchical pluralism 
be as powerful if its foundation was not religious 
but, say, economic or ethnic? Scholarly opinions 
on the uniqueness of religious pluralism vary; 
while some claim that it is “the most evocative 
of issues and provocative of conflicts” among 
different kinds of pluralism16; others warn against 
simplistic assumptions of this sort17, arguing 
that what tends to be described as “religious 
conflict” often has much more complicated 
causes. Reducing people merely to their religious 
affiliations does not do justice to the complexity of 
individual identities – as believers, coworkers, fans 
of the same football team – but it is also important 
to see how religion subtly, often unconsciously, 
shapes interactions both inside and outside 
explicitly religious contexts. My study of the multi-
religious community demonstrates that in order 
to understand the paradoxes and contradictions 
inscribed into the practice of pluralism, it is 
essential to consider the manifold ways in which 
people live religion, what they do with religious 
idioms and practices in their everyday life. They 
may use religion as a source of moral inspiration, 
16 Marty, Martin, “Pluralisms”, The ANNALS of the Ameri-
can Academy of Political and Social Science 612 (2007).
17 Casanova, “The secular and secularisms”, 2009.
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a marker of difference, a means of sociability, a 
basis for collective action, an element of tradition, 
or an expression of national identity – and 
these different usages sometimes challenge and 
sometimes reinforce the hierarchical component 
of pluralism. I thus contend that it is a focus on 
lived religious experiences that enables us to 
comprehend the ambiguous nature of religious 
pluralism and opens new vistas onto religion’s 
individual, social, and cultural meanings. 
To conclude, local engagements with and local ways 
of conceptualizing – and actually constructing 
– pluralism allow us to identify three aspects 
of scholarly approaches to religious pluralism 
that, I think, must be further problematized. 
Idealization refers to a tendency to idealize 
pluralism, in both present-day circumstances and 
historical contexts – a tendency that obscures 
pragmatic reasons behind pursuing pluralism as 
well as the acceptance of its good and bad sides 
as a foundation of pluralism, and which leads 
scholars to overlook the ways that it can reinforce 
hierarchies. The second problem is naturalization, 
by which I mean those effects of the discourse of 
pluralism that establish what kind of religious 
encounters and religious dialogue are perceived 
as desirable, meaningful, normal, and even what 
counts as religion or religious. Consequently, such 
a discourse may perform exclusion, reify the very 
religious difference that pluralism is supposed to 
engage18, and foster a process of “othering” under 
the label of pluralism19. 
18 Klassen and Bender, “Habits of Pluralism”, 2010.
19 Masuzawa, Tomoko. 
And finally, in identifying a third aspect of 
pluralism in essentialization, I wish to call the 
attention of scholars to different ways in which 
religion shapes people’s lives and in which it is 
used by them. I believe that such an approach – a 
careful scrutiny of what “religion may be and may 
do”, rather than what “religion is and does” – is a 
condition of a serious engagement with the idea of 
religious pluralism and may lead us to discovering 
“pluralism” and “pluralistic worldviews” even in 
those places that supposedly lack them.
The work on the article was possible thanks to 
the grant of the National Science Centre (Poland) 
(DEC-2012/04/S/HS3/00370). Fieldwork research 
on which the article is based was co-financed by 
the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology 
and Volkswagen Foundation.
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TWO USES OF “LAICIDAD”
SEBASTIÁN RUDAS 
Contemporary debates about secularism are 
largely focused on what scholars have called the 
fact of pluralism that characterizes contemporary 
western societies. Unsurprisingly, the proposals 
that have been derived from these debates (e.g. 
the liberal pluralist conception of secularism) 
are intended to address the challenges posed 
by pluralistic societies to the advancement of 
liberal and democratic ideals. For instance, 
several attempts to define a workable conception 
of secularism emphasize that its normative 
requirements are not hostile towards pluralism, in 
particular towards religious pluralism. This trend 
is apparent in the 2005 Déclaration Universelle sur 
la Laïcité au XXIe Siècle1, presented to the French 
senate by professors Jean Baubérot (France), 
Micheline Milot (Canada), and Roberto Blancarte 
(Mexico) on the occasion of the celebration of the 
centenary of the French Law of Separation. As the 
authors explain, one of the purposes of writing a 
“universal declaration” was to demystify French 
exceptionalism about laïcité and to make of it a 
concept that mirrors the liberal and democratic 
stand towards pluralism. By emphasizing its 
focus on freedom of conscience, pluralism, 
functional church-state separation, and the idea 
of reasonable accommodations as an effective tool 
for non-discrimination, the Declaration presents 
secularism as a political concept identical in its 
normative content to contemporary dominant 
versions of liberal pluralism. 
1  Jean Baubérot, Roberto Blancarte and Micheline Milot, 
“Déclaration universelle sur la laïcité au XXIe siècle”, 
Le Monde, September 12, 2005, http://www.lemonde.fr/
idees/article_interactif/2005/12/09/declaration-univer-
selle-sur-la-laicite-au-xxie-siecle_718769_3232
 html. Henceforth the Declaration. 
By focusing on the Latin American context, in 
this chapter I present an argument against the 
universalistic character that the Declaration 
attributes to the notion of secularism2. I identify 
two political uses of the value of secularism and 
show that one is not captured by the Declaration. 
The first can be identified with the mainstream 
liberal democratic approach to secularism 
and finds no principled incompatibility with 
influential public religions. The second insists on 
the requirement to reduce the role of religion—
particularly the Catholic Church—within the 
political-public sphere. I argue that the latter is 
“anticlerical” or “confrontational” and that it is not 
only compatible with liberalism and democracy, 
but that is presented as a defense of liberal and 
democratic values3. For instance, that it is used as 
a mechanism to advance protections of pluralism, 
particularly of social groups that do not conform 
to the dominant public morality. In other words, I 
argue that the latter is a legitimate (i.e. compatible 
with the values of liberal and democratic regimes) 
use of secularism.
2 I will use “laicidad” when referring explicitly to the 
Latin American context. Otherwise, I will use the Eng-
lish word “secularism.”
3 For arguments similar to the one I am presenting, see 
Faviola Rivera, Laicidad y Liberalismo, Colección de 
Cuadernos Jorge Carpizo. Para Entender y Pensar la Lai-
cidad 3 (Mexico D.F.: IIJ - UNAM, 2013); Julieta Lemai-
tre, “Anticlericales de Nuevo. La Iglesia Católica Como 
un Actor Político Ilegítimo en Materia de Sexualidad y 
Reproducción en América Latina”, in Derecho y Sexuali-
dades (Buenos Aires: SELA, 2010).
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THE UNIVERSAL (LIBERAL AND 
DEMOCRATIC) DEFINITION OF 
SECULARISM 
The authors of the Declaration emphasize their 
effort to disentangle the common association of 
secularism from the French republican experience 
of church-state separation and the hostility 
towards religion that is usually attached to French 
laïcité. They consider that secularism is not a 
French invention, as it is sometimes believed, and 
that an adequate definition of this notion need not 
be grounded on the particular features (especially 
its religious hostility) developed within the French 
tradition of political thought4. 
Roberto Blancarte, one of the authors of the 
Declaration, argues that it is important to clarify 
that secularism cannot, and should not, be 
considered equivalent to church-state separation5. 
There are political regimes that maintain the 
religious establishment, such as Denmark and the 
United Kingdom, yet are highly secular. Conversely, 
there are political regimes that explicitly stipulate 
church-state separation but use secularism as an 
ideology that betrays its own purposes (e.g. some 
interpretations of French laïcité). Furthermore, 
there are religious hierarchies that are politically 
influential despite the formal regime of separation, 
such as Mexico. An identification of secularism 
with church-state separation would be misguiding 
at the point in time of analyzing these three sorts 
of contexts. Alternatively, Blancarte proposes to 
understand secularism as a process whereby the 
4 Roberto Blancarte, “Laicidad: La Construcción de Un 
Concepto Universal”, in Laicidad: Una Asignatura Pen-
diente, ed. Rodolfo Vázquez (Mexico D.F.: Ediciones 
Coyoacán, 2007), 29.
5 This is indeed commonplace among contemporary theo-
rists of secularism, see Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Tay-
lor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience, trans. Jane 
Marie Todd (Harvard University Press, 2011); Charles 
Taylor, “Why We Need a Radical Redefinition of Secu-
larism?”, in The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere, 
ed. Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan VanAntwerpen, 
2011, 34–59.
sources of the legitimacy of political power are 
not found (anymore) in religious organizations, 
but in popular sovereignty. For him, therefore, 
democratic regimes are necessarily secular6.
In addition to the link with democracy, the 
Declaration is explicit in its intention to 
highlight its commitment to liberalism. The 
three fundamental principles of the Declaration 
emphasize the acknowledgment of moral and 
religious pluralism and the consequent need 
for respecting freedom of conscience on equal 
grounds. In what seems a clear reference to 
the Canadian version of secularism, Article 3 
of the Declaration proposes the mechanism of 
“reasonable accommodations” as an effective tool 
for guaranteeing non-discrimination7. 
By associating secularism with the notions 
of popular sovereignty, the ideal of non-
discrimination, and respect of freedom of 
conscience, the Declaration grounds the field for 
a genuinely liberal and democratic understanding 
of this political notion. As a strategy to obtain 
the support of skeptics of secularism, both on 
the secularist and religious sides, this is a smart 
move. However, it does not do justice to some 
legitimate - e.g. liberal and democratic - uses 
of the notion of secularism in certain contexts. 
6 Roberto Blancarte, “Definir La Laicidad (Desde Una Per-
spectiva Mexicana)”, Revista Internacional de Filosofía 
Política 24 (2004): 15–16. By the same author, see Lai-
cidad en México. La construcción de la República Laica 
en México, Colección de Cuadernos “Jorge Carpizo” 
Para entender y pensar la laicidad 31 (Mexico D.F.: IIJ-
UNAM, 2013); Los retos de la laicidad y la secularización 
en el mundo contemporáneo (El Colegio de Mexico AC, 
2008); “El por qué de un Estado Laico”, in Los Retos de 
La Laicidad y de La Secularización en el Mundo Contem-
poráneo, ed. Roberto Blancarte (Mexico D.F.: El Colegio 
de México, 2008), 29–46. 
7 For the Canadian version of secularism, see Maclure and 
Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience; Micheline 
Milot, “The Secular State in Quebec: Configuration and 
Debates”, Diversité canadienne/Canadian Diversity 10, 
no. 1 (2013): 39–43; Micheline Milot, Laïcité dans le nou-
veau monde: Le cas du Québec (Brepols, 2002).
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM: A Resource Book48
In what follows, I will identify two legitimate 
uses of the notion of secularism found in the 
Colombian context - although they can be found 
in most Latin American contexts and perhaps in 
several European ones. I will show that while the 
Declaration captures the first, “religious friendly 
use” -, it overlooks the second, “confrontational 
use”.    
ON THE POLITICAL USES OF LAICIDAD 
a) Religious friendly use 
As in several other Latin American countries, 
Colombia has implemented a system of laicidad 
inspired by liberal and democratic values. The 
1991 Constitution is motivated by an explicit 
commitment to respecting pluralism, which led 
to the conclusion of the concordat between the 
state and the Vatican and, importantly, to the 
disestablishment of the Catholic Church8. 
Laicidad is became a political value to which 
citizens can appeal in order to advance their 
claims with relation to freedom of conscience and 
equal respect. In matters of religious pluralism, 
laicidad in Colombia implies that no organized 
religion is entitled to receive privileged treatment. 
As it turns out, religious minorities (most of them 
non-Catholic Christians) have found in laicidad 
an effective political value for protecting and 
advancing their interests. Their rationale has been 
the following: laicidad implies no-discrimination 
of any religion; the Catholic Church enjoys a 
set of legitimate privileges (e.g. tax and judicial 
exceptions); therefore, not recognizing a similar 
set of privileges to religious minorities constitutes 
8 For an account of the recent history of relations between 
the Colombian state and the Catholic Church, see 
Ricardo Arias, El Episcopado Colombiano. Intransigen-
cia y Laicidad (1850-2000) (Bogota: CESO-Ediciones 
Uniandes-ICANH, 2003); Ricardo Arias, “El Difícil 
Camino Hacia La Laicidad: La Reforma Religiosa de 
1991 Y El Episcopado Colombiano”, in Utopía Para Los 
Excluídos: El Multiculturalismo En África y América 
Latina, ed. Jaime Arocha (Bogota: Unibiblos - National 
University of Colombia, 2004), 319–45. 
a case of discrimination. The Colombian 
Constitutional Court has accepted this rationale 
and has ruled in support of the claims of religious 
minorities9. 
Since 1991, the system of laicidad in Colombia has 
become one of evenhandedness towards religion. 
This is apparent at the level of public education. 
For instance, in 1997, a governmental decree based 
on the principle of religious freedom—known 
by the public as the “evangelical concordat”—
acknowledged the right to all recognized 
Christian churches to provide, upon demand, 
religious assistance in state offices, including 
public schools10. Accordingly, nineteen recognized 
Christian churches joined the Catholic Church 
as recipients of the right to provide religious 
education in public schools if requested by the 
school community. In order to protect freedom of 
conscience within the school, children cannot be 
obliged to take religion course.
This use of laicidad has been useful to the claims 
of religious minorities who have sought the 
protection of their rights to freedom of conscience 
and free exercise of religious practice and 
conviction. Religious minorities have advanced 
their claims, arguing that they are entitled to 
protection of these rights on equal grounds, which 
in Colombia means on conditions of equality with 
regards to the Catholic Church. 
b) Confrontational use 
The implementation of a regime of laicidad inspired 
by liberal pluralism has brought positive outcomes 
in promoting pluralism in Colombia. In particular, 
it has had a manifest impact in fostering religious 
pluralism. Such implementation, however, faces a 
challenge that is unlikely to appear elsewhere and 
9 For an account of several of the cases decided by the 
Colombian Constitutional Court regarding freedom of 
religion, see Leonardo García, Laicidad y Justicia Con-
stitucional, Colección de Cuadernos Jorge Carpizo. Para 
Entender y Pensar la Laicidad 33 (Mexico D.F.: Instituto 
de Investigaciones Jurídicas - UNAM, 2013).
10  Arias, El Episcopado Colombiano, 346–347.
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is not accounted for by the liberal and democratic 
inspiration of the Declaration. 
The Declaration is silent about what is the 
most adequate institutional arrangement for 
guaranteeing the conditions upon which pluralism 
can flourish in contexts like the Latin American 
one. It seems to take for granted that the ‘fact of 
pluralism’ invariably appears everywhere and that 
the terms for an overlapping consensus have been 
settled uniformly in all liberal democracies11. The 
Declaration assumes that the social landscape 
to which secularism responds nowadays is 
homogenous everywhere and therefore its 
normative derivations can be translated into the 
terminology of a liberal democratic rule that is 
focused on dealing with the challenges posed by 
pluralism.
The Declaration’s diagnosis overlooks that one 
challenge for the secular state is the fact that the 
Catholic Church is socially influential, politically 
active, and reluctant to embrace the consequences 
of living in a liberal democracy. As a consequence, 
it is unwilling to renounce the remaining privi-
leges inherited from past confessionalism. In these 
contexts, secularism has been used as a political 
value that confronts the dominant church. The 
Declaration seems to assume that such reluctance 
is consigned to the past and therefore that a sound 
conception of secularism must be built under 
the assumption that the Catholic Church, and 
perhaps most churches in western societies with 
a similar history, has effectively internalized the 
requirements derived from being part of liberal 
and democratic regimes. Considering the context 
in which it was first socialized, the message of the 
Declaration seems to be that any confrontational 
dimension of French laïcité must be abandoned, 
for in contemporary France there is no longer a 
11 Faviola Rivera, “Laicidad y pluralismo”, Isonomía: 
Revista de teoría y filosofía del derecho, no. 33 (2010): 
35–64.
dominant organized religion that threatens to 
destabilize the republic12. 
One famous expression of the confrontational 
interpretation of secularism is the enlightened 
critique of religion embedded in its republican 
version. At different periods of time, this interpre-
tation has been implemented in different contexts, 
for instance in France, Mexico, or Uruguay13. As 
shown above, it is against this interpretation of 
secularism that the Declaration reacts. However, 
in several countries where the Catholic Church 
is majoritarian and dominant there is a differ-
ent confrontational use of secularism because it 
appeals to liberal and democratic values that aim 
at fostering the interests of women, sexual minori-
ties, and advocates of sexual and reproductive 
rights. 
Many social groups, both religious and non-reli-
gious, might be as conservative as the Catholic 
Church is today when it comes to women and 
LGBT rights. The confrontational use of secular-
ism that I have been describing appears as a strat-
egy to reduce the political power of a dominant 
religious institution that takes advantage of its 
historically-privileged position to interfere with 
state recognition of equal rights to women and the 
LGBT population. Minority conservative religious 
groups do not give rise to a confrontational use of 
secularism because they do not constitute a politi-
cal force that is able to interfere with state recog-
nition of equal rights to women and LGBT. Con-
sequently, although different social groups might 
hold similar conservative views regarding sexual 
and reproductive rights, the confrontational use 
of secularism appears in contexts where a domi-
nant religious institution uses its political power 
12 Islam is usually said to have taken such place. However, 
the reasons explaining why this is a misleading claim are 
beyond the scope of this chapter. 
13 Néstor Da Costa, “La laicidad uruguaya”, Archives de 
sciences sociales des religions, no. 146 (June 1, 2009), 
doi:10.4000/assr.21270.
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to interfere with the recognition of expressions of 
pluralism that are at odds with its moral doctrine. 
The defense of women’s right to abortion and 
gay rights to equal access to the institution of 
the family have incorporated laicidad into their 
political discourse. They use the notion as a 
political value, that is, as a value that refers to a 
foundational aspect of the republic. Similar to 
religious minorities, they request from the state a 
genuine commitment to laicidad. However, they 
do not use this value as a mechanism to gain access 
to privileges such as tax exceptions or special 
facilities in public buildings. They do not use 
laicidad as a mechanism to gain state recognition 
in the public sphere. Instead, their use of it is 
confrontational –or “anticlerical”—because they 
identify organized religions, and particularly the 
Catholic Church, as the main obstacle to seeing 
their requests recognized14. Their anticlericalism 
consists of requesting that the Catholic Church 
does not interfere with the state’s recognition of 
pluralism. Therefore, they request that the public-
14 Julieta Lemaitre provides a detailed description of the 
Catholic Church’s strategy to defend its moral view on 
these issues in the United States, Mexico, and Colombia. 
Interestingly, she shows that it has adopted the require-
ments of liberalism (e.g. public reason requirements) in 
advocating its view in politics at the same time as tak-
ing advantage of its position within state institutions in 
order to be effective in its political activism, see Lemaitre, 
“By Reason Alone: Catholicism, Constitutions, and Sex 
in the Americas”, International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 10, no. 2 (March 30, 2012): 493–511, doi:10.1093/
icon/mor060.lay Catholic lawyers have translated theol-
ogy into constitutional and human rights arguments to 
halt and reverse liberal abortion and same-sex marriage 
laws. Their arguments invoke reason instead of faith, 
based on the claim that the right use of reason in legal 
arguments leads to the same conclusions as theological 
reasoning. This article examines the main arguments 
recently used by lay Catholic lawyers in the United States, 
Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil and relates them back to 
the Vatican’s position on human life, religious freedom, 
and gender equality. This article examines these paral-
lels, their implicit theological basis, as well as their ten-
sions, both rhetorical and substantive, with mainstream 
constitutionalism. →
political sphere to remain independent from 
undue interference from organized religions15. 
Confrontational secularism emphasizes that 
evenhandedness towards religion is not enough to 
guarantee equal recognition of all. The Catholic 
Church still enjoys privileges inherited by past 
confessionalism which allows it to protect its moral 
doctrine and impose it as the public morality of 
society. Under the regime of secularism defined 
by the Declaration, recognition of expressions of 
non-religious (moral) pluralism is hindered by 
the dominant public morality—as defined by a 
dominant Catholic Church. As a consequence, 
marginalization of social groups that do not 
conform to the dominant public morality remains 
unaddressed. The confrontational use of laicidad, 
in contrast, seeks recognition of these groups 
by defending the view that the dominant power 
of the Catholic Church needs to be reduced as a 
means to guarantee real equal recognition16. 
 ”,”DOI”:”10.1093/icon/mor060”,”ISSN”:”1474-2640, 
1474-2659”,”shortTitle”:”By reason alone”,”
 journal Abbreviation”:”Int J Constitutional
   Law”,”language”:”en”,”author”:[{“family”:”Lemaitre”,”giv
en”:”Julieta”}],”issued”:{“date-parts”:[[“2012”,3,30]]},”acc
essed”:{“date-parts”:[[“2013”,10,9]]}}}],”schema”:”https://
github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/mas-
ter/csl-citation.json”}  For accounts of Latin American 
conflicts between sexual and reproductive rights and the 
Catholic Church, see Marta Lamas, “El Laicismo Y Los 
Derechos Sexuales Y Reproductivos”, in Laicidad: Una 
Asignatura Pendiente, ed. Rodolfo Vázquez (Mexico 
D.F.: Ediciones Coyoacán, 2007), 125–42; Mala Htun, 
“Life, Liberty, and Family Values. Church and State in 
the Struggle over Latin America’s Social Agenda”, in 
Religious Pluralism, Democracy, and the Catholic Church 
in Latin America, ed. Frances Hagopian (Notre Dame, 
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 335–64; 
Gustavo Ortiz, La moralidad del aborto (México: Siglo 
XXI, 2009), chap. 10–11.2007 
15 Rivera, Laicidad y Liberalismo; Lemaitre, “Anticlericales 
de Nuevo”.
16 The religious landscape in Latin America is changing 
dramatically, since numerous (conservative) Protestant 
churches are growing in number and size—partly due to 
the implementation of a system of laicidad that acknowl-
edges privileges to religious organizations. One might 
conjecture that the political relevance of these churches 
will increase in the near future and therefore that the 
confrontational use of laicidad might not be directed 
towards the Catholic Church only but also the political 
power of these new churches. 
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CONCLUSION 
Following the dominant trend among theorists of 
political secularism, the authors of the Declaration 
identify in the fact of pluralism the most important 
input for protecting and updating the notion 
of secularism. It is argued that in the context of 
deep and growing pluralism, it is important to 
stress that secularism does not require hostility 
towards religion. On the contrary, they argue that 
secularism is the incarnation of a strong respect 
for the fundamental commitments of conscience 
of all. 
The second use of laicidad that I have presented 
differs from the use proposed by the writers of 
the Declaration and, more generally, from the 
dominant liberal interpretation of secularism, 
which is skeptical about any confrontational 
use of it. What this paper sought to stress is 
that this use of laicidad is grounded on liberal 
and democratic values. It appeals to the need to 
respect the decisions of conscience of individuals 
(women, homosexuals) who have been historically 
marginalized by the majority’s social norms. 
More specifically, it advances the claim in favor of 
recognition of new moral worldviews that diverge 
from the morality endorsed by the majority, the 
dominant church, and the state. Furthermore, 
it promotes a public-political sphere that is 
independent from external pressures (e.g. the 
Catholic Church). This latter aspect is grounded on 
a democratic interpretation of political autonomy. 
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CIVILITY WITHIN CONFLICT–
MANAGING RELIGIOUS 
PLURALISM
GARVAN WALSHE 
STEPHEN DE WIJZE
This paper argues that liberal and libertarian 
theories of justice are unable to accommodate 
the phenomenon of religious pluralism in 
contemporary democratic societies. The reason 
is this: the attempt to do so by establishing core 
principles which all citizens, including illiberal 
religious citizens, can endorse is impossible. There 
will always be a pluralism of values in a liberal 
society, some of which are incommensurable 
and from which there is no Archimeadean 
point to decide whether one is better or more 
reasonable, or place them in an agreed hierarchy. 
Seeking reasonable citizens does not solve the 
fundamental problem and result in consensus or 
harmony since the very notion of ‘reasonableness’ 
is itself attractive and sensible only from within 
what Hampshire calls ‘ the liberal stockade’. 
Thus, liberal and libertarian approaches to justice 
are inevitably tragic: some religious practices 
are suppressed, and some religious doctrines 
officially discouraged, if not formally banned, 
and there can be no resolution of this clash that 
will be acceptable to liberals and non-liberals 
alike. Again, following Hampshire, liberals and 
libertarians need to see that (their) ‘own way of life 
and habits of speech and thought, not only seem 
wrong to large populations, but can be repugnant 
in very much the same way in which alien habits of 
eating, or alien sexual customs, can be repugnant’1. 
Consequently, the best we can do in such 
circumstances is to adopt an account of justice that 
recognizes religious conflict as inevitable and that 
liberal societies will impose some injustice upon 
illiberal religious believers as society’s institutions 
1 Stuart Hampshire. Justice is Conflict (London: Duck-
worth Publishers, 1999).
manage this conflict. However, we argue that this 
conflict can be pursued within the bounds of 
civility and that civility can reduce the injustice 
involved to an acceptable minimum.
We focus on the fact that orthodox adherents 
of different faiths believe they are privy to the 
truth about religious matters and that (a) they 
consider the corresponding doctrines maintained 
by adherents of other faiths or none to be false; 
and (b) that the content of religious doctrines has 
a direct bearing on politics and the law. How far 
then can such illiberal believers be accommodated 
within a broadly liberal society? Can liberal or 
libertarian theories of justice provide a way of 
treating them justly? 
1. LIBERALISM AND LIBERTARIANISM – 
TWO APPROACHES TO ACCOMMODATING 
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM
Liberal theories of justice are concerned with 
how to fairly allocate the benefits and burdens 
of cooperative living. These benefits and burdens 
do not only concern the allocation of material 
goods but other social primary goods (as Rawls 
calls them)2 which include political liberties, 
social opportunity, and the preconditions for 
living a life of self-respect. Libertarian theories of 
justice maintain that people are endowed with a 
set of rights, and that the government’s function 
is limited to the protection of those rights. We 
focus on two approaches whose advocates seek 
to establish frameworks that treat even illiberal 
religious believers with justice: a liberal approach 
that seeks rational and reasonable consensus on 
principles of justice, and the other a libertarian 
approach that is indifferent to the religious beliefs 
held and practices followed provided these do not 
violate rights. 
2 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachu-
setts: Harvard University Press, 1971), 92.
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a) The liberal search for reasonable and rational 
consensus
John Rawls’s conception of justice as fairness is a 
useful way to illustrate the search for reasonable 
and rational consensus on principles of justice. In 
his early work (A Theory of Justice), he argues for a 
set of principles that all rational persons ought to 
endorse. In so far as religious doctrines fit within 
these principles, the state has no interest in the 
particular faith or practice in which such individ-
uals engage. It is only when the practices of a par-
ticular faith violate the principles of justice that 
the state uses its power to prevent these activities. 
That is, by protecting basic rights, or ensuring that 
all children are given some secular education to 
enable them to participate in society, or outlawing 
polygamy as it treats women and men differently. 
Rawls himself acknowledged that those who hold 
non-liberal religious views may not be able to 
endorse liberal principles of justice that apply to 
all aspects of their lives. Consequently, his later 
work (Political Liberalism) restricts the scope of 
his conception of justice to the political domain. 
Here, a consensus is sought on political values 
leaving the private lives of citizens to their own 
liberal or non-liberal conception of good. As long 
as religious doctrines allow their adherents to be 
liberal citizens, they can lead a non-liberal exis-
tence without interference from the state.  
This limits how far religious views can impinge on 
the lives of individuals qua individuals and qua 
citizens but suffers from three challenges. Firstly, 
it requires that all religions accommodate liberal 
(or political liberal) values. Secondly, such lib-
eral and libertarian principles of justice prioritize 
individuals over the group — non-liberal views, 
in contrast, often view a collective (such as the 
nation or community of believers) as being more 
important than the individual. Thirdly, these 
approaches undermine certain religious beliefs by 
insisting on a democratic liberal (or liberal civic) 
education, equality for men and women, and the 
priority of nurturing autonomy and individuality 
in conflict with religious doctrines that hold con-
flicting views. Religious doctrines that reject such 
core liberal values are discouraged, considered 
unreasonable or irrational, and practices associ-
ated with them may be officially suppressed.
b) The libertarian defense of a set of rights
Though libertarians are best known for their hos-
tility to economic redistribution3, the defining 
feature of their attitude to the state is different. 
Libertarians hold that people are endowed with a 
set of rights, usually called natural rights, and that 
governments may not violate these. 
Libertarian natural rights are not quite the same 
as those expressed, for instance, as ‘human rights’ 
in constitutional charters and international 
conventions4. To illustrate, judges interpreting a 
body of human rights law such as that initiated by 
the European Convention on Human Rights may 
find themselves deciding on where to draw the 
line between, for instance, a right to freedom of 
speech and another protecting personal privacy. 
In those deliberations, reference is often made 
to ‘balancing’ or ‘resolving’ the conflict between 
rights. Libertarians, however, consider the conflict 
between actual natural rights to be impossible5. 
3 Not all libertarians can fairly be so described. ‘Left-lib-
ertarians’ prescribe an original equal right to economic 
goods that can justify significant state intervention to 
redistribute the holdings of property issuing from mar-
ket transactions. For such an account see Hillel Steiner, 
Peter Vallentyne, and Michael Otsuka. ‘Why Left-Lib-
ertarianism Is Not Incoherent, Indeterminate, or Irrel-
evant: A Reply to Fried.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 
33 (2005):201–205. Walshe provides an environmental-
ist libertarian account in ‘Green Libertarianism,’ Ethical 
Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2014):955–970. 
4 No distinction is made here between legal and moral 
rights. It is assumed that a political system has authority 
to rule and upholds legal rights that correspond to moral 
ones. This is, of course, a simplification.
5 H.L.A Hart. ‘Are there Any Natural Rights?,’ Philosophi-
cal Review 64 (1955).
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2. THE TRAGIC DIMENSION AND THE 
NEED FOR CIVILITY IN CONFLICT
Liberal and libertarian attempts to accommodate 
religious pluralism require the imposition 
of liberal values on non-liberal groups and 
individuals. In so doing, they argue that there is 
a fair and just resolution to the conflict that arises 
between liberal and religious values and that a fair 
compromise can be reached which is satisfactory 
to all. However, to hold this view is to fail to 
see the proper nature of such conflict and the 
ultimate futility of resolving it through a search 
for a commonly-shared set of values or principles. 
As Hampshire points out:
The essence of a liberal morality is the rejection 
of any final and exclusive authority, natural 
or supernatural, and of the accompanying 
compulsion and censorship. In this context, 
freedom itself is felt, and is cherished, as a negative 
notion: no walls of dogma, no unquestionable 
rules from priests and politicians; the future is 
to be an open field for discovery. Openness is 
a negative concept, appropriately therefore an 
indeterminate concept. The liberal adversary is 
disgusted, or made nervous, by this negativity, by 
the openness and the emptiness, by the looseness 
of undirected living. The ensuring conflict is stark 
and often bitter6
We argue, following Hampshire, that any 
‘resolution’ necessarily leaves a moral remainder 
and bitterness which should be recognized 
and accounted for when dealing with religious 
pluralism. There can never be a resolution that 
enables a ‘perfect harmony of values’7. Conflict is 
inevitable and perpetual, as Hampshire succinctly 
sums up with the title of his book - Justice is 
Conflict.  
6  Hampshire, Justice is Conflict, 41. 
7  Hampshire, Justice as Conflict, 73.
The purpose of courts is to rule on which right 
takes precedence if a clash does occur. It follows 
from this understanding that a religious practice, 
just like any other set of actions, either violates 
individual rights or it does not. This can allow 
for considerable freedom to practice religion, 
but not because libertarians think that religion 
is something special or important. It is seen as 
an activity like any other, to be dealt with no 
differently than getting a haircut or going fishing. 
This attitude is, however, limited to activities that 
do not violate the libertarian state’s conception of 
rights. Activities that do, such as female genital 
mutilation or, arguably, male infant circumcision, 
would be forbidden. More importantly, the use of 
state power to promote religious ends - something 
that non-quietist religions often seek - is absolutely 
prohibited. 
While the libertarian position does not take 
it upon itself to suppress dissenting views, a 
libertarian polity is the sole determinant of what 
should be included in the set of publicly-enforced 
rights. In addition, it requires that these rights 
protect individuals rather than groups. This allows 
religious practices to which they are indifferent, 
but forbids those that clash with libertarian core 
values and denies official recognition to collective 
agents, such as religions, except insofar as they 
are associations of individuals. Consequently, the 
resolution of a clash in values between a libertarian 
state and illiberal religious believers amounts to 
the use of state power to repress religious practices 
that do not conform to libertarian principles. 
While Libertarians may defend this position 
on its merits, its implementation should not be 
characterized as the satisfactory ‘resolution’ of 
a conflict concerning religious pluralism. The 
imposition of a libertarian (or indeed, a liberal) 
state upon conservative religious believers does 
not cease to be an imposition because liberals 
or libertarians think it justified. Liberal and 
libertarian states ought to acknowledge this fact 
and attempt to mitigate the effects of loss they 
have inflicted upon illiberal religious believers.
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If this is correct, accommodating religious 
pluralism in a liberal democratic society requires 
at least two things: 1. the acknowledgement of 
the tragic nature of such conflict and with it the 
attempt to compensate and mitigate the unjust 
imposition on those who hold non-liberal values; 
2. an attempt to find ways of ensuring that conflict 
is kept to a minimum – a civility within conflict. 
The development and maintenance of institutions 
and procedures within society that can ‘hear the 
other side’ and garner the respect of both liberals 
and non-liberals ‘from their customary use and 
from their gradually acquired familiarity’8. These 
institutions and procedures cannot deliver perfect 
fairness, but offer an equality of access to those 
who hold power and a kind of imperfect justice 
given the incommensurable values and ways of 
life.
A full specification of what that mitigation and 
compensation might consist cannot be developed 
here, but we expect that at the very least it should 
involve the public acknowledgement that illiberal 
religious believers ought to be able to make their 
peace with the social arrangements under which 
they live. It may extend, for instance, to some kind 
of material assistance or limited legal exemption to 
allow conservative religious believers to preserve 
some elements of their practices that do not pose 
an existential threat to the liberal or libertarian 
order maintained by the state. Such religious 
institutions may be entitled to tax exemptions 
or certain customs that would, in a strictly 
secular application of the law, be forbidden (e.g. 
Sikhs being allowed to carry ceremonial daggers 
where equivalent blades would not be permitted; 
permission to carry out Halal and Kosher animal 
slaughter where otherwise forbidden by animal 
welfare legislation; or individual Anglican priests 
could choose not to carry out same sexmarriages, 
and so on). These exemptions are not, of course 
new, although we see them as means of managing 
an unavoidable conflict between liberals and 
8  Ibid., 45.
conservatives living in the same society: they do 
not amount to just resolutions of that conflict.  
This will not, of course, satisfy the most 
committed illiberal religious hardliners. As Isaiah 
Berlin points out, there is no social world without 
loss9. However, it may at least be able to add some 
flexibility to what would otherwise appear an 
unduly cold application of abstract principle and 
thereby provide reasons for illiberal religious 
believers to acquiesce to a political order that is, 
from their point of view, far from the ideal. The 
hope is that this would go some way to preventing 
religious conflicts from being aggressively tackled 
solely in the political domain, increasing the 
likelihood of a resort to violence. With a pluralist 
framework that seeks civility within conflict, it is 
more likely that illiberal religious doctrines will be 
able to peacefully co-exist within a liberal political 
framework. The conflict and injustice experienced 
will be acknowledged and mitigated, and with it 
the kind of response that will result. Here, a way 
will be found to manage this inevitable conflict 
and prevent the great evils of war and other forms 
of extreme violence. 
9  Isaiah Berlin. The Crooked Timber of Humanity (Lon-
don: John Murray Publishers, 1990): 13.
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II – PLURALISM AND 
THE FREEDOM OF 
RELIGION
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CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 
TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGES 
AND PARTNERSHIPS: THE 
LIMITS OF TOLERATION 
IN PLURALISTIC LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACIES
STIJN SMET1
In this chapter, I examine how the law deals with a 
particular feature of religious pluralism in liberal 
democracies: the existence of individuals who, 
due to deeply held religious convictions, object 
to complying with legislation inspired by liberal 
values. 
I focus in particular on legislative and judicial 
responses to civil servants who refuse to register 
same-sex marriages and partnerships in the 
Netherlands and United Kingdom. In both 
countries2, a small number3 of devout Christian 
civil servants sincerely believe that their religious 
conscience precludes them from registering same-
sex marriages or partnerships. Such cases entail a 
conflict between the freedom of religion of such 
civil servants and the right to equality of same-sex 
1 Postdoctoral Fellow, Human Rights Centre, Faculty of 
Law, Ghent University (stijne.smet@ugent.be).
2 The issue has also arisen in several other liberal democ-
racies, including Spain, Finland, Sweden, France and 
Canada. See, for instance, Queen’s Bench for Saskatch-
ewan, Nichols v. M.J. [2009] SKQB 299 (Canada); Conseil 
Constitutionnel nr. 2013-353, 18 October 2013 (France). 
Also Bruce MacDougall et al., “Conscientious Objection 
to Creating Same-Sex Unions: An International Analy-
sis,” Canadian Journal of Human Rights 1 (2012): 127-
164. 
3 In the Netherlands, the most recent exact number cited 
is 88 registrars. See the explanatory report [Memorie van 
Toelichting] to the Law of 4 July 2014, Kamerstukken II 
2012/2013, 33 344, nr. 6 (for the Law, see infra, footnote 
5).
couples4. In both countries5, the conflict has been 
resolved in favor of the latter’s right.
In the UK, the court case of Ladele v. Islington 
involved a registrar who refused to register 
same-sex partnerships for religious reasons. 
Initially, Ms. Ladele’s objections were de facto 
accommodated by colleagues, who performed 
the relevant duties in her stead. However, when 
other - LGBT - colleagues complained about Ms. 
Ladele’s behavior, Islington initiated disciplinary 
proceedings. The case ended up at the Court of 
Appeal, which ruled against Ms. Ladele, finding 
that Islington was justified in holding fast to its 
non-discrimination policy by ordering Ms. Ladele 
to perform all her duties as a registrar. 
In the Netherlands, Parliament has recently 
enacted a piece of legislation that categorically 
denies persons who would act in contravention 
of Dutch equal treatment legislation access 
to the post of registrar, despite the Council of 
State’s advice to deal with the relevant cases in a 
pragmatic manner6. 
THE OPTIMAL SOLUTION?
4 See also - in the UK - Supreme Court, Bull and Anor. 
v. Hall and Anor. [2013] UKSC 73; Court of Appeal of 
England and Wales, Black and Anor. v. Wilkinson [2013] 
EWCA Civ 820; Court of Appeal of England and Wales, 
McFarlane v. Relate Avon Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 880. In 
the Netherlands, see also Equal Treatment Commission, 
advice 2002/25 (2002); Equal Treatment Commission, 
advice 2008/40 (2008).
5 In the UK, all related cases, cited in footnote 4, have also 
been resolved to the detriment of religious liberty.
6  Law of 4 July 2014 tot wijziging van het Burgerlijk Wet-
boek en de Algemene wet gelijke behandeling met betrek-
king tot ambtenaren van de burgerlijke stand die ondersc-
heid maken als bedoeld in de Algemene wet gelijke behan-
deling, Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 
Jaargang 2014, 260. 
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At first glance, it appears possible to avoid 
the predicament caused by civil servants 
conscientiously objecting to the registration of 
same-sex partnerships/marriages by doing away 
with the conflict itself, while keeping the rights of 
both parties entirely intact. One way of doing so 
would be through reasonable accommodation, i.e. 
by granting to registrars an exemption from their 
duties whenever same-sex couples are involved. In 
the argument of those who support such a move, 
this would not cause an undue burden on the 
rights of same-sex couples, since their marriage 
or partnership would still be registered, just by a 
different registrar7. Hence, this pragmatic solution 
would supposedly keep both parties’ rights 
intact. Interestingly, this is precisely the solution 
advocated by the Dutch Council of State in its 
negative advice on the Dutch law8. The Council of 
State specifically held that “a pragmatic approach 
[to the problem] ... fits in with the Dutch tradition 
of tolerance vis-à-vis different opinions”9. 
Considerations of reasonable accommodation 
were also on the table in the UK Ladele case. 
Yet, the UK courts and the Dutch legislator 
decided differently, holding that the right to 
equality of same-sex couples should prevail 
over freedom of religion. They thus preferred a 
principled solution over a pragmatic one. In this 
chapter, I will attempt to offer an explanation for 
that preference, in terms of the limits of toleration 
in pluralistic liberal democracies.
7 Robin Fretwell Wilson, “Insubstantial Burdens: The 
Case for Government Employee Exemptions to Same-
Sex Marriage Laws,” Northwestern Journal of Law & 
Social Policy 5 (2010): 321-22; Geoffrey Trotter, “The 
Right to Decline Performance of Same-Sex Civil Mar-
riages: The Duty to Accommodate Public Servants - A 
Response to Professor Bruce MacDougall,” Saskatch-
ewan Law Review 70 (2007): 366-67.
8 Council of State, Advice W04.12.0331/I, 12 October 
2012, Kamerstukken II 2012/2013, 33 344, nr. 4.
9 Ibid (author’s translation).
TOLERATION: A SUITABLE TOOL FOR 
ANALYSIS?
The concept of toleration arguably consists of 
three elements: 1) a negative element of (moral) 
disapproval of a certain belief or practice10; 2) 
a positive element that supersedes the negative 
element, for instance respect for individual 
freedom of conscience, leading to the toleration 
of the belief or practice despite the (moral) 
disapproval thereof; and 3) an account of the 
limits of toleration, i.e. the point beyond which 
(acting upon) a belief or practice can no longer be 
tolerated11.
Toleration is a prominent principle of the political 
philosophies of, inter alia, Pierre Bayle and John 
Locke, aimed at ensuring peaceful religious 
co-existence in their times12. In transposing the 
concept to the present day, a few obstacles arise that 
prima facie preclude it being employed in relation 
to contemporary pluralistic liberal democracies 
in general, and the studied conflict in particular. 
Here, the two most important obstacles will be 
dispelled.
The first obstacle relates to the idea that the 
historical conception of toleration entailed an 
obligation of non-interference by the state in 
matters belonging to the private sphere (e.g. 
religious beliefs). Therefore, the objection goes, 
the same concept cannot be applied to issues 
pertaining to the current public sphere, such as 
10 In the case of indifference towards a belief, opinion or 
practice, toleration is thus not a conceptual possibility. 
See Jürgen Habermas, “Intolerance and Discrimination,” 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 1 (2003), 3.
11 Rainer Forst, “Pierre Bayle’s Reflexive Theory of Tolera-
tion,” in Toleration and Its Limits, ed. Melissa Williams 
and Jeremy Waldron (New York: New York University 
Press, 2008), 79; Anna Galeotti, “Citizenship and Equal-
ity: The Place for Toleration,” Political Theory 21 (1993): 
587.
12 For more details on the history of toleration and the dif-
ferent accounts of Locke and Bayle, see Forst, “Reflexive 
Theory”; Habermas, “Intolerance and Discrimination”.
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the conscientious objection issue studied here13. 
However, there is no principled reason to assume 
that the historical conception of toleration cannot 
usefully be adapted into a modern conception that 
can be applied to issues pertaining to the public 
sphere14. Indeed, speaking of toleration regardless 
of the sphere in which issues arise seems an 
appropriate course to take, given that there does 
not - or should not - exist a strict separation 
between a supposedly private and purportedly 
public sphere in contemporary liberal society15. 
Indeed, one of the salient features of contemporary 
religious pluralism is that, contrary to historic 
expectations, religion has not allowed itself to be 
strictly confined to the private sphere. Instead, 
it is increasingly, and strongly, claiming its right 
to be present in the public sphere. In accepting 
this reality and viewing toleration as a tool to 
deal with deep-seated differences in pluralistic 
society, regardless of the sphere in which those 
differences are expressed, an important analogy 
can be drawn between the historic conditions of 
religious pluralism under which the concept came 
to fruition and contemporary questions of deep 
religious pluralism in modern liberal democracies, 
signalling that the concept may be as relevant 
today as it was in the past16. 
The second obstacle relates to the seeming 
contradiction between toleration and the 
(supposed) neutrality of the contemporary liberal 
state. The objection goes as follows: since the liberal 
state purports to be neutral towards different 
13 François Boucher and Cécile Laborde. “Why Tolerate 
Conscience,” Criminal Law and Philosophy (2014): 14-15, 
accessed December 23, 2014, doi:10.1007/s11572-014-
9357-7.
14 Anna Galeotti, Toleration as Recognition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 10.
15 Galeotti, “Citizenship and Equality,” 600.
16 Jeremy Waldron and Melissa Williams, “Introduction,” 
in Toleration and Its Limits, ed. Melissa Williams and 
Jeremy Waldron (New York: New York University Press, 
2008), 24; Michael Walzer, On Toleration (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1997), 96.
conceptions of the good life, it is conceptually 
impossible for it to tolerate one or more such 
conceptions, given that toleration presupposes an 
element of negative appraisal17. Because the neutral 
liberal state refrains from negatively (or positively, 
for that matter) appraising conceptions of the good 
life, the question of toleration simply never arises. 
Toleration thus, it is alleged, has no place in the 
contemporary liberal state, at least not as a (vertical) 
political practice18. One possible answer19 to this 
objection entails arguing that the liberal state is 
not - and cannot be - truly neutral20 and to insist 
instead that the liberal state is based on a number 
of perfectionist ideals, such as autonomy, equality 
and human rights21. When this is accepted, the 
objection of conceptual impossibility no longer 
holds22. The concept of toleration may instead 
prove quite useful in explaining why the liberal 
state may want to - and does, in fact23 - accept 
into its midst certain beliefs and practices that go 
against the fundamental principles of liberalism 
(e.g. equality) for superseding reasons (e.g. respect 
for autonomy and human rights).
17 John Horton, “Toleration as a Virtue,” in Toleration - An 
Elusive Virtue, ed. David Heyd (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), 36.
18 Tolerance, conversely, may very well retain its place as an 
important (horizontal) moral virtue of individuals.
19  Other avenues are available, which will be explored in a 
later, full paper.
20 Lawrence Alexander, “Is There Logical Space on the 
Moral Map for Toleration? A Brief Comment on Smith, 
Morgan, and Frost,” in Toleration and Its Limits, ed. 
Melissa Williams and Jeremy Waldron (New York: New 
York University Press, 2008), 304.
21  Ibid.
22 Bernard Williams, “Toleration: An Impossible Vir-
tue,” in Toleration - An Elusive Virtue, ed. David Heyd 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 24; Wal-
dron and Williams, “Introduction,” 29.
23 For instance the exclusion of women from the post of 
priest in the Catholic Church.
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WHAT ABOUT OUR CASE?
Thus far, I have opened up the conceptual space 
for applying the political principle of toleration 
to contested issues of (religious) pluralism in the 
public sphere of contemporary liberal society. 
However, this does not mean that space should be 
limitless. On the contrary, there are good reasons 
to speak of toleration only in a limited set of 
specific circumstances24. 
The primary reason for restricting the conceptual 
space for toleration has to do with its negative 
connotation: in general, individuals do not 
wish for the mere toleration of their beliefs and 
practices25. Rather, they quite rightly demand that 
these be viewed positively in terms of recognition 
and equal respect26. The liberal state should indeed 
be primarily concerned with respecting the equal 
human rights of all persons, including those who 
hold ‘different’ beliefs or practices27. 
Nevertheless, there are areas in which toleration 
remains a valid tool to deal with such ‘difference’, 
but only when the liberal state has cause to 
reasonably disapprove of the beliefs and practices 
at issue28, most notably when these negate 
autonomy, equality norms or the human rights of 
others29 30.
24 Alexander, “Logical Space,” 300.
25 Horton, “Toleration as a Virtue,” 35-36.
26 David Heyd, “Is Toleration a Political Virtue?” in Tol-
eration and Its Limits, ed. Melissa Williams and Jeremy 
Waldron (New York: New York University Press, 2008), 
175.
27 Ibid., 177. It should be clear from the remainder of the 
arguments set forth in this paper that I disagree with 
Heyd’s conclusion that there is no room for toleration by 
the liberal state.
28  Horton, “Toleration as a Virtue,” 33.
29  George Fletcher, “The Instability of Tolerance,” in Tol-
eration - An Elusive Virtue, ed. David Heyd (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1996), 162; Alexander, “Log-
ical Space,” 306. 
30 Hate speech would be a good example; one in which 
most European liberal democracies consider the limits 
of toleration to be exceeded. Towards beliefs and prac-
tices that cannot be the object of reasonable disapproval 
by the liberal state, conversely, it should remain indif-
ferent (in terms of (moral) evaluation), thus leaving no 
conceptual space for toleration.
In the context of religious beliefs and practices 
- the focus of this chapter - two examples may 
illustrate the point. The first is that of a Sikh man 
who objects to being photographed without his 
turban on an ID card. I submit that there is no 
reasonable cause for the liberal state to (morally) 
disapprove of his belief and practice as such, 
since these do not prima facie contravene any 
of the above-mentioned core liberal principles. 
Thus, there is no conceptual space or need for 
toleration. In that sense, this is from the outset a 
matter of respect for - not toleration of - the Sikh’s 
‘difference’. The second example, in which there 
does exist conceptual space for toleration, is that 
of a Sikh man who objects to removing his turban 
while riding a motorcycle, and thus refuses to 
wear a helmet31. Here, I contend that the liberal 
state can reasonably disapprove of the practice, 
namely on paternalistic grounds32. The liberal 
state may nevertheless tolerate his choice for 
superseding reasons, for instance, out of respect 
for his religious liberty and personal autonomy.
The earlier outlined case of conscientious objection 
belongs to the second category. Given that the 
registrars wish to put into practice religious beliefs 
that contravene equality norms, there is reasonable 
cause for the liberal state to (morally) disapprove 
of their beliefs and practice. This opens up the 
conceptual space for toleration to come into play. 
The liberal state may either tolerate the beliefs and 
practices of its registrars, based on positive reasons 
relating to respect for religious liberty, or it may 
rule that they transgress the limits of toleration33. 
31 See contra, Boucher and Laborde, “Why Tolerate Con-
science,” 15.
32 These reasons, as in the case of rules on the mandatory 
wearing of seatbelts, are paternalistic in the sense that 
they aim at protecting the individual against ‘dangerous’ 
exercises of his autonomy. The State decides on behalf 
of the individual what their superior interest or value – 
i.e. protection of his life and physical integrity – should 
be and contemplates restricting his autonomy in pursuit 
of those ‘higher’ ends (i.e. for his own good). See, for 
instance, Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self – The Moral Limits 
of the Criminal Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1986), 8.
33 I rely here on what Rainer Forst terms the ‘respect con-
ception of toleration’. See Rainer Forst, “The Limits of 
Toleration,” Constellations 11 (2004): 316.
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Although the Dutch Council of State considered 
the case to fall within the limits of toleration, the 
Parliament clearly disagreed. Likewise for the UK 
Court of Appeal in the Ladele case. But why would 
the limits of toleration have been reached, given 
that neither case entailed the denial of a public 
service to same-sex couples?34 The reason can be 
found in the notion of expressive harm and the 
expressive function of law.
The expressive function of law is the role of law 
in shaping - both positively and negatively - the 
attitudes and opinions of members of society, 
for instance towards same-sex couples35. Within 
that context, expressive harm is the non-material 
harm caused by the state to the individual “when 
she is treated according to principles that express 
negative or inappropriate attitudes towards her”36. 
Expressive harm can be caused by a piece of 
legislation - the classic example being segregation 
laws in the United States37 - or by a non-verbal 
act by the state or its agents38. Registrars refusing 
to register same-sex partnerships/marriages fall 
within the latter category. 
In Ladele, the UK Court of Appeal dismissed 
the reasonable accommodation route, because 
insistence thereon would “mischaracterise 
Islington’s aim by treating it as a purely practical 
one of delivering an efficient system”. Instead, the 
court identified Islington’s proper aim as providing 
a service “which complied with their overarching 
policy of being “an employer and a public authority 
wholly committed to the promotion of equal 
34 In neither the Dutch nor the UK case were/are same-sex 
couples denied a public service, since other registrars 
were/are available to take over from conscientious objec-
tors.
35 Cass Sunstein, “On the Expressive Function of Law,” 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 144 (1996): 2021-
53.
36 Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes, “Expressive 
Theories of Law: A General Restatement,” University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 148 (2000): 1527.
37 Ibid., 1528.
38 Ibid., 1530.
opportunities and to requiring all its employees 
to act in a way which does not discriminate 
against others””39. The court went on to find 
that “permitting Ms Ladele to refuse to perform 
civil partnerships “would necessarily undermine 
the council’s clear commitment to ... their non-
discriminatory objectives which [they] thought it 
important to espouse both to their staff and to the 
wider community””40. The court also ruled that 
“Ms Ladele’s proper and genuine desire to have 
her religious views relating to marriage respected 
should not be permitted to override Islington’s 
concern to ensure that all its registrars manifest 
equal respect for the homosexual community”41. 
Given that no same-sex couple had been denied 
a public service in Islington due to Ms. Ladele’s 
objection, these findings are best understood 
in terms of expressive harm and the expressive 
function of Islington’s non-discrimination policy. 
Similar considerations apply to the Dutch case, 
in which Parliament ignored the Council of 
State’s advice in favor of a pragmatic solution. 
The principled and symbolic nature of the Act 
constituted an important rationale for its passing. 
In the explanatory report, the Act is referred 
to being in the first place a piece of principled 
legislation42. Of particular importance is the 
statement that “what can help in a climate of 
intolerance is not the mere searching for ‘pragmatic 
solutions’ for the consequences of intolerance, but 
the consistent upholding of the prohibition of 
discrimination”43. The relevant Minister referred 
to the Act as constituting “an important step that 
partly has a symbolic character”44. He went on to 
state that 
39 Ladele, para. 45 (emphasis added).
40 Ibid., para. 49, citing the Employment Appeal Tribunal’s 
statements with approval (emphasis added).
41 Ibid., para. 55 (emphasis added).
42  Explanatory report, supra note 2, 2.
43  Ibid., 6 (emphasis in original).
44  Handelingen Tweede Kamer 2012-2013, nr. 91, item 6.
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“with this [Act] a message is being sent, not 
only towards this category of registrars [i.e. the 
conscientious objectors], but in the first place 
to all gays and lesbians in the Netherlands and 
eventually towards Dutch society in its entirety: 
the norm is that we in no way wish to differentiate 
between persons of equal sex who marry and 
persons of different sex who marry”45. 
These statements all underscore the expressive 
aim of the Dutch law.
CONCLUSION - ANALOGOUS CASES?
An important step that remains is to analyze the 
above arguments on toleration and expressive 
harm in relation to analogous cases, to determine 
(i) whether they can be applied to those cases 
as well, and/or (ii) whether those cases can 
convincingly be distinguished from the one 
discussed in this paper. Those analogous cases 
concern, chiefly, conscientious objection by 
doctors to the performance of abortions, the 
refusal of private persons to provide services to 
same-sex couples (e.g. a double room in a bed 
and breakfast)46, and conscientious objection to 
compulsory military service.
With regard to conscientious objections by 
doctors to the performance of abortions, my 
initial conclusions are (i) that such cases fall to be 
distinguished from the primary case examined 
in this paper, and  thus, (ii) the conscientious 
objections at issue in abortion cases can be 
tolerated in a liberal democracy47. 
45  Ibid.
46  Cf. Bull and Anor. v. Hall and Anor., supra note 3. 
47  These initial conclusions are based on the following 
(summarised) elements of difference (primary case ver-
sus ‘abortion’ case): (a) State agent versus private person; 
or State agent whose acts are directly identified with 
those of the State versus public employee (doctor in a 
public hospital) whose acts are not; (b) objection on the 
grounds of animus versus objection based on will to pro-
tect life; (c) no ability to formulate religious reasons in 
secular language versus availability of secular language 
to explain objection (protection of the right to life); (d) 
level of seriousness of interference with the individual’s 
conscience: forced ‘recognition’ versus forced ‘killing’ .
With regard to private persons’ refusal to provide 
services to same-sex couples, my initial conclusion 
is that this situation is similar to the primary 
case examined in this paper in several respects, 
but crucially different in others. The important 
elements of difference are that the primary case 
involves state agents causing expressive harm, 
while the denial of private services involves private 
individuals causing material harm. My tentative 
argument is that the practice at issue in the ‘denial 
of private services’ case could also be considered 
as transgressing the limits of toleration, since it 
entails the causing of material harm.
With regard to conscientious objection to 
compulsory military service, my initial conclusion 
is that this issue is different from the primary case 
discussed in this paper in two crucial respects: (a) 
the objection does not cause any harm (expressive 
or material), and (b) the liberal state has no 
reasonable cause to morally disapprove of the 
objection, since it does not prima facie contravene 
core liberal principles. My tentative argument 
is that it is therefore not appropriate to consider 
conscientious objection to compulsory military 
service in terms of toleration and its limits. 
Instead, such cases should from the outset be 
dealt with as revolving around respect for human 
rights, in terms of (religious) conscience. Where 
other (non-moral) reasons fail to convince, for 
example, those based on public order, the liberal 
state should respect the ‘difference’ and grant an 
exemption.
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FREEDOM FOR ME AND, 
PERHAPS, YOU – BUT 
SURELY NOT THEM? 
ATTITUDES TO NEW 
RELIGIONS IN CONTEMPORARY 
DEMOCRACIES
EILEEN BARKER
Throughout history, new religious movements 
(NRMs) have been treated with suspicion and 
fear. Although contemporary democracies do not 
throw members of NRMs to the lions or burn them 
at the stake, they have ways and means of making 
it clear that pluralism and freedom of religion 
have their limits. The limits to pluralism are 
evident enough in countries such as Saudi Arabia 
or North Korea that have regimes stipulating that 
citizens must adhere exclusively to their one and 
only ‘true religion’ – or to atheism. Limitations 
to pluralism have also been manifest in countries 
such as Northern Nigeria, Sri Lanka or Myanmar 
(Burma), where terrorists have used violence to 
eliminate religions other than their own. Even 
otherwise peaceful democracies – that have 
signed the United Nations Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights1, the European Convention on 
Human Rights2 and other statements affirming 
freedom of belief (and non-belief) for all – can 
discriminate against religions, especially the new 
religious movements in their midst, and this they 
do in a variety of ways3. 
1 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Pages/Language.
aspx?LangID=eng All websites were accessed on 21 Feb-
ruary 2015
2 http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.
pdf 
3 James T. Richardson, ed., Regulating Religion: Case Stud-
ies from Around the Globe (New York & Dordrecht: Klu-
wer Academic/Plenum, 1994); Tore Lindholm, W. Cole 
Durham, and Bahia G. Tahzib-Lie, eds. Facilitating Free-
dom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook (Leiden, The Neth-
erlands: Koninklijke Brill, 2004); David M. Kirkham, 
ed., State Responses to Minority Religions (Aldershot 
Ashgate, 2013).
This paper outlines, from the perspective of a 
sociologist of religion, the ways in which such 
exclusions of NRMs demonstrate more subtle, but 
nevertheless marked and serious limitations to 
pluralism, even in contexts that pride themselves 
on their progressive and inclusive approach to 
diversity. 
STATE REACTIONS TO MINORITY 
RELIGIONS 
When the Berlin wall came down in 1989, 
the celebrations for democracy and freedom 
resounded throughout Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union – and, after decades of state-
imposed atheism, freedom of religion was among 
the most welcomed of changes. However, the 
honeymoon was soon over, and the traditional 
religions – be they the Orthodox Church in Russia, 
Bulgaria and Romania, or the Catholic Church 
in Poland, Croatia and Hungary – complained 
vociferously about foreign religions taking away 
their flock. The spiritual lives of people, they 
claimed, rightly belonged to them – the religions 
that had protected the culture and traditions of the 
society not only throughout the Soviet period but 
also throughout the centuries4. Politicians were 
urged to introduce laws restricting the incursion 
of foreign religions and, indeed, indigenous NRMs 
such as Vissarion’s Church of the Last Testament 
in Siberia5, the New Jerusalem in Romania6, the 
White Brotherhood of Peter Deunov in Bulgaria7, 
4 Eileen Barker, “But Who’s Going to Win? National and 
Minority Religions in Post-Communist Society’”, New 
Religious Phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. 
Irena Borowik and Grzegorz Babinski (Kraków: Nomos, 
1997), 25-62.
5 Filatov, Sergei, “Sects and New Religious Movements in 
Post-Soviet Russia”. Proselytism and Orthodoxy in Rus-
sia: The New War for Souls, ed. John Jr Witte (Maryknoll, 
NY: Orbis, 1999), 163-84.
6 Silvia Chiţimia, “The New Religious Landscape in 
Romania”, New Religions and the New Europe, ed. Robert 
Towler (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1995), 87-98.
7  Milka Kraleva, The Master Peter Deunov. His Life and 
Teaching. (Sofia: Kibea, 2001).
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or the White Brotherhood of Maria Devi Christ in 
Ukraine8. 
To take an example from Western Europe, the 
French Republic has, since its 1905 Law on the 
Separation of Church and State9, declared itself 
to be a nation celebrating laïcité. In some ways 
resembling the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution10, laïcité is a situation that 
reputably guarantees not only the absence of state 
involvement in religious affairs, but also the equal 
treatment of all religions. The French government 
has, however, commissioned a number of Reports 
highlighting the problems of les sectes. One such 
Report listed 172 sectarian movements11, as a 
consequence of which, group members have found 
themselves discriminated against in a number of 
ways, such as loss of employment; being unable 
to have their children accepted in schools; and 
being unable to rent accommodation, including 
halls in which to meet12. France funds, moreover, 
an Interministerial organization, MIVILUDES13, 
which is specifically designed to fight ‘cultic 
deviances’ and has contributed to legislation 
8 Marat Shterin, “New Religions in Changing Russia” The 
Cambridge Companion to New Religious Movements, ed. 
Olav Hammer and Mikael Rothstein (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2012), 286-302.
9 Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des 
Eglises et de l’Etat. Republic of France
 http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=J
ORFTEXT000000508749&fastPos=1&fastReqId=11941
87241&categorieLien=cid&oldAction=rechTexte
10 Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the government for a redress of grievances.
11  Jacques Guyard and Alain Gest. Les Sectes en France 
(Paris: Assemblée Nationale, 1995). http://www.assem-
blee-nationale.fr/rap-enq/r2468.asp 
12 N.L. Lheureux et al., Report on Discrimination Against 
Spiritual and Therapeutical Minorities in France (Paris: 
Coordination des Associations et Particuliers Pour la 
Liberté de Conscience, 2000).
13 ‘Mission interministérielle de vigilance et de lutte contre 
les dérives sectaires’, http://www.derives-sectes.gouv.fr/
that focuses particularly on the activities of new 
religious or spiritual movements14.
A distinction can be drawn between two 
approaches to pluralism. On the one hand, there 
are states such as France, Russia or China which 
declare that they want to protect their citizens 
from the potential dangers of what the Chinese 
term ‘the evil sects’15, and to this end, introduced 
special laws directed towards their movements 
before they have the opportunity to do harm. On 
the other hand, states such as the United States 
of America, Great Britain or the Scandinavian 
countries adopt the position that all citizens 
are equal before the law, whatever their beliefs, 
and everyone is assumed innocent until, by due 
process, proven guilty after having committed a 
criminal offence16. In other words, states in the 
former group react to the presence of religions 
that are perceived to be potentially dangerous 
before they have actually engaged in any criminal 
activity, while the latter wait until a law has been 
broken.
In practice, however, the distinction is not so 
clear-cut. Even the latter group of countries 
frequently introduce more subtle ways of ensuring 
that these religious ‘others’ are not treated equally 
to an established ‘us’. One such way is if an 
NRM wants to register as a recognized religion 
in order to receive special privileges such as tax 
exemptions, for example, or simply to be able to 
14 Eileen Barker, ed., The Centrality of Religion in Social Life: 
Essays in Honour of James A. Beckford (Aldershot: Ash-
gate, 2008); Susan Palmer, The New Heretics of France: 
Minority Religions, la République, and the Government-
Sponsored “War on Sects” (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011). 
15 Guobin Zhu, “Prosecuting “Evil Cults”: A Critical Exam-
ination of Law Regarding Freedom of Religious Belief in 
Mainland China.” Human Rights Quarterly 32(3): 471-
501, 2010.
16 Eileen Barker, “Do What Thou Wilt shall be the Whole 
of the Law”. Freedom of Conscience and Religious Free-
dom, ed. Michaela Moravčíková. (Bratislava: Institute 
for State-Church Relations, forthcoming).
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function as a religion in the country. First, it may 
have difficulty in persuading authorities that it is a 
religion17. The criteria are decidedly selective and 
applied inconsistently. For example, Buddhism 
may be accepted as a religion, while belief in 
God is stipulated as a necessary criterion for the 
classification18. Or, more generally, one criterion 
might be a minimum number of members, and 
if this number is large (the threshold is 20,000 in 
Slovakia), new religions are unlikely to reach the 
target. Another requirement might be existence 
of the religion in the country concerned for a 
specific number of years, again militating against 
eligibility of new religions for registration – or any 
kind of legal status at all, as is the case in some 
countries19.
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL REACTIONS 
Even if the law itself does not discriminate, 
its application can be partial. There have been 
frequent reports in the US and elsewhere of the 
police turning a blind eye when converts to a ‘cult’ 
have been illegally kidnapped and held against 
their will by “deprogrammers”, telling those 
who have appealed for help that the police do not 
17 Eileen Barker, “But is it a Genuine Religion?” Between 
Sacred and Secular: Research and Theory on Quasi Reli-
gion, ed. Arthur L. Greil and Thomas Robbins (Green-
wich CT; London: JAI Press, 1994).
18 The Charity Commissioners of England and Wales have 
been undergoing some changes in recent years. For cen-
turies it was assumed that religion was ‘a good thing’, 
and thus entitled to certain privileges. More recently, 
with the advent of an ever-increasing religious plu-
ralism, the definition was widened beyond belief in a 
Supreme Being, but increasingly stress has been laid on 
the necessity to demonstrate ‘public benefit’, the alleged 
absence of which has been used to exclude some religions 
from charitable status. https://www.gov.uk/government/
organisations/charity-commission/. Eileen Barker. “Do 
What Thou Wilt shall be the Whole of the Law”. In: 
Freedom of Conscience and Religious Freedom, Michaela 
Moravčíková (ed.). Bratislava: Institute for State-Church 
Relations, forthcoming.
19  Ibid.
interfere in family matters20. Similar responses 
have been given when members of new religions 
have appealed to the courts for help21.
Sometimes the law can be interpreted in a way 
that assumes that the customs of the majority 
religion(s) are those with which any ‘normal’ 
citizen should be expected to comply. An example 
of the taken-for-granted cultural implications of 
a country’s traditional religion was provided in 
court when it was argued that there were limits 
to the extent that the British could ‘reasonably’ be 
expected to accommodate Jewish citizens. In this 
case of the late 1970s, a Mr and Mrs Ostreicher 
lodged an objection when the Secretary of State 
for the Environment decided to hold a public 
inquiry on a matter that concerned them (the 
compulsory purchase of houses they owned) on 
the seventh day of Passover. One of England’s 
most senior judges, Lord Denning, ruled that “the 
men at the department acted perfectly reasonably” 
when they had arranged the inquiry to take place 
on 21 April, which carefully avoided Good Friday 
and Easter Monday, and which, he said, would 
seem to all ordinary people to be a quite suitable 
date22. Another example occurred when the judge 
in a case involving the Unification Church and 
a tabloid newspaper addressed the jury with the 
words:
20 Ted Patrick with Tom Dulack, Let Our Children Go (New 
York: Ballantine, 1976).
21  Eileen Barker, New Religious Movements: A Practical 
Introduction (London: HMSO, 1989). 
 Forcible deprogramming has almost completely been 
replaced by voluntary ‘exit counselling’ in the West, but 
the practice continues in Japan, again, with members 
of NRMs being held against their will, sometimes for 
years. Willy Fautré, ed. Japan: Abduction & Deprivation 
of Freedom for the Purposes of Religious De-conversion 
(Brussels: Human Rights Without Frontiers Interna-
tional, 2012).
22  Ostreicher v Secretary of State for Environment [1978] 1 
WLR 810 64. 
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You ask yourselves whether a reasonable man 
could believe that Mr. Moon is in fact the Messiah 
and the Lord of the Second Advent. Is he a dupe? 
Was he a dupe originally and then became 
converted? Or is he a fraud?23
Perhaps it is surprising that intransigent 
discrimination has come from some ecumenical 
and interfaith organizations which have an explicit 
policy that there should be freedom of religion for 
all in a pluralistic democracy, and that all should be 
treated equally. Yet these same organizations have 
appeared to believe that dialogue needs or ought 
to be limited to the more traditional or ‘acceptable’ 
religions. When questioned about their refusal to 
admit new religions to their number, organizers 
have responded that their members would not like 
this and the whole organization would collapse. 
Interestingly, it is often the members of a particular 
‘mainstream’ religion who most strongly object 
to NRMs claiming to belong to their tradition. 
Thus, Soka Gakkai may be rejected by some other 
Buddhists, the International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness (ISKCON) by some other Hindus, 
the Ahmadiyya by other Muslims and the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the Mormons), 
The Family International (the erstwhile Children 
of God) and the Unification Church by other 
Christians. It is possible that a new movement’s 
claim to be Buddhist, Hindu, Islamic or Christian 
is seen as a threat to the boundaries of what 
is considered by mainstream traditions to be, 
respectively, ‘real’ Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam 
or Christianity in a way that NRMs from other 
traditions would not be so seen24.
23 Dennis Frederick Orme (Plaintiff) v Associated News-
papers Group Inc.1980-81. Transcript of Summing-Up 
given in the High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Divi-
sion, by Mr Justice Comyn in Orme v. Associated News-
papers Group Ltd (30 March 1981: 232).
24 Eileen Barker, “But is it a Genuine Religion?”
Even in countries that make no official distinctions 
between different religions (apart from having 
an Established Church), formal recognition of 
NRMs is considered inappropriate in certain 
circumstances. In the UK, for example, NRMs 
may be informally excluded. At a recent meeting 
at which a former British Prime Minister (Tony 
Blair) and the then Archbishop of Canterbury 
(Rowan Williams) were discussing democracy, 
religious freedom and the role of religion in public 
life25, they were asked whether there were limits to 
the religions with which the state or th Established 
Church should dialogue. Both gave the same 
answer: talking to some individual members of 
some NRMs might be possible on occasion, but 
it would be unwise for either Church or state to 
engage in formal dialogue with such people.
We can also come across apparently well-meaning 
clergy finding ingenious ways of confirming 
that NRMs are ‘less equal than us’. Once, while 
walking across a university campus with the 
Anglican chaplain, I remarked on a saffron-
robed student and asked whether they had many 
devotees. The chaplain told me that he could 
not recognize the Hare Krishna movement as a 
religion (despite the fact that it would fit all the 
criteria he would normally use in defining a 
‘religion’) because there were ‘not enough rooms’ 
in the chaplaincy to accommodate the addition. 
This, he explained, was because the university 
had a rule that every religion should be allotted a 
room in the chaplaincy. When I asked whether it 
might not be more honest to change the rule, he 
replied in a shocked tone that to do so could be 
seen as religious discrimination by allowing some 
religions, but not others, to have rooms.
25 “Westminster Faith Debate: Religion in Public Life 
”http://www.jointpublicissues.org.uk/westminster-
faith-debate-religion-in-public-life/ 
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Since the 1970s, new religions have frequently 
found themselves under attack from the 
contemporary ‘anti-cult movement’ (ACM) that 
has spread throughout both the West and the East. 
This consists of groups (which may be funded 
by governments, traditional religions or private 
means) that have the primary objective of warning 
the public of the dangers of ‘destructive cults’ and 
often lobbying for these to be controlled or even 
banned altogether26. The information that the 
anti-cult movement disseminates has tended to be 
generalizing, often ill-informed and nearly always 
highly selective, pointing to occasional atrocities 
and suggesting that these apply to all ‘cults’27. Not 
surprisingly, it is the ACM that supplies many of 
the horror stories picked up by the media, and it is 
the media that are the most efficient disseminators 
of popular images of NRMs. Analyses of reports 
in newspapers and magazines, on radio and 
television indicate that the media rarely present 
balanced accounts of NRMs, preferring instead 
to attract the interest of their audiences with the 
more lurid, bizarre or sensational reports, thereby 
confirming the ‘conventional wisdom’ that NRMs 
in general do not deserve the respect that can be 
afforded older, more established religions28. Such 
an atmosphere can have many repercussions that 
cannot be pursued in this paper. 
26 Eileen Barker, “Watching for Violence: A Comparative 
Analysis of the Roles of Five Cult-Watching Groups”. 
Cults, Religion and Violence, edited by David G. Bromley 
and J. Gordon Melton. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2002); Anson D. Shupe and David G. Bromley, 
eds Anti-Cult Movements in Cross-Cultural Perspective 
(New York: Garland, 1994).
27 Anson D. Shupe and David G. Bromley, The New Vigi-
lantes: Deprogrammers, Anti-Cultists, and the New Reli-
gions (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980).
28 James T. Richardson and Massimo Introvigne. “New 
Religious Movements, Counter-movements, Moral Pan-
ics, and the Media”. Teaching New Religions, ed. David 
G. Bromley (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007) 91-114; James A. Beckford, “The Mass Media 
and New Religious Movements”. New Religious Move-
ments: Challenge and Response, ed. Bryan R. Wilson and 
Jamie Cresswell (London: Routledge, 1999): 103-19.
It might, however, be mentioned that children 
brought up in NRMs will frequently hide their 
religion from their peers, and former members 
will massage their curricula vitae, afraid that 
acknowledging a connection with a so-called 
‘cult’ would affect their life chances29.
Finally, the cultural relativism of attitudes 
towards minority religions should be noted. 
Reactions to the diversity engendered by minority 
religions varies considerably between (and 
within) different societies, so that a particular 
religion may be tolerated or even welcomed in one 
society yet have its freedoms severely curtailed 
in another. Jehovah’s Witnesses are in prison 
because they are conscientious objectors in a 
number of contemporary democracies and have 
been ‘liquidated’ in a Moscow court; members 
of the Russian Orthodox hierarchy have referred 
to Roman Catholicism as a cult; members of the 
Baha’i faith are persecuted in Iran, but regarded 
as one of the nine ‘respectable’ religions in the 
UK; members of the Ahmadiyya community are 
persecuted in Pakistan, but include a government 
minister in the UK; the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints features on the French and 
Belgian Reports’ lists of ‘sectes’ , and were refused 
membership of the Inter Faith Network UK until 
2014, yet in the USA there are a couple of dozen 
Mormons serving as Senators or Congressmen 
and one has stood as the Republican candidate for 
the Presidency.
29 Amanda van Eck Duymaer van Twist, Perfect Children: 
Growing Up on the Religious Fringe (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015); Eileen Barker, New Religious 
Movements: A Practical Introduction (London: HMSO, 
1989).
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CONCLUSION
This paper has described some of the ways in which 
increasing diversity, insofar as it encompasses 
the arrival of new religious movements, has 
sometimes led to attempts to restrict the very 
diversity that pluralist ideologies and policies 
overtly welcome30. This can happen at the most 
formal and explicit state levels; it can be seen in 
the interpretation and selective implementation of 
the law, in traditional religions, in organizations 
founded with the explicit purpose of introducing 
controls over the activities of ‘cults’ – and even 
in organizations explicitly founded with the 
objective of celebrating religious pluralism. 
Discrimination is also observable in the general 
culture of societies, frequently expressed through 
the mass media and, more recently, the ever-more 
pervasive social media. In short, the pluralism 
to be found in contemporary democracies may 
overtly celebrate freedom for all, but at a more 
implicit level, it would seem that the standpoint is 
more one of “freedom for me and, perhaps, you – 
but surely not them?”
30 Here a distinction is being drawn between the descrip-
tive concept of ‘diversity’, meaning ‘many different’, 
and the evaluative concept of ‘pluralism’, implying an 
approval of diversity.
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EGALITARIAN THEORIES 
OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
AND THE BLACK BOX OF 
RELIGION
ANNA BLIJDENSTEIN
Many contemporary political theorists writing 
about religious freedom argue that in pluralist 
societies, religious convictions should not be 
treated as uniquely special1. Cécile Laborde 
calls these t h i n k e r s  ‘egalitarian theorists of 
religious freedom’2. This family of approaches can 
be contrasted with another form of thought in 
which religious freedom is a special freedom, or 
even the first l i b e r t y  of the liberal state, because 
religion is seen as distinctive and irreducible to a 
broader category ‘as it serves to protect a uniquely 
special human good’3. According to egalitarian 
theories, the liberal state should endorse a stance 
of neutrality toward religious and nonreligious 
citizens, but the category of what is protected 
by religious freedom is extended by analogizing 
religion with other beliefs, commitments and 
identities. 
In this text, I will focus on two egalitarian theories 
of religious freedom: the influential model John 
Rawls puts forward in Political Liberalism and the 
theory Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor present 
1 See, for example: Ronald Dworkin, Religion without God 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013);
 Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2012); Micah Schwartzman, “What If Reli-
gion Is Not Special?” University of Chicago Law Review 1351 
(2012).
2 Cécile Laborde, “Equal Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Reli-
gious Freedom”, Legal Theory 20(1):5, (2014).
3 Ibid. For a defense of the idea that religion is special, see 
Michael W. McConnell, “Why Protect Religious Freedom?” 
Yale Law Journal 123, (2013), 770 -792; Rafael Domingo, “Reli-
gion for Hedgehogs? An Argument against the Dworkinian 
Approach to Religious Freedom”, Oxford Journal of Law and 
Religion 1 (2012), 1-22.
in Secularism and Freedom of Conscience4. Maclure 
and Taylor depart from a Rawlsian starting 
point, but criticize his chosen analogy of religion 
with ‘comprehensive doctrines’. They claim that 
all ‘convictions of conscience’ merit protection. 
However, while Laborde defends the need to 
develop egalitarian theories, she rightly states that 
the analogy chosen by Maclure and Taylor shows 
that these theorists ‘underestimate the communal, 
cultural dimensions of religion itself and betray 
an (unexpected) Protestant bias’5 – an argument 
which could also be made for Rawls’ conception of 
religion as a comprehensive doctrine. In this essay, 
I briefly discuss Laborde’s critique, and build 
upon it to show that both theories in fact contain 
several different representations of religion. These 
assumptions, which are rarely made explicit, 
cannot only be found in the theories’ general 
definitions and descriptions of religion but also 
in discussion of specific religions and religious 
believers. Some of these representations rely on 
implicit theological assumptions, whilst others 
are related to a historically-specific construction 
of religious conflict. Implicit assumptions on the 
nature of religion do not only inform political 
theory’s normative standpoints on religious 
freedom and the accommodation of religious 
minorities, but may also have a wider influence 
on societal debates on religion, and its place in 
society. Making these ideas explicit opens up the 
possibility of contestation. 
4 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 2005); Charles Taylor and Jocelyn Maclure, Secu-
larism and Freedom of Conscience (Cambridge MA, London: 
Harvard University Press).
5 Cécile Laborde, “The Politics of Religious Freedom: Protecting 
Freedom of Religion in the Secular Age”, The Immanent Frame 
(blog), April 23, 2012, http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2012/04/23/pro-
tecting-freedom-of-religion-inthe-secular-age/.
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This paper proceeds by setting out the 
particular ways in which these authors view 
religion – as matters of conscience and as 
comprehensive ideologies, demonstrating how 
this characterisation overestimates the likelihood 
of inter-religious diversity and division and 
underestimates the possibility for intra-religious 
heterogeneity and conflict. It goes on to show how 
their focus on the Reformation and the so-called 
wars of religion mean that such accounts of 
religious and moral pluralism are modeled on 
a historically-specific construction of religious 
conflict. 
RELIGION AS CONSCIENCE
Maclure a nd  Tay lor  argue that the good of 
religion – that part of it that merits special 
consideration and protection – is situated in 
the idea that religious beliefs are ‘convictions of 
conscience’. These ‘core meaning-giving beliefs’ 
are especially important because they structure 
people’s existence, help them understand the world 
around them and guide their moral judgments 
and conduct6.
A similar role is ascribed to comprehensive 
doctrines when Rawls explains that religious, 
philosophical or moral doctrines are part of an 
individual’s conception of the good – that is, 
their conception of ‘what is valuable in human 
life’7. Moral judgments, according to Rawls, are 
always made ‘from the point of view of some 
comprehensive moral doctrine. These doctrines 
render a judgment, all things considered: that is, 
taking into consideration what they see as relevant 
moral and political values and all relevant facts 
(as each doctrine determines)’8. Consequently, the 
role Rawls assigns to the individual’s  religion 
is closely related to that ascribed by Maclure and 
6 Maclure and Taylor, Freedom of Conscience, 13. 
7 Rawls, Political Liberalism, xx.
8 Ibid.
Taylor to conscientious convictions: it coordinates 
our moral decisions and helps us understand our 
aims and commitments. This similarity between 
the two theories is remarkable, for in the past 
Charles Taylor has fiercely criticized Rawlsian 
liberalism by stating that it rests on an overly-
individualistic conception of the self. This current 
focus on individual conscience seems to be at odds 
with his earlier commitment to communitarian 
political theory9.
According to Laborde, something is lost when 
re-describing freedom of religion as the freedom 
to live according to ‘conscientious convictions’ 
or ‘comprehensive doctrine’. Many aspects of 
people’s religious experience cannot simply be 
reinterpreted in such a manner. For numerous 
religious believers, she states, religion is about 
exhibiting virtues, living in community with others 
and ‘shaping one’s daily life in accordance with the 
rituals of the faith’10. A practicing Catholic who 
goes to mass on Sunday receives the sacrament 
of marriage, and has her children baptized and 
confirmed, will most likely find these activities 
meaning-giving, yet they are not necessarily 
duties of conscience. ‘Taylor and Maclure tend to 
re-interpret acts of habitual, collective, “embodied 
practices” of religious devotion as Protestantized 
duties of conscience’11. Despite their different 
terminology, therefore, Rawls and Maclure and 
Taylor are equally guilty of collapsing religion 
into matters of conscience. And this isn’t the only 
similarity in their characterization of religion.
9 Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philo-
sophical Papers Two. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985); Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the 
Modern Identity. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989).
10 Laborde, “Politics of Religious Freedom”.
11 Ibid.
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RELIGION AS COMPREHENSIVE
Not only do these authors focus on religion as a 
system of ethics – as a matter of conscience – 
they see this system as taking a particular form, 
namely, comprehensive. Maclure and Taylor offer 
a nuanced account. Certainly, they believe that 
by using the term ‘comprehensive doctrine’ John 
Rawls disregards the fact that many people do 
not base their life decisions on a wide-ranging 
and general doctrine. Some individuals may 
adopt a partially comprehensive doctrine by 
attempting to establish coherence in their values 
and commitments, but others – perhaps t h e 
majority, a s  Maclure a n d  Taylor believe – ‘refer 
to a fluid, eclectic set of values that are spelled out 
and linked to one another to a greater or lesser 
degree’12. The individual appeals to values when 
making a decision, but weighing up competing 
values ‘occurs on an ad hoc basis’13. On the other 
hand, this does not mean that Maclure and Taylor 
do not consider religion to be comprehensive. In 
fact, several passages in Secularism and Freedom 
of Conscience suggest they do in fact believe 
religion to be all-encompassing and systemic. 
Comprehensiveness, however, is not the aspect 
of religion that makes it worthy of respect and 
protection in their view14. Instead, its significance 
is characterized by its producing intensely-
held convictions – like some secular beliefs 
and commitments15. By distinguishing between 
established ‘religious doctrines and other values 
that do not originate in any totalizing system of 
thought’, convictions that ‘originate in a doctrine 
based on exegetical and apologetic texts’, and 
those that follow from an eclectic set of specific 
and (sometimes) temporary commitments and 
values, Maclure and Taylor present religion as an 
12 Maclure and Taylor, Freedom of Conscience, 94 
13 Ibid.
14 Rawls would agree that what creates the need for protection is 
the importance doctrines play in people’s life, not the fact that 
they are comprehensive. 
15 Maclure and Taylor, Freedom of Conscience, 97.
all-embracing system of values and convictions 
based on dogma found in religious texts16. This 
conception of religion – as I go on to show – leads 
the authors to argue that religious believers have 
little opportunity to adapt their convictions over 
time.
John Rawls uses the concept of a ‘comprehensive 
doctrine’ when he speaks of religious and secular 
conceptions of the good. A conception may be 
fully comprehensive, Rawls contends, ‘if it covers 
all recognized values and virtues within one 
rather precisely articulated system’17. Although 
Rawls explicitly states that not all people adhere 
to a doctrine that is systemic and ‘all-inclusive’, 
he believes ‘there is a tendency for religious and 
philosophical conceptions to be general and 
fully comprehensive; indeed their being so is 
sometimes regarded as an ideal to be realized’18. 
In this way, an ambition to being general and all-
encompassing is made into a defining feature of 
religious or secular moral doctrines.
RELIGION, UNIVOCALITY AND CONFLICT
Another feature that Rawls, Taylor and Maclure 
also take to be typical of religion is its internal 
homogeneity. In both Political Liberalism and 
Secularism and Freedom of Conscience, it is 
stressed that in a modern liberal democracy 
individual value systems are incompatible. It is 
this circumstance of inevitable conflict that leads 
Rawls to search for an overlapping consensus 
on political principles that can provide stability. 
Taylor and Maclure argue that moral and religious 
pluralism ‘lies at the heart of the most profound 
and complex disagreements existing among 
citizens’19.
16  Ibid., 93.
17  John Rawls, Political Liberalism, 13.
18  Ibid., 175.
19  Maclure and Taylor, Freedom of Conscience, 10. 
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For Maclure and Taylor, the idea that religions 
provide – or aim to provide – a systematic account 
of all virtues and values that applies to all subjects 
is directly related to the fact that they regard the 
presence of many different religions and secular 
doctrines as a source of conflict. The emphasis 
on system – in which all virtues and values are 
coherently positioned – leads the authors to focus 
solely on conflicts between diverging ‘totalizing 
systems of thought’, and not on possible conflicts 
within religious traditions, texts or communities. 
The ‘doctrinal’ aspect of religion that is emphasized 
in both theories make religions seem like rigid 
moral systems that are internally consistent and 
thus leave little room for doubt, uncertainty or 
moral dilemmas:
People who refer […] to a more fluid, eclectic 
set of values are not as likely to see their values 
as so many obligations or unconditional rules 
for action. Since the arbitration among values 
– professional success, family life, and social 
involvement, for example – not all of which can 
be realized fully and simultaneously, is permanent 
and structural reality in their lives, such people 
enjoy a much larger margin for maneuvering with 
respect to their convictions than those who rely on 
a comprehensive doctrine (whether an ecocentrist 
philosophy or a monotheist religion)’.20
While Christians, Jews and Muslims apparently 
have access to a complete and fully coherent 
value system that helps them to balance career 
and family life without losing any sleep over it, 
those who do not adhere to such a doctrine must 
balance and weigh competing values on a daily 
basis. As a result, individuals who do not adhere 
to a comprehensive doctrine are more adept at 
adapting their beliefs and values to changing 
circumstances21.
20  Taylor and Maclure, Freedom of Conscience, 94. 
21  Ibid.
For Rawls, the idea that religion leaves little room 
for doubt and discussion and is therefore an 
important source of societal conflict has less to do 
with the notion of comprehensiveness than with 
the idea that religious and non-religious doctrines 
contain an impenetrable transcendent element22. 
This can be better understood by examining how 
Rawls describes the historical origins of freedom 
of conscience, toleration and neutrality of state. 
Rawls and Taylor and Maclure consider the 
Reformation and the aftermath of religious wars 
as a starting point for these developments that 
now characterize the secular state23. As depicted 
by the authors, the pluralism of religious and 
nonreligious doctrines in modern societies in some 
sense mirrors the conflicting Christian doctrines 
that developed during the Reformation. In the 
introduction to Political Liberalism, for example, 
Rawls discusses the historical developments that 
led to the contemporary reality of the pluralism 
of moral and religious doctrines. Christianity, and 
especially the Reformation, says Rawls, drastically 
changed the aims and nature of political and 
moral philosophy. 
During the religious wars after the Reformation, 
people were no longer ‘in doubt about the nature of 
the highest good, or the basis of moral obligation 
in divine law. These things they thought they 
knew with the certainty of faith, as here their 
moral theology gave them complete guidance’24. 
This clash between Salvationist, creedal, and 
expansionist religions was not known to the 
ancients, but is, according to Rawls, a defining 
feature of modernity: 
22 As Ulrike Spohn shows in her contribution to this volume, the 
idea that all religions contain a certain core or essence that 
cannot be discussed, much less compromised over, is present 
in the work of many liberal philosophers, especially of those 
critical of the use of religious arguments in political discus-
sions. See her contribution for a problematization of this vol-
ume. 
23 Maclure and Taylor, Freedom of Conscience, 22; Rawls, Politi-
cal Liberalism, xxii-xxiv
24 Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxiv
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM: A Resource Book80
What is new about this clash is that it introduces into 
people’s conceptions of their good a transcendent 
element, not admitting of compromise. Political 
liberalism starts by taking to heart the absolute 
depth of that irreconcilable latent conflict25.
Political liberalism should thus embrace the 
fact of reasonable pluralism as ‘a pluralism of 
comprehensive doctrines, including both religious 
and nonreligious doctrines’26. The focus of 
modern political and moral philosophy therefore 
can no longer be the nature of the highest good. 
For the Moderns, states Rawls, the good is known 
in their religion or – in contemporary society – 
in their religious or non-religious comprehensive 
doctrine. This personal conception of the good, 
he continues, is characterized by a special 
inaccessibility that makes conflicts between 
different ideas of the good irreconcilable.
This historical reading of religious wars, which 
gives them a crucial place in the ‘making of 
modernity’, has been extensively criticized by 
Cavanaugh27. Even without his critique on the 
characterizations of religious wars as wars about 
conflicting doctrines, we may wonder if the idea 
of clashes between people who are ‘in no doubt 
about the nature of the highest good’ provides 
the best description of contemporary, pluralistic 
societies28.
25  Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxvi.
26  Ibid., xxiv.
27  Cavanaugh, William. The Myth of Religious Violence: Secu-
lar Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 150.
28 Moreover, Rawls seems to fall prey to what Donald Lopez calls 
the ‘ideology of belief ’, the assumption ‘that religion is above 
all an interior state of assent to certain truths’. While belief 
may be central to the way Christians have told their own his-
tory, religion in general can and should not be defined as a ‘set 
of truth claims’ Belief is not a universal or natural category, 
but a statement that is appropriate in a specific situation. In 
many historical and contemporary religious conflicts the cat-
egory of belief has functioned to obscure more material and 
political interests. (Donald Lopez Jr., “Belief,” in Critical Terms 
for Religious Studies, ed. Mark C. Taylor, Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1998, 28-31).
REPRESENTATION OF SPECIFIC RELIGIONS: 
RAWLS ON ISLAM
Up to now I have argued that Rawls’ and Taylor 
and Maclure’s egalitarian theories of religious 
freedom contain several contestable assumptions 
about the nature of religion. Egalitarian theorists, 
however, not only write about religion in general 
but also discuss cases involving specific religious 
groups and traditions. Islam and the presence 
of Muslims in democratic Western societies are 
topics that are discussed particularly often. These 
debates contain descriptions of Islam that are 
again based on assumptions about Muslims and 
the nature of their religion. To fully open the 
‘religious black box’29, it is instructive to look at 
such representations of specific religions alongside 
assumptions about religion in general in order to 
see how the two are interrelated.
In On the Muslim Question, Anne Norton 
claims that Rawls’s The Law of Peoples contains 
several contestable assumptions about the nature 
of Islam30. In his book, Rawls introduces a 
hypothetical and idealized Islamic people he calls 
Kazanistan which is used to illustrate the idea that 
liberal peoples can have just relations with non-
liberal but decent peoples31. According to Norton, 
Kazanistan’s decency is ensured by its departure 
from what Rawls presents as ‘the Muslim norm’. 
29 Kristina Stoeckl, “The Theology Blind Spot”, The Imma-
nent Frame (blog), February 13, 2014, http://blogs.ssrc.org/
tif/2014/02/13/the-theology-blind-spot/.
30 Anne Norton, On The Muslim Question (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2013), 96-100; John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 
with “The Idea of Public Reason  Revisited” (Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 2001).
31 Liberal peoples, according to Rawls, are those societies that 
respect their citizens’ comprehensive doctrines, while illiberal 
societies do not. Provided the institutions of illiberal societies 
meet certain conditions of political right and justice, and pro-
vided they accept general principles regulating their behavior 
towards other states, these peoples are described as ‘decent’. 
Rawls, Law of Peoples, 59-60; 62-78.
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For example, when Rawls states that ‘unlike most 
Muslim rulers, the rulers of Kazanistan have not 
sought empire and territory’ and that this ‘is the 
result of ‘its theologians’ interpreting jihad in 
a spiritual and moral sense, and not in military 
terms’, he implies that regular Muslim leaders are 
‘violent, warlike and imperialistic’32. The same 
could be said about his statement that Kazanistan is 
marked by its ‘enlightened treatment of the various 
non-Islamic religions and other minorities’33. 
This statement could be interpreted saying that 
“normal” Islamic people are not enlightened in 
this sense. He is, after all, describing an ‘idealized’ 
Islamic people. This leaves us, says Norton, with a 
very problematic description of Muslims as violent 
and discriminatory towards women and minority 
religions34.
Even though it is debatable that Rawls intended to 
sketch such a clear relationship between Islamic 
religion and the policies of his imaginary people, 
it is significant that his description of Kazanistan 
contains several representations of Islam that are 
reminiscent of historical, Orientalist thinking 
which has been rigorously criticized35. In 
particular, the ideas that Islam and despotism are 
closely linked and that Islam does not separate 
religion and politics are both present in this body 
of thought.
32  Norton, Muslim Question, 98.
33  Rawls, Law of Peoples, 76.
34  Norton, Muslim Question, 96-100.
35  Tomoko Masuzawa. The Invention of World Religions (Chi-
cago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2005).
CONCLUSION
Cécile Laborde rightly argues that analogizing 
or comparing religion with ‘core convictions’ or 
‘comprehensive doctrines’ betrays a Protestant 
bias. Rawls and Taylor and Maclure tend to 
overlook the communal, habitual, embodied 
aspects of religion and neglect those parts of 
religious experience that cannot be reinterpreted 
as stemming from individual conscience.
Contestable assumptions about the nature of 
religion, however, cannot be found only in the 
theorists’ chosen analogies. I have tried to show 
that by emphasizing the ways in which religions 
are coherent and complete value systems which 
contain an impenetrable transcendent core, these 
authors minimize the room for conflict within 
religions and over-emphasize the irreconcilability 
of ‘competing’ religions. By discussing the focus 
on the Reformation and its aftermath of religious 
warfare, I have tried to demonstrate that the 
authors’ accounts of religious and moral pluralism 
are modeled on a historically-specific construction 
of religious conflict.
These assumptions merit critical analysis and 
should at least be made explicit in debates on 
the relationship between politics and religion. 
Moreover, to completely open the black box 
of religion, it is necessary to further examine 
representations of specific religions and believers: 
Rawls’ description of Kazanistan shows that 
historically-charged notions can find their way 
into contemporary political theory.
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RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS 
AND FREEDOM OF 
CONSCIENCE
DARA SALAM
In this chapter, I discuss the question of religious 
exemption as an inescapable implication of 
religious pluralism. It is discussed from the point 
of view of political philosophy and the debate it 
has created surrounding the issue of religious 
freedom and freedom of conscience; namely, 
whether religious claims and, more generally, 
claims of conscience in pluralistic societies should 
be granted exemptions from generally applicable 
laws. 
As ethical pluralism – that is, the plurality of 
moral and religious convictions – is an essential 
feature and the foundation of liberal societies, it 
becomes then an important point to scrutinize 
how to accommodate this plurality, provided that 
the rights of all are equally protected. Religious 
pluralism, as part of a broader pluralism in liberal 
societies, poses the following question: how can 
this plurality of different religious practices and 
beliefs coexist in a way so as to generate political 
consensus and uphold the law? There are at least 
two responses that can be identified with regard 
to this question. Some political and legal theorists 
have argued that constitutional and conventional 
texts guaranteeing freedom of religion would 
make room for this plurality by way of granting 
these practices and beliefs certain exemptions 
from the law1. Others have argued that it is not 
only religion – with its beliefs and practices – that 
exceptionally requires special consideration and 
exemption from otherwise valid laws. There are 
other non-religious claims of conscience, that is, 
secular moral and ethical claims that also require 
1 See Michael McConnell, “The Problem of Singling Out 
Religion”, 50 DePaul Law Review 1(3), 2000; and Abner S. 
Greene, “The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses”, 
102 Yale Law Journal, 1611, 1613 (1993).
exemption from generally applicable laws2. This 
latter argument has led to the introduction of the 
language of the right to freedom of conscience in 
order to capture non-religious claims and respond 
to the unfairness that follows the singling out of 
religion for special consideration.  
I focus here on what has become the dominant 
argument in recent liberal political theory, i.e., 
egalitarian theories of religious freedom3. The 
ambition of the chapter is to clarify the egalitarian 
argument and identify some important points 
of disagreement between some of the main 
proponents of this argument. Egalitarian theories 
deal with exemption claims based on freedom of 
religion and conscience and the main arguments 
regarding the specialness of religion. In the 
first section, I discuss the egalitarian theories 
of religious freedom and the main arguments 
surrounding it. In the second, I will discuss some 
of these theories and their different reasoning, for 
exemption of claims of conscience.            
2 Most liberal egalitarian theorists would be willing to 
grant exemptions to religious and nonreligious claims 
of conscience. See,  Christopher L. Eisgruber and Law-
rence G. Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
2007); Micah Schwartzman, “What if Religion is not 
Special?”, University of Chicago Law Review 1351 (2012) 
and “Religion as a Legal Proxy”, San Diego Law Review, 
51, (2014), 1085-1104; Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: 
An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001); Jocelyn 
MacLure and Charles Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of 
Conscience (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
2011); Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2013); Martha Nussbaum, 
Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition 
of Religious Equality (New York, New York: Basic Books, 
2008); Ronald Dworkin, Religion without God (Cam-
bridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2013).
3 By egalitarians we mean those who give weight to the 
value of equality and start from the premise that citizens 
are free and equal in their moral standing. 
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I - If an individual is persecuted or imprisoned 
for her moral and political views, she is said to 
be a prisoner of conscience. The demand she, and 
many others who hold the same view, would most 
likely and strongly raise in this case is the right of 
individuals to the right to freedom of conscience. 
That is, individuals must be free to express their 
thoughts without fear of discrimination and 
persecution. Here, it seems that freedom of 
conscience is a subset of a more general category 
of freedom, such as freedom of expression or 
thought or speech4.   
However, suppose another individual is persecuted 
or imprisoned because of her religious beliefs and 
practices. The first demand, even though she is 
called a prisoner of (religious) conscience, raised 
by her and others who hold the same belief is 
somehow different from the first example. The 
demand of her campaigners would be the right 
of individuals to have religious freedom. That is, 
their religious conscience must be protected by 
the state.
So it seems that in the above example, freedom 
of conscience encompasses religious and non-
religious claims of conscience that are expressed 
and sincerely held by individuals; they represent 
their substantive commitments and are the basis 
for the beliefs and practices necessary for them to 
lead an authentic life. In fact, some egalitarians 
have analogized religion with conscience and held 
that the latter is more encompassing of individuals’ 
deep commitments than the former5. Thus, in a 
liberal state, religious and nonreligious claims 
4 For a clear formulation and discussion of this, see Cecile 
Laborde, “Equal Liberty, Non-Establishment and Reli-
gious Freedom”, Legal Theory, Volume 20, Issue. 1 (2014): 
52-77. 
5 See Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor, Secularism and 
Freedom of Conscience (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2011). For a critique of this analogizing 
approach and its problematic implications, see Cecile 
Laborde, “Politics of religious freedom”, The Immanent 
Frame, http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2012/04/23/protecting-
freedom-of-religion-in-the-secular-age/ 
of conscience are both protected by freedom of 
conscience. Religious freedom, as egalitarians 
would like to contend, is just a subcategory of 
freedom of conscience and this constitutes the 
archetypical right in any just liberal state which 
the state has an obligation to secure.
The religious commitments of individuals and 
their beliefs and practices must, in a liberal state, 
be protected by freedom of conscience. Protecting 
religious conscience, however, seems to entail that 
religious beliefs and practices should be freely 
practiced and, therefore, that the liberal state must 
accommodate these beliefs and practices and grant 
them exemptions as and when the application of 
general laws might lead to an unfair discrimination 
against religious adherents. Egalitarians also 
emphasize that this discrimination could follow 
against other non-religious claimants. 
Liberal egalitarian philosophers have argued that 
freedom of conscience is designed, in pluralistic 
democratic societies, to protect minority religions 
from burdensome laws that are designed by 
the majority and ensure that their beliefs and 
practices are accommodated. Martha Nussbaum, 
for example, argues that liberal democratic 
states should ensure that individuals with strong 
religious commitments and those who search for 
the ultimate meaning and purpose of life are not 
placed into a dilemma, such as that of Antigone. 
Nation states should not throw people into a 
religious dilemma, that is, between obeying the 
general rules and going against their religious 
commitments6. However, all liberal egalitarians 
stress the point that the plurality embedded in 
modern democratic societies requires that the 
6 Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense 
of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (New York, 
New York: Basic Books, 2008), 116-7. Sophocles’s Anti-
gone is placed in a moral dilemma when her strong 
commitment to her religion demanded her to bury her 
brother who is killed as a traitor in a city whose laws do 
not allow the burial of traitors. The burden of the law 
leads her to kill herself.    
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law should not only accommodate religious 
conviction but also non-religious, secular 
convictions that express the individual claim 
of conscience7. Following this fact of moral and 
religious pluralism, egalitarians consider that 
freedom of conscience gives everyone the right to 
pursue a good and meaningful life according to 
their beliefs and, more importantly, freedom of 
conscience will be equally applicable to all claims 
of conscience.
John Rawls has stressed that “equal liberty of 
conscience” is the first principle that individuals 
in a social contract would acknowledge, because 
they “cannot take chances with their liberty 
by permitting the dominant religious or moral 
doctrine to persecute or to suppress others if it 
wishes”8. Nussbaum also, following Rawls, views 
“equal respect for all citizens’ consciences” as 
one of the fundamental principles that should 
constitute any law on the free exercise of religious 
and non-religious commitments. She arrives at 
this conclusion by arguing that what religion is 
concerned with are the “ultimate questions”, such 
as questions of life and death, the meaning of 
life, life’s ethical foundation, and so forth. Thus, 
what is worthy of respect and legal protection is 
“the faculty with which each person searches for 
the ultimate meaning of life… except when that 
search violates the rights of others or comes up 
against some compelling state interest”9.
7 The egalitarian argument for the inclusion of secular 
claims of conscience alongside religious claims as being 
worthy of likewise legal exemptions has been reflected in 
court decisions which led to successful legal exemption 
cases as, for example, in the case of Daniel Seeger’s con-
scientious objection to military conscription. The U.S. 
Supreme Court granted exemption to Seeger based on 
his secular moral beliefs; U.S. v. Seeger (1965), 380 U.S. 
163.     
8 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, revised ed. 1999), 181.
9 Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience, 168-9.
There are disagreements among liberal egalitarian 
theorists of religious freedom about what should 
and should not count as claims of conscience. 
While Nussbaum defends an account of “questions 
of ultimate meaning” to be the best candidate for 
an account of religious and non-religious claims 
of conscience, Maclure and Taylor criticize this 
and argue for a more inclusive range of questions 
that are not centered on only such questions. In 
their argument against the above account, they 
find two defects. First, concentrating on “ultimate 
questions” will exclude from the individual’s 
conscientious claims those questions and 
commitments that are not focused on existential 
or metaphysical concerns, but on more ordinary 
attachments that a person may have, for example, 
the care given to loved ones. That is, the individual 
may believe that life has no meaning if it is not 
possible to care for loved ones, for example, a 
terminally ill wife or child10. However, this may not 
involve reflection on existential and metaphysical 
questions. According to Maclure and Taylor, the 
side effect of this view is that any commitment or 
conviction not grounded in the human cognitive 
faculty to contemplate on, and search for, the 
meaning of life will be excluded from the realm 
of claims of conscience and, therefore, will not be 
considered for conscientious exemptions. Second, 
the difficulty created by Nussbaum’s account of the 
primacy or priority of the contemplative search for 
the ultimate meaning of life is that the neutrality 
of the state will be compromised. That is, the state 
must favor those conceptions of the good that are 
linked to the individual’s quest for the meaning of 
life over those not linked to a systematic doctrine 
but more to “ordinary life” attachments11.             
10 Maclure and Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Con-
science, 96.
11 Ibid., 97.
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II - Liberal egalitarians generally agree that religion 
should be protected, but object to the idea that 
religion should be uniquely protected. This claim 
has two consequences. First, it is intended to argue 
that religion is not special, that is, religious belief 
and practice should not be treated as deserving 
of special consideration. Religious freedom, 
thus, is not sui generis. This view is defended 
by Ronald Dworkin and others. He argues that 
religious freedom is just a right that individuals 
seek to have and is the result of the more general 
right to “ethical independence”12. Second, it also 
is intended to argue that it is not only religious 
claims that demand exemption from generally 
applicable laws. There are other non-religious 
ethical claims and commitments that equally 
demand special treatment and legal exemptions, 
such as conscientious objection to military service 
which is based on ethical objections to the killing 
of others13. 
Brian Leiter also refuses to see religious claims 
of conscience as unique and worthy of special 
protection compared to other non-religious 
claims14. He gives the example of the Sikh boy who 
was allowed by the Canadian Supreme Court in 
2006 to wear the kirpan, a ceremonial knife, for 
religious reasons. He criticizes this move, arguing 
that a rural boy would not be allowed in any 
Western democracy to carry a knife in school for 
either cultural or traditional reasons15.
12 Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011), 376. See also 
Dworkin, Religion without God (Cambridge, Mass: Har-
vard University Press, 2013). 
13 See Micah Schwartzman, “What if Religion is not Spe-
cial?”, University of Chicago Law Review, 1351 (2012). 
He argues “[I]nstead of disabling or protecting only 
religious beliefs and practices, the law ought to provide 
similar treatment for comparable secular ethical, moral, 
and philosophical views”. 1355 
14 Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 2012).
15 Ibid., 1-3.
Leiter argues that the moral ideal of religious 
freedom in Western democracies is based on 
the principle of toleration, more specifically, on 
principled toleration. Principled toleration refers 
to the idea that the dominant religions put up 
with the other (dis-favored or minority) faiths and 
groups based on moral, not instrumental, reasons. 
This means there are moral reasons to accept 
their beliefs and practices even though these 
are disapproved of by the dominant religions. 
He, nonetheless, does not reject religious and 
non-religious exemptions across the board16. He 
argues that the only test that can be conducted to 
decide whether a religious or nonreligious claim 
of conscience should be exempt from generally 
applicable laws is the principle of shifting burdens. 
It is only with this principle that religious 
exemptions can be justified. He argues that the 
exemption, for instance, to wear a hijab in public 
schools and offices can be justified, precisely 
because it shifts no burdens or risks onto others. 
However, exempting religious organizations from 
taxes is not justified because it requires channeling 
income and tax from others for the welfare of these 
organizations and, therefore, shifting burdens onto 
others. A possible objection to Leiter’s principle as 
grounds for his exemptionist approach towards 
the exhibition of religious identities and symbols 
in public can be seen in relation to the hijab in 
schools. The claim could be made that it could have 
proselytizing effects on other girls whose families 
might be burdened (psychologically and socially) 
by the consequences of this proselytization.
16 Leiter argues that the No Exemption approach is prob-
lematic and cannot be applied universally because of the 
abuses that can follow from its application, for exam-
ple, the state’s anti-religious motivation to discrimi-
nate against certain faiths under the name of neutrality. 
(Leiter, 104. See also Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience, 
for arguing against the no-exemption approach.
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Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager would 
agree with Leiter that religion is not morally or 
legally special. However, they offer a different 
reason as to why certain religious claims of 
conscience should be exempt from generally 
applicable laws17. They argue that in a religiously 
plural society, religious exemptions reflect the equal 
treatment shown by the state and its constitution 
towards its religious citizens compared to others. 
Freedom of religion and conscience, they argue, 
require the liberal state to adopt the principle of 
“equal liberty” which grants everyone, regardless 
of their convictions, equal treatment. In order to 
implement the equality of treatment in a pluralized 
society and to be fair to religious citizens, this 
liberal egalitarian principle requires the state to 
grant religious adherents exemptions that make 
them equal in comparison to other non-religious 
citizens, notwithstanding that they rule out the 
possibility of treating religion as special. 
Their principle of equal liberty would ideally have 
it that every citizen is treated or regarded as free 
and equal in a just political order regulated by 
fair principles18. That is to say, the state should 
be neutral towards its citizens as to what kind 
of convictions they hold and should not favor 
or disfavor any conviction or faith group in 
its policy and institutional structure. This has 
been constitutionally reflected – and widely 
discussed - in the Establishment clause of the 
First Amendment of the US Constitution which 
states that “Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion...” Insofar as this 
principle is concerned, every citizen is treated 
equally and fairly before the law, as the state 
has not enacted any discriminatory law against 
certain religious groups. 
17 Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, Reli-
gious Freedom and the Constitution (Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2010).
18 See Rawls, Theory of Justice, xii and elsewhere.
Freedom of religion, clearly, grants religious 
citizens the freedom to exercise their beliefs and 
practices and this requires, in certain cases, the 
withholding of the general law that is equally 
applicable to all citizens. This is one of the most 
influential interpretations of the highly debated 
constitutional clauses, i.e., the Free Exercise 
clause of the US Constitution19. It is clear that the 
main concern of Eisgruber and Sager’s project 
of granting religious exemptions is fairness 
and equality in dealing with religious claims of 
conscience20.
19 No interpretation of this clause is offered here as to 
whether exemption is implicated in it, as it is already 
widely debated. Michael McConnell argues that the Free 
Exercise clause is about exemptions: “if there is a con-
stitutional requirement for accommodation of religious 
conduct, it will most likely be found in the Free Exer-
cise Clause. Some say, though, that it is a violation of the 
Establishment Clause for the government to give any 
special benefit or recognition of religion. In that case, 
we have a First Amendment in conflict with itself—the 
Establishment Clause forbidding what the Free Exercise 
Clause requires”. Michael McConnell, Religion and the 
Constitution (Aspen Publishers, 2002), 105.
20 “Equal Liberty… sees concerns of fairness as lying at 
the very heart of free exercise exemption controversies. 
What is critical from the vantage of Equal Liberty is that 
no members of our political community be disadvan-
taged in the pursuit of their important commitments 
and projects on account of the spiritual foundations of 
those commitments and projects”, Eisgruber and Sager, 
Religious Freedom and the Constitution, 15.
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IS RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 
SIMPLY A MATTER OF 
JUSTICE?1
VOLKER KAUL
There is a long lasting debate in political philosophy 
as to what extent pluralism and, more specifically, 
religious pluralism is a matter of justice. It is 
a discussion that goes back at least to Hobbes’ 
Leviathan. According to the social contract 
tradition, religious pluralism and tolerance is 
neither natural nor spontaneous but occurs only in 
political circumstances that guarantee some form 
of justice, last but not least, social and economic 
justice. This thesis stands in clear contrast to the 
position that holds pluralism to depend upon the 
respective religious doctrines themselves and 
the degree to which they allow for differences. 
According to this theory, religions can be more or 
less tolerant - and this entirely independent from 
the social and political context. The most extreme 
formulation of this theory we can find in Samuel 
Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations.
My goal here is to defend a very light and moderate 
version of the latter, anti-reductionist thesis. 
Although I am not defending any form of religious 
essentialism, I do sketch out the argument that we 
cannot ignore the constitutive role that religious 
beliefs and norms play in the motivation of 
extremism and intolerance. Accordingly, religious 
pluralism is not solely the result of institutions. 
Reductive theories that emphasize the ideological 
character of religion or stress religious extremists’ 
lack of self-knowledge run into a variety of 
problems that concern, in particular, agency, 
subjectivity and first-person authority. 
1 I would like to thank all participants of the workshop 
“Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Religious Pluralism” 
(European University Institute (EUI), Florence, January 
19-20, 2015) for the engaged discussion and the editors 
of this volume for their very helpful comments.
A methodological point: I use the terms religious 
extremism and intolerance as more or less 
synonymous and the terms religious pluralism 
and moderatism as antonyms. Extremists believe 
that in one way or another religion may actually 
legitimate acts of discrimination and the use of 
violence. Moderates, on the other hand, do not 
commit acts of intolerance on religious grounds. 
RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND AGENCY
It is a recurrent debate, in particular with regard 
to the emergence of Islamism, that religious 
extremism has its cause in poverty, frustration, 
repression, hatred, etc., rather than in God’s 
law. There are good grounds to believe that 
radicalization has other origins than religion itself. 
Sociologists and economists show that correlations 
exist between certain social factors and extremism 
and violence2. Psychologists demonstrate that 
personality disorders rather than particular belief 
systems explain violence. In fact, certain studies 
can be interpreted, although with great caution 
and inconclusively, as indicating that extremists 
tend to have some common psychological and 
social features3. It is very plausible to think that 
psychological and social factors explain extremism 
rather than a religious doctrine that is moreover 
often shared by moderates too4. 
2 See in particular Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “On 
Economic Causes of Civil War”. Oxford Economic Papers 
(50)4:563–573, 1998.
3 See Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Bundeskriminal-
amt (KI11, ST33), Hessisches Informations- und Kom-
petenzzentrum gegen Extremismus (HKE), Analyse der 
den deutschen Sicherheitsbehörden vorliegenden Infor-
mationen über die Radikalisierungshintergründe und 
-verläufe der Personen, die aus islamistischer Motiva-
tion aus Deutschland in Richtung Syrien ausgereist sind, 
01.12.2014, downloaded at http://www.pti-kassel.de/
institut/download/praeventionsnetzwerk_salafismus_
analyse.pdf. 
4 This is the claim of Akeel Bilgrami in “What is a Mus-
lim? Fundamental Commitment and Cultural Identity”. 
Critical Inquiry 18(4):198-219, 1992.
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It is not the place here to flesh out a causal theory 
of religious extremism in detail. As an empirical 
theory, it requires not only data but also rather 
complex theories of causation and a theory of 
the mind. Whereas Seyla Benhabib emphasizes 
the role of negative emotions such as anger and 
hatred in the emergence of fundamentalism5, 
other analysts, such as Scott Atran, stress rather 
the attractive features of terrorist networks and 
the positive feelings they bring about6. The point 
I want, however, to analyze here is whether causal 
theories can really deny the foundational function 
that beliefs have in the motivation of an action. 
Despite the evidence that speaks in favor of causal 
theories, one crucial aspect is left out: namely that 
religious beliefs, though perhaps insufficient, are 
nevertheless necessary in the psychology of the 
extremist. For an Islamist to attack a bareheaded 
woman because she does not wear a head covering, 
for example, requires the belief that women should 
cover their heads. 
I would like to discuss here one particularly 
hard objection to those causal theses that reject 
the relevance of religion in the explanation of 
extremism. The hard objection holds that causal 
theories depict extremists as a sort of victim of 
their psychology, family background and social 
and economic circumstances, thereby denying 
their agency as actors. Seen from their own 
perspective, however, extremists are absolutely 
not victims, they are just the contrary. 
5 Seyla Benhabib, “Piety or Rage? On the Charlie Hebdo 
Massacres”. In; Reset DOC, 11.01.2015, downloaded at 
http://www.resetdoc.org/story/00000022481. 
6 Scott Atran with Lydia Wilson, Richard Davis, Ham-
mad Sheikh, The Devoted Actor, Sacred Values, and 
Willingness to Fight: Preliminary Studies with ISIL Vol-
unteers and Kurdish Frontline Fighters, Recent and 
ongoing research in conjunction with the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense MINERVA Initiative, November 2014, 
downloaded at http://artisresearch.com/wp-content/
uploads/2014/11/Atran_Soccnet_MINERVA_ISIS.pdf.  
They consider themselves to be moral heroes that, 
unlike their moderate peers, have the courage to 
speak out and act in accordance with religious values 
and God’s commandments. They are the epitome 
of integrity, refusing, contrary to moderates, any 
kind of compromise and utilitarian calculus. If 
anyone is a victim, the godless moderates are. 
Such strong convictions become manifest in their 
self-righteous and cruel action. Extremists present 
themselves as highly-stylized and display very 
elaborated aesthetics of their own in the way they 
dress, move and talk - a phenomenon that we can 
observe also in respect of other violent subaltern 
actors, such as mafia gangsters, guerilla fighters, 
child soldiers etc.7 In fact, following the Charlie 
Hebdo massacre, the portrayal of the attackers as 
victims was muted in favor of condemnations that 
asserted their moral agency8. From the extremist 
point of view, their actions are clearly guided by 
convictions, values and commitments. In this 
regard, causal explanations that do not take into 
account religious beliefs are certainly incomplete. 
By rejecting the agency of extremists, we risk 
ignoring the subjective point of view and its 
importance in the motivation of action. 
7 Jean-François Bayart and Jean-Pierre Warnier (eds.), 
Matière à politique. Le pouvoir, les corps et les choses, 
(Paris: Karthala, 2004). See also Janet MacGaffey and 
Rémy Bazenguissa-Ganga, Congo-Paris: Transnational 
Traders on the Margins of the Law (Bloomington, Indi-
ana: Indiana University Press, 2000). 
8 Michaela Wiegel, “Eine Zäsur”. Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, 8.01.15, p. 1: “All those who provided a social 
explanation of the worst acts of violence disappeared 
astonishingly quickly from the public debate. The former 
managing editor of Charlie Hebdo, Philippe Val, exhorted 
that society is not to be blamed for young French people 
with a background of living out their Islamistic fantasies 
of violence. He demanded, in particular from the left, a 
new sincerity in the overly-cautious debate on Islam and 
immigration in society” (translation by the author). 
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RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND IDEOLOGY 
We can find two arguments that defend the causal 
theory against the hard objection: the arguments 
concerning ideology and self-knowledge. Both these 
arguments try, in one way or another, to explain 
away the problem of beliefs. The first counter-
thesis basically leaves intact the hard objection and 
its claim that beliefs motivate action. Yet, it argues 
that in the end, all that what we consider to be 
doctrines, values and subjective reasons are rather 
a form of ideology. People believe indeed that they 
are the authors of their proper beliefs, yet in reality 
their beliefs, at least in the Marxist tradition, are 
simply the results of the relations of production 
and, more generally, material conditions. Marx 
reduces and explains “the production of ideas, 
of conceptions, of consciousness […] with the 
material activity and the material intercourse 
of men”9. Therefore, he can say that “religion is 
the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a 
heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. 
It is the opium of the people”10. Religion is an 
illusion, a false consciousness. In this regard, 
beliefs, although existent and powerful, are no 
particular big problem. At the moment that the 
material conditions change, extremist beliefs will, 
over time, disappear. 
9 Marx continues: “Conceiving, thinking, the mental 
intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux 
of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental 
production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, 
morality, religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people. Men 
are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. – real, 
active men, as they are conditioned by a definite devel-
opment of their productive forces and of the intercourse 
corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms”. (Karl 
Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Feuerbach. Gegensatz von 
materialistischer und idealistischer Anschauung”. Karl 
Marx and Friedrich Engels, Über Ludwig Feuerbach, 
(Leipzig: Reclam, 1970), p. 15. Translation from the 
online edition of The German Ideology, downloaded at 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/
german-ideology/).Perhaps check this quote, it doesn’t 
seem to be all one block quotation as it is shown here. 
Ok, now it’s a block quotation. 
10 Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy Of Right’, 
Joseph O’Malley  (ed., trans.),  Annette Jolin  (trans.), 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 1.
Leaving aside the complex difficulties in proving 
this theory, advocates of the hard objection could 
claim that all efforts to eliminate the first-person 
miss the point. The first-person perspective is 
irreducible. In short, the hard objection could 
point to the subjective nature of practical beliefs, 
in the sense that values and commitments are the 
result of our freedom and autonomy. 
RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND SELF-
KNOWLEDGE
The second counter-argument tends to dismiss the 
role played by beliefs and maintains that it need 
not necessarily be beliefs that give rise to religious 
intolerance, even though we tend to think they do. 
This theory is based upon the assumption that our 
mind lacks transparence: we do not always, and 
perhaps only rarely, have accurate access to our 
mind. For example, extremists who believe that 
non-Muslims are infidels must not automatically 
have this belief, despite believing that they do. Or, 
Islamists, claiming to act upon the obligations 
written in the Qur’an, might have quite different 
motivations for their actions, such as feelings 
of guilt, resentment etc. The motives or beliefs 
guiding their actions can in fact be hidden from 
them, without the need to deceive themselves. 
According to this theory, self-knowledge is not 
special with respect to other knowledge. Therefore, 
we do not have immediate, first-person access to 
our mental state nor special authority with regard 
to our beliefs and desires. Knowing oneself is not 
unlike knowing other minds. We must observe 
ourselves in order to know what we are really up 
to.
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM: A Resource Book92
Many experiments in the cognitive sciences 
confirm the opacity of the mind11. And extremists 
may effectively be driven by motives other than they 
are aware of. It is a standard thesis in the psychology 
of religion that fundamentalism fulfills particular 
psychological needs and is an answer to the quest 
for meaning in an inhospitable environment12. 
Nevertheless, questioning first-person authority 
might again fail to refute the hard objection. 
Lack of self-knowledge does not necessarily 
compromise agency13. Perhaps extremists are not 
always particularly clear on their commitments 
and are confused about their motivations, but 
their integrity and credibility in the eyes of others 
- and also in their own eyes - stands and falls with 
the extent to which they actually live up to the 
self-proclaimed commitments. If commitments 
do not reflect themselves in action - if extremists 
are not perceived to be authentic and to,believe 
in their cause and reveal, on the contrary, only 
self-interest, insecurity and frustration - religious 
extremism may well disappear. The problem is, 
as the hard objection continues to insist, that 
beliefs and convictions are present and cannot be 
brushed aside. 
11 For the original epistemological account of self-knowl-
edge, see Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1949). For a recent 
study that denies privileged access to our own minds 
and is based upon studies and results from the cogni-
tive sciences, see Peter Carruthers, The Opacity of Mind: 
An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011).
12 Ralph W. Hood Jr., Peter C. Hill and W. Paul William-
son, The Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism (New 
York: Guilford Press, 2005). 
13 This is the thesis of Akeel Bilgrami in Resentment and 
Self-Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2006).
CONCLUSION 
Religious extremists are therefore agents rather 
than passive victims. Treating their beliefs as only 
residues of various injustices suffered, without 
taking such beliefs seriously, risks increasing 
incomprehension between groups, offensive 
behavior and social division. Still, the question 
remains  as to how to engage with extremist 
beliefs. Since refuting their claims on a cognitive 
or theological level, as hermeneutical readings 
of the sacred texts propose14, might nonetheless 
miss the point if we do not consider extremism 
to be about religious truth15. In order to address 
extremism effectively, it is impossible to avoid 
the arduous task of understanding the nature 
of religious commitments from the first-person 
perspective.    
14 See in particular Nasr Abu Zayd, Rethinking the Qu’ran: 
Towards a Humanistic Hermeneutics (Amsterdam, SWP 
Publishing, 2004). 
15 This is my argument in “What Makes a Fundamentalist? 
Metaphysics, Morality and Psychology,” in Philosophy 
& Social Criticism 41(4-5):, pp. 509-514, 2015. Not sure 
what you mean by ‘Latter is my argument’
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III–DISAGREEMENTS, 
DIFFERENCES 
AND PUBLIC 
JUSTIFICATION
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HABERMAS’S TRANSLATION 
PROVISO AND 
CONSERVATIVE RELIGIOUS 
ACTORS IN THEPUBLIC 
SPHERE
ANJA HENNIG
This chapter discusses Jürgen Habermas’s 
institutional translation proviso, which is central to 
his concept of post-secular societies1 and consists 
of the claim that religious arguments should be 
translated into a secular language before entering 
the public sphere. Habermas’s argument is not 
only normative but also relates the translation 
proviso to socio-political developments such as 
the religious pluralization of European societies, 
which goes hand in hand with a decreasing level 
of individual religiosity. Habermas’s response 
to cultural plurality is that religious reasons can 
be publicly expressed but must be accessible 
to others once they enter the arena of political 
decision-making. This chapter focuses on the 
extent to which Habermas’s concept is applicable 
to empirical cases; the difficulty in identifying 
religious arguments; and the problems arising 
from the observation that “translation” is often 
used as a strategy by conservative religious citizens 
to voice their claims.
1 Jürgen Habermas, „Glaube, Wissen - Öffnung. Zum Frie-
denspreis Des Deutschen Buchhandels. Eine Dankrede,“ 
Süddeutsche Zeitung; available at: http://ig.cs.tu-berlin.
de/oldstatic/w2001/eu1/dokumente/Basistexte/Haber-
mas2001-Buchhandel.pdf, 10, 15 2001.
HABERMAS’S TRANSLATION PROVISO
For the past two decades, attempts in Europe 
to liberalize existing abortion regulations and 
recognize same-sex partnerships have provoked 
harsh criticism, especially from the Roman 
Catholic Church, national episcopates, and 
Catholic ‘pro-life’ organizations. For traditional 
Catholicism, moral liberalization is problematic 
because it prioritizes individual choice and 
contradicts Catholic moral teaching, for which 
saving the unborn child and preserving traditional 
family structures are fundamental responsibilities 
of a society2. Accordingly, the Vatican and other 
conservative religious communities are, as 
Habermas is all too aware, still reluctant to adapt 
to many liberal moral values3. Considering that 
religious communities have a vested interest in 
defending their moral principles and contributing 
to bio-ethical debates, the core normative element 
of Habermas’s concept of the post-secular, the 
“institutional translation proviso”, becomes 
central for understanding the status of their 
claims in public debate. 
Following Rawls, Habermas provides a normative 
framework for the place of religious arguments 
in public reason. His proviso states that religious 
reasons can be introduced into the debate in the 
informal public sphere provided that, in the course 
of the debate, such religious reasons are adequately 
translated into secular ones. Only secular reasons 
would “push for mutual perspective-taking so 
that different communities can develop a more 
inclusive perspective by transcending their own 
universe of discourse”4. This process of translation 
must be completed before debate can enter 
formalized institutions of democratic decision-
2 Aline H. Kalbian, Sexing the Church. Gender, Power, 
and Ethics in Contemporary Catholicism (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2005).
3 Jürgen Habermas, “Equal Treatment of Cultures and the 
Limits of Postmodern Liberalism”, The Journal of Politi-
cal Philosophy 13, no. 1 (2005), 10.
4 “Dialogue. Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor”, in The 
Power of Religion in the Public Sphere, ed. Judith But-
ler, Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan VanAntwerpen 
(Columbia University Press, 2011), 66.
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making, such as parliament and government. 
However, individual religious citizens who are 
not able to translate their arguments should also 
be allowed to contribute religious arguments 
to public discourses in the pre-parliamentary 
sphere.5 
Central to Habermas’s translation proviso are 
the distinctions he makes between a formal and 
informal public sphere; the dichotomy between 
religious and secular reasons as well as religious 
and secular citizens; and the acknowledgment of 
religious contributions to public reason as relevant 
to the liberal state. To begin with, the formal 
public sphere is, for Habermas, the space where 
democratic decision-making within political 
bodies occurs, where laws are written and the 
government rules. In this sphere of parliaments, 
courts, and administrations, only secular 
contributions are allowed. The formal proceedings 
within these institutions filter “the Babel of voices 
in the informal flows of public communication”, 
divesting the formal public sphere of such “wild 
life”6. 
The distinction between the formal public sphere 
of democratic procedures and the informal as a 
place of “wild” democratic deliberation is essential 
for understanding how Habermas’s translation 
requirement for the former is linked to his 
cautious endorsement of religious contributions 
to the latter. It is, however, difficult to locate 
the boundaries between both spheres, since 
Habermas states that “the translation of religious 
contributions into a secular language occurs 
already in the pre-parliamentarian domain, i.e., 
in the political public sphere itself”7. Against 
this apparently clear demarcation, I will argue 
here that the boundaries between informal civil 
societal and formal political sphere are fluid, and 
a clear-cut separation is difficult to maintain.
5 Naturalismus Und Religion (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 
2005), 125.(Author?)
6 “Religion in the Public Sphere”, European Journal of 
Philosophiy 14, no. 1 (2006), 11.(Author?)
7 Habermas, Public Sphere, 11.
Religious Reasoning between the informal and 
formal Public Sphere
For Habermas, the translation demand derives 
from the principle of constitutional separation 
of religion and politics, or ‘church and state’. 
This separation only allows “translated” – that 
is, secular - contributions “to penetrate from the 
Babylonian chaos of voices in the wider public 
to the agenda of state institutions”8. This process 
ensures that political authorities are able to 
exercise the liberal-democratic principle of state 
neutrality toward competing worldviews9. 
Under the conditions of post-secularity, however, 
the liberal state also has an interest in “unleashing 
religious voices in the political public sphere, 
and in the political participation of religious 
organizations as well”. In this, Habermas differs 
clearly from Rawls in his Habermas esteem of 
religious reasoning and traditions because of 
their “special power to articulate moral intuitions, 
especially with regard to vulnerable forms of 
communal life”10. Secular citizens or those of 
other religious persuasions can, in his view, learn 
something from the religious contributions of 
others. Accordingly, Habermas invites religious 
communities to express and justify their 
convictions through religious language in public 
discourse, provided that they cannot find secular 
translation for them. At the same time, he asks 
religious citizens for an “epistemic ability” to 
consider their faith “reflexively from the outside 
and to relate it to secular views”11. 
8 Habermas, Naturalismus, 124ff.
9 Habermas, Public Sphere, 6.
10 Ibid., 9.
11  Ibid., 10.
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In sum, religious reasoning can12 be part of 
deliberation in the informal public sphere; also 
because it may transport some “truth content” for 
the institutionalized democratic process. Yet, the 
precondition for this is that religious speech will 
be translated into a generally-accessible language 
before it enters the formal public sphere, and every 
citizen must accept it13. 
Normative Implications
Habermas views translation not merely as a 
vehicle for enabling religious citizens to contribute 
to political decision-making but rather, it will in 
a normative sense be conceived as “a cooperative 
task” in which the non-religious citizen must 
likewise participate. In this vein, translation 
reduces the “asymmetrical burden” for religious 
citizens when, for instance, arguing against 
abortion. That said, cooperative translation will 
enhance the “process of mutual learning and 
understanding” between religious and non-
religious citizens14 and help to overcome cultural 
differences as well as fixing the “controversial 
boundary” between secular and religious 
reasons15.
Habermas’s reasoning relies on two liberal 
principles which turn out to be essential for 
analyzing the translation praxis of conservative 
religious groups. First is the premise that 
constitutional democracy guarantees the same 
fundamental rights to all citizens. The second 
principle is the concept of state neutrality. 
12 3 Harrington criticizes Habermas for having appar-
ently “retreated from the force of this “must” in favor of 
a more ambiguous “should”, although this sometimes 
only sounds like a “can”. Austin Harrington, ‘Haber-
mas and the “Post-Secular Society”’. European Journal of 
Social Theory 10, no. 4 (2007), 552. 
13  Habermas, Public Sphere, 9.
14  Habermas, Glaube und Wissen; Public Sphere, 12
15  Habermas, Glaube und Wissen
This does not merely include impartiality toward 
different faiths and a language “for all enforceable 
political decisions” that is “equally accessible to 
all citizens”, but also guarantees equal ethical 
freedom for all citizens and is, as Habermas’s 
translation proviso underlines, incompatible 
with “the political generalization of a secularist 
worldview”16. Finally, as Habermas replies to 
Wolterstorff, neutrality in a procedural sense 
must exclude the fact that “the majority deploys 
religious arguments in the process of political 
opinion and will formation”17. 
Translation Proviso under Critique
Within the broader debate among liberal thinkers 
over the permissiveness of religious reasons in the 
public sphere, Habermas uses the institutional 
translation proviso to adopt a “middle-ground 
position” between exclusionists like Robert Audi18 
on the one hand, and inclusionists like Nicholas 
Wolterstorff19 and Paul Weithman20 on the other21. 
His translation proviso is criticized from both 
sides. For inclusionists, it is built on problematic 
theoretical assumptions. In particular, the clear-
cut distinction between religious and secular 
arguments/citizens is considered to be misleading, 
as this dichotomy implies that the religious would 
be clearly irrational and the secular rational, and 
16  Habermas, Naturalismus, 118.
17  Habermas, Public Sphere, 13.
18  Robert Audi, Religious Commitment and Secular Reason 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
19  Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Habermas on Religion and 
Postmetaphysicalphilosophy in Political Discourse”, in 
Understanding Liberal Democracy. Essays in Political 
Philosophy, ed. Terrence Cuneo (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2012).
20  Paul J. Weithman, Religion and The Obligations of Citi-
zenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
21  Patrick Loobuyck and Stefan Rummens, “Religious 
Arguments in the Public Sphere: Comparing Habermas 
with Rawls”, Ars disputandi: the online journal for phi-
losophy of religion http://hdl.handle.net/10067/92032015
1162165141(2011), 239.
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that citizens argue always either religiously or in 
a secular vein. The “real world” appears different. 
Some authors have even expressed doubt that 
religious citizens wish to use religious language in 
the public sphere.22
On the other hand, strict exclusionists strongly 
oppose Habermas’s accommodationist shift. 
Accordingly, Paolo Flores D’Arcais, the Italian 
leftist philosopher, criticizes Habermas’s openness 
toward religious contributions. He sees in the 
“cooperative” translation demand a burden 
particularly for non-believers since they would 
have to accept illiberal religious arguments. Flores 
D’Arcais offers the example of Joseph Cardinal 
Ratzinger, the former president of the Catholic 
Church’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the 
Faith (CDF), who “wants to impose criminally 
22 See: Michelle Dillon, “Can Post-Secular Society Toler-
ate Religious Difference?” Sociology of Religion 71 (2010); 
Veit Bader, “Post-Secularism or Liberal-Democratic 
Constitutionalism,” Erasmus Law Review 5, no. 5 (2012); 
Justin Beaumont, “Transcending the Particular in Post-
secular Cities”, in Exploring the Post-Secular. The Reli-
gious, the Political and the Urban, ed. Arie L. Molendijk, 
Justin Beaumont, and Christoph Jedan (Leiden, Boston: 
Brill, 2010); Darren R. Walhof, “Habermas, Same-Sex 
Marriage and the Problem of Religion in Public Life”, 
Philosophy and Social Criticism 39, no. 3 (2013); José Cas-
anova, “The Problem of Religion and the Anxieties of 
European Secular Democracy”, in Religion and Democ-
racy in Contemporary Europe (London: Alliance Pub-
lishing Trust, 2008); John H. Evans, “An Empirical Per-
spective on Religious and Secular Reasons”, The Imma-
nent Frame Web site: http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2010/10/01/
an-empirical-perspective/ (2010). 
 Among others, Harrington criticizes that Habermas’s 
translation demand does not overcome his previous 
secularist liberal approach and continues the narrow 
narrative of a linear, modernist European development, 
considering secular reasoning mandatory (Harrington, 
Habermas and the Post-Secular); a perspective, which is 
criticized as ethno- and Euro-centric (Michiel Leezen-
berg, “How Ethnocentric Is the Concept of the Post-
secular?” in Exploring the Post-Secular. The Religious, 
the Political and the Urban, ed. Arie L. Molendijk, Justin 
Beaumont, and Christoph Jedan (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 
2010).
sanctioned prohibition on women who are not 
believers, or who follow other faiths”23. 
Habermas’s theory that religious voices should be 
heard in the informal public sphere is valuable. 
However, this is also true for Flores D’Arcais’ 
critique that Habermas ignores the consequences 
of the public engagement of conservative religious 
citizens, such as the former Cardinal Ratzinger 
(later Pope Benedict XVI.), whose illiberal moral 
political position represents contemporary 
conservative Catholic thought. In a similar vein, 
Dillon expresses her concerns about the “discursive 
strategy” of the Catholic Church when arguing 
against abortion or same-sex-partnerships24. 
The Problem of Identifying Religious Arguments
A central problem encountered when applying 
the translation proviso to empirical cases is that 
Habermas defines religious and secular reasons 
or arguments in a purely normative way. In 
one dialogue with Charles Taylor, he defends 
secular reasons as those that “do not expand the 
perspective of one’s own community, but push 
for mutual perspective taking so that different 
communities can develop a more inclusive 
perspective by transcending their own universe 
of discourse”25. Religious reasons, instead, would 
involve a reference to God and, thus, a particular 
set of beliefs. In this vein, religious reasons are, 
unlike secular ones, unable to create a common 
source for reason. Common sources, as the 
constitution provides, are supposed to be shared 
by all, that is, by different religious communities, 
believers, and non-believers alike. “Secular” 
implies for Habermas a non-Christian sense of 
23 Paolo Flores d’Arcais, “Eleven Theses against Haber-
mas”, The Utopian (2009) http://www.the-utopian.org/
d’Arcais_1
24 Dillon, Can post-secular, 148.
25 Habermas, Dialogue, 66
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secularization26 and reflects his interpretation of 
state impartiality toward different faiths27. 
If religious arguments enter the formal public 
sphere, they must be translated into a secular 
language accessible to all. Habermas offers the 
example of “in the image of God” which could be 
translated into “human dignity”28. Although this 
example lacks empirical criteria, it demonstrates 
that “translation” is more than a semantic 
transformation of an argument. For Habermas, it 
implies the translation of a thought from religious 
to secular language which, however, “must entail 
a loss of connotations”. To “render the idea that 
human beings were made ‘in the image of God’ as 
‘human dignity’ is to lose the original connotation 
of man having been ‘created’”. Yet the core of its 
semantic content need not be lost29. 
According to Robert Audi, it is almost impossible 
to clearly identify a religious argument (reason), 
since it is often expressed in secular terms30. Audi, 
a liberal thinker who defends strict church-state 
separation but advocates religious arguments in 
the public sphere31, had proposed a typology of 
religious arguments two decades ago, and only 
the first type – an argument with theistic content, 
such as the mentioned reference to a holy scripture 
– is clearly identifiable as religious. The other three 
types of religious argument – the epistemic, the 
motivational, and the historical type – also contain 
secular vocabulary which makes identifying them 
as religious very difficult. 
26 Habermas, Dialogue, 65.
27 Habermas, Equal Treatment, 15.
28 Habermas, Dialogue, 64.
29 Jürgen Habermas, “Religion and the Public Sphere: A 
Response to Paolo Flores D’Arcais”, The Utopian, Febru-
ary, 2 (2009). http://www.the-utopian.org/Habermas/, 
30 Robert Audi, “The Place of Religious Argument in a Free 
and Democratic Society”, San Diego Law Review 30, no. 
4 (1993).
31 Audi, Religious Commitment, 75-78
Following Audi, an epistemically-religious 
argument requires that (a) its premises, (b) 
its conclusion, (c) both, or (d) its premises 
warranting conclusion cannot be known, or at 
least justifiably accepted, apart from reliance on 
religious considerations, for example scripture 
or revelation32. Considering the motivational 
criterion, an argument is religious because what 
motivates the individual to formulate and defend 
it is a religious objective. An example would 
be the aim to live life according to God’s will. 
This criterion does not focus on the content of 
the argument, which can be religious or not. It 
“applies primarily to reasoning processes and 
only derivatively to arguments as the abstract 
structures realized in those processes”33. 
Most importantly, some arguments exchanged 
within a political debate may be religious in this 
motivational sense, “except if the person offering 
the argument acknowledges his [sic] religious 
motivation, we have no legitimate ground to apply 
this criterion”, and thus, to identify a secular 
argument as a translated religious argument. A 
religious argument in the historical sense, finally, 
“genetically traces explicitly or implicitly, by some 
mainly cognitive chain, such as a chain of beliefs, 
to one or more arguments that are religious in one 
of the above senses, or to one or more propositions 
that are either religious in content or epistemically 
dependent on a proposition that is religious in 
content.”34 
To place this criterion into the context of 
conservative religious thought, we can contend 
with Dillon that “the appropriation of religion into 
civic discourse is not a straightforward matter of 
simply retrieving from some historical vault a set of 
traditionally pure principles” 35. As cases in point, 
Dillon refers to the history of theological debate 
about abortion, women’s ordination, or same-sex 
32 Audi, The Place of Religious Arguments, 680-681.
33 Ibid., 683.
34 Ibid.
35 Dillon, Can post-secular, 148.
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM: A Resource Book100
relationships in the Catholic Church. Comparative 
studies of Catholic countries reveal that, in such 
moral-political debates, the motivational and 
historical types of religious argument prevail36. 
Thus, religious groups have not merely been 
participating in public policy debates for some 
time37, they have also applied a “discursive 
strategy” which somehow falls outside of the 
range of arguments considered by Habermas – a 
strategy according to which the Catholic Church 
addressed its normative views on various issues 
to the public at large, to “fellow-citizens”, and 
not only fellow believers”38. With Flores D A´rcais, 
cases in point include the Vatican’s opposition 
against laws permitting abortion, assisted 
fertilization or gay marriage. A central element 
of this discursive strategy – and this leads back to 
the “translation proviso” – is the intentional use of 
secular language for public communication39. The 
Catholic Church has, since the 1970s, objected 
abortion on behalf of a “person’s right to life”40. 
A more recent example of applying secular 
rights language to religious-moral argument is 
a petition launched by Italian Catholics against 
sexual education. This refers merely to legal rights 
acts such as Art. 26 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights respecting the parent´ s role in 
emotional and sexual education, and Art. 30 of 
the Italian constitution protecting the rights and 
duties of parents to educate their children.41
36 Anja Hennig, Moralpolitik und Religion. Bedingungen 
Politisch-Religiöser Kooperation in Polen, Italien und 
Spanien (Würzburg: Ergon-Verlag, 2012).
37 Beaumont, Transcending, 7.
38 Dillon, Can post-secular, 148.
39 Hennig, Moralpolitik, 404.
40 For the evolution of this argumentation see Ronald 
Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument About Abor-
tion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom (New York: 
Vintage Books 1993).
41 http://www.citizengo.org/it/14837-una-sana-educa-
zione-alla-sessualita
To conclude, while the normative underpinnings 
of Habermas` s translation proviso are well 
intended, it is difficult to identify religious 
arguments empirically. Moreover, scholars 
should particularly question which conditions, 
and for which aims, conservative religious 
actors express their moral-political concerns in a 
secular language and whether it occurs within a 
cooperative process of mutual understanding.
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LOST IN TRANSLATION;  
A CRITIQUE ON HABERMAS’ 
“TRANSLATION PROVISO”
MARTHE KERKWIJK 
Jürgen Habermas contends that only secular 
reasons can justify state coercion in a democracy 
where the democratic principle - that all those who 
are subject to a law should be able to see themselves 
as co-authors of that law – counts 1. However, 
he recognises our society as being post-secular: 
religious plurality is here to stay. Furthermore, 
he takes on board Nicholas Wolterstorff’s insight 
that  religious citizens ought to base their political 
decisions on their religious beliefs2. Therefore, 
Habermas proposes his translation proviso: 
religious citizens can use their religious reasons 
in the public arena, but beyond the institutional 
threshold they ought to be translated into secular 
reasons if they are to justify coercion3. This process 
of translation from religious to secular language 
is the cooperative task of society as a whole, 
in Habermas’ view. This process of translation 
“salvages” the relevant content from religious 
reasons and results in secular reasons which are 
neutral, that is, “equally accessible to all”4. Thus, 
religious and secular citizens can accept this 
requirement, Habermas argues.
1 Jürgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere: Cog-
nitive Presuppositions for the Public Use of Reason by 
Religious and Secular Citizens” in Between Naturalism 
and Religion: Philosophical Essays, (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2008), 120-122. For an in-depth discussion of the 
democratic principle, see: Jürgen Habermas, Between 
Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of 
Law and Democracy (MIT Press, 1998), particularly pp. 
97-103.
2 Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘The Role of Religion in Decision 
and Discussion of Political Issues’, in Religion in the Pub-
lic Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political 
Debate, by Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Row-
man & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), 105.
3 Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere”, 130.
4 Ibid., 120.
But can religious reasons be translated into secular 
ones? Are secular reasons neutral in the sense that 
Habermas suggests? I will argue that translation 
is not possible without inviting Wolterstorff’s 
objection again. 
According to Habermas, “freedom of conscience 
and religion is the appropriate political response 
to the challenges of religious pluralism”5. 
This freedom, he continues, contains two 
corresponding liberties: “the positive liberty to 
practice a religion of one’s own and the negative 
liberty to remain unencumbered by the religious 
practices of others”6. In a deliberative democracy, 
this means that religious citizens should be free to 
express their religious views in public discussion, 
but at the same time all citizens should be free from 
coercion by laws for which the only justification is 
the religious view of others.
The balance between these two liberties is 
“precarious”7, as Habermas warns us. If we assume 
that for many religious citizens their political 
views are informed by religion, how can they freely 
express these views in public deliberation without 
thereby imposing their religious views on those 
who don’t share their beliefs? To protect negative 
liberty – the right to be free from religious coercion 
– Habermas contends that a law is only justified 
if the support given for it is “equally accessible to 
all”8, which means for Habermas that it must be 
phrased in secular language. 
Like Habermas, John Rawls supports the view 
that although citizens are free to express their 
religious views in public, religious justifications 
alone are not sufficient to justify a binding law. 
Rawls’s proviso holds that as democratic citizens 
we can “introduce into political discussion at any 
time our comprehensive doctrine, religious or 
5 Ibid., 120.
6 Ibid., 120.
7 Ibid., 120.
8 Ibid., 120.
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nonreligious, provided that, in due course, we give 
properly public reasons to support the principles 
and policies our comprehensive doctrine is said to 
support”9.
Rawls’s proviso has raised the following objection 
by Wolterstorff who suggests that it puts an 
undesirable psychological burden, a breach of 
political integrity, on the shoulders of religious 
citizens: “It belongs to the religious convictions 
of a good many religious people in our society 
that they ought to base their decisions concerning 
fundamental issues of justice on their religious 
convictions. They do not view it as an option 
whether or not to do so”10. In other words: if a 
religious citizen truly believes policy X should 
be implemented, and her reasons for believing so 
are based on her religious convictions only, then 
to ask of her not to support the policy unless she 
can also offer a justification that does not depend 
on her religious conviction would demand a kind 
of dishonesty of her that is not only undesirable 
for that reason alone, but also violates the 
positive liberty of the freedom of consciousness 
and religion. I will call Wolterstorff’s objection, 
henceforth, the Integrity Objection.
Habermas takes on board the integrity objection 
but is not content with Wolterstorff’s solution - to 
allow unrestrained access of religious justification 
in the institutional sphere where laws are made – 
since that endangers the negative liberty discussed 
above, and introduces the danger of tyranny of 
the majority in societies where one religion is 
dominant11. Instead, he offers his “institutional 
translation proviso”12: religious citizens can justify 
their political convictions in public discourse 
using religious language, but they must accept 
9 John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, Uni-
versity of Chicago Law Review 64.3 (1997) 776.
10 Wolterstorff, “The Role of Religion in Decision and Dis-
cussion of Political Issues”, 105.
11 Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere”, 134.
12 Ibid., 130.
that “beyond the institutional threshold”13 only 
secular reasons count. This means that religious 
reasons must be translated to secular reasons. 
To avoid placing the burden of translation on 
religious citizens only, “this requirement of 
translation must be conceived as a cooperative task 
in which the nonreligious citizens must likewise 
participate”14. See fig. 1 for a representation of this 
two-tier model.
Some authors have argued that placing the filter 
on the institutional threshold instead of within the 
public sphere does nothing to counter the integrity 
objection. After all, why would a religious citizen 
contribute to a public discussion if she must accept 
that her religious reasons will not count in the 
institutional sphere or be used to justify the laws 
they are meant to support15?
13 Ibid., 130.
14 Ibid., 131.
15 See, for instance, Alessandro Ferrara, “The Separation 
of Religion and Politics in a Post-Secular Society”; and 
Lafont, “Religion and the Public Sphere What Are the 
Deliberative Obligations of Democratic Citizenship?” 
both in Philosophy and Social Criticism 35:1-2 (2009).
PUBLIC SPHERE
(Where citizens discuss 
public matters. Religious 
and secular language)
TRANSLATION
INSTITUTIONAL SPHERE
(Where laws are made.
Only secular language)
Fig. 1
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This is where the metaphor of translation comes 
in. Habermas uses this metaphor throughout. 
He talks of “religious language” and “secular 
language”, maintaining that the former can be 
“translated” into the latter16. The translation 
proviso, therefore, does not function as a filter that 
simply prevents religious reasons from entering 
the institutional sphere whilst letting secular ones 
through. Instead, it functions as a filter in which 
a transformation takes place: religious reasons are 
translated, that is, reformulated in secular terms. 
For this to work, Habermas must show that what 
comes out of that filter is in some recognisable way 
the same reason as the religious one stated. He 
must show that what makes the religious reason 
relevant to the discussion does not get lost in 
translation. If it does become lost, and translation 
into secular language does not enable the full force 
of the religious reason to enter the institutional 
sphere, the integrity objection applies all the same. 
Habermas is aware of this but is optimistic for two 
reasons: firstly he points out that his translation 
model depends on a mutual learning process 
facilitated by the premise of a deliberative democracy 
to which he takes all citizens to be committed, 
such as the principle of reciprocity and respect for 
each other’s autonomy and co-authorship of the 
law - meaning that there is an understanding that 
they owe each other good reasons17. Therefore, he 
contends, religious citizens can understand and 
accept that the religious formulation of the reasons 
they put forward cannot be enough to convince 
nonreligious individuals and so reformulation in 
secular language is needed to make these reasons 
equally accessible to all. At the same time, secular 
citizens can understand and accept that religion 
remains a source of political motivation for many 
and a vehicle for politically relevant meaning from 
which they might learn. Therefore, Habermas 
contends, in a post-secular society, nonreligious 
citizens can understand that religious reasons are 
16 Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere”, 131.
17 Ibid., 136.
to be taken seriously in public deliberation and not 
to be dismissed as belonging to the private sphere. 
Hence, Habermas speaks of a mutual learning 
process18.
Secondly, he is optimistic that translation of 
religious language to the secular is possible. 
Translation, he notes, can “salvage” the relevant 
cognitive content from religious reasons and make 
them equally accessible to all. He gives several 
examples of the sort of translation he has in mind, 
for instance: the idea that human dignity deserves 
equal and unconditional respect can be seen as a 
translation of the idea that humans are made in 
the image of God19, as well as Marx’s idea of the 
emancipated society as a translation of the idea of 
the kingdom of God20.
But a few examples don’t merit the optimistic 
view that all relevant religious reasons have 
good secular translations. For that, we have to 
look deeper at the process of translation, and 
what it means to “salvage” the relevant content 
from religious reasons. Habermas is somewhat 
vague on this account, so Maeve Cooke offers 
one answer. According to Cooke, “[successful] 
translations retain the power of the original to 
inspire thought and action insofar as they succeed 
in making truth appear anew”21. She claims that 
translations in this respect fulfil two functions: (1) 
“they enable critical engagement with these truth 
contents” and (2) “serve motivational purposes, for 
example, inspiring collective action”22. She argues 
that translation of inspirational religious stories 
18 Ibid., 136–144.
19 Ratzinger and Habermas, The Dialectics of Seculariza-
tion, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007) 45.
20 Habermas, “The Boundary between Faith and Knowl-
edge: On the Reception and Contemporary Importance 
of Kant’s Philosophy of Religion”, in Between Natural-
ism and Religion: Philosophical Essays, (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2008) 231.
21 Cooke, “Translating Truth”, Philosophy & Social Criti-
cism 37(4):481, May 1, 2011. 
22 Ibid., 483.
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can fulfil the first function, but whether it fulfils 
the second depends on subjective characteristics 
of the target audience.
So, for both Habermas and Cooke it is important 
that justifications for laws are not only logically 
valid and cognitively comprehensible, but also 
carry a motivational force. If this is important, 
then it is also imperative that translation preserves 
this force. Why is this significant? Firstly, it is 
important for Habermas, given his commitment to 
a mutual learning process whereby secular citizens 
might learn from the meaning and motivational 
force embedded into religious language. This 
characteristic makes Habermas’ account post-
secularist rather than secularist. Secondly, let 
us remember the democratic principle that 
those who are subject to the law should be able 
to see themselves as co-authors of that law. For 
Habermas, co-authorship means co-ownership. 
He would like citizens to be coerced by only those 
laws whose justifications they could come to 
accept as their own. For this to happen, citizens 
must not only be able to critically engage with the 
justifications for laws, but be able to understand 
themselves as addressed by these justifications. 
This in turn is only possible if they are receptive to 
the motivational force of such justifications. Only 
when a citizen is grasped by this motivational 
force, can she truly call the justification her own. It 
is characteristic of Habermas’ work that he stresses 
that democratic deliberation and law-making is 
not an armchair exercise. Active engagement of 
those potentially affected by binding decisions is 
essential.
Cooke focuses in her article on exemplary figures 
and acts. Take, for example,  the story of an 
exemplary figure or act which inspires those who 
have access to the cultural religious tradition to 
which the story belongs; how can that story be 
translated to those who have no access to this 
tradition? Her argument is that a good translator 
can indeed “represent” truth in new ways, to new 
audiences. However, whether the motivational 
force of an exemplary figure or act can be 
transposed by translation is not so easy to predict. 
I will discuss one of her examples here. 
Central to Orhan Pamuk’s novel, My Name is 
Red23 which is set in Istanbul, is the practice of 
manuscript illumination. Master Osman, the 
master illuminator, is inspired by a tradition of 
great illuminators in the past, many of whom 
produced their best work when blind. One of 
the legendary illuminators is Master Bihzad. The 
story goes that Master Bihzad blinded himself 
voluntarily when he reached a state so close to the 
divine that he no longer needed physical eyesight 
to do his work. When Master Osman finds the 
needle with which Master Bihzad reputedly 
used to blind himself, he proceeds to do exactly 
the same24. The story of Master Bihzad has an 
exemplary validity for Master Osman. “But”, 
Cooke rightly asks, “does it have it for us?”25 I 
doubt many of Pamuk’s readers have blinded 
themselves with a needle. Yet, Pamuk, as a gifted 
intercultural translator, succeeds in opening up 
the premise of this story to his readers in such 
a way that the act of self-blinding is no longer 
utterly bizarre, but – seen from Master Osman’s 
perspective – rather plausible. Pamuk opens up 
truths such as this which states that there is more 
to seeing than physical eyesight, and that great 
sacrifices are sometimes worth it. 
This example shows that the first function of 
translation can be fulfilled: Pamuk’s readers can 
critically engage with the truth contents implicit 
in the story of Master Osman. But for this story to 
have any motivational force, the second function, 
more is needed. It is one thing to understand that 
certain circumstances can call for a sacrifice – like 
self-blinding – but it is quite another to see oneself 
23 Pamuk, My Name Is Red, translated by Erdag Goknar 
(London: Faber & Faber, 2011).
24 Cooke, “Translating Truth”, 485–487.
25 Ibid., 485.
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as being called to make such a sacrifice. And this, 
I take it, is beyond the scope of translation. Not 
because stories like the one Pamuk tells us have no 
effect on our motivations – they do! - but because 
the effect they have is highly subjective. It depends 
on the vast network of other connections - not 
least that which binds us to the exemplary figures 
in the story - that determine our motivations. 
Therefore, I doubt there is any secular language 
available that is neutral in the sense of “equally 
accessible to all”, as Habermas hopes. Truths can 
be “salvaged” from a story like Pamuk’s; his readers 
can recognise that a truth like “great sacrifices are 
sometimes worth it” is universally applicable. Yet, 
they need the story of Master Osman to be able to 
critically engage with such a truth. However, the 
story does not execute the motivational on them 
as it does on Master Osman, since he stands in 
a particular relation to Master Bihzad. Pamuk’s 
readers do not. Likewise, religious citizens stand 
in a particular relation to the exemplary figures in 
their respective traditions which those of another 
religion, or no religion, don’t share. Translation 
cannot bridge that gap.
Finally, back to the integrity objection; if the 
motivational force of religious reason is lost in 
translation between the public and institutional 
sphere, the integrity objection still applies. Firstly, 
because without the motivational force it is no 
longer clear how the reason in question can be 
taken seriously in the institutional sphere such 
that it has an effect on decision-making, and 
secondly because without the motivational force 
it is doubtful that the religious citizens to whom 
these reasons matter can still truly call them their 
reasons. 
Habermas hopes that translation from religious 
to secular language can render religious reasons 
accessible to all. “Accessible” is thereby not merely 
to be understood as “comprehensible”, but indeed 
as “acceptable” in a stronger sense. Cooke has 
shown that whilst translation can enable critical 
engagement beyond the boundaries of a religious 
or cultural group, it cannot achieve the universal 
acceptability hoped for by Habermas. Whether a 
reason can be accepted as one’s own depends to 
a large degree on subjective characteristics of the 
kind that gave rise to the integrity objection in the 
first place. This conclusion can say very little about 
the question asking to which extent religious 
reasons may indeed justify laws; that question is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. What I do hope 
to show is this: if the integrity objection is indeed 
a problem, as Habermas admits, the translation 
proviso is an unsatisfactory solution.
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LIBERAL JUSTIFICATORY 
NEUTRALITY AND 
MANDATORY VACCINATION 
SCHEMES
BOUKE DE VRIES
It is not uncommon for parents within liberal 
societies to refuse to have their children vaccinated 
against infectious diseases such as the measles, 
mumps, smallpox, polio, and whooping cough. 
Whilst some parents object to vaccinations on 
religious grounds (e.g. certain groups of orthodox 
Calvinists in The Netherlands believe that 
preventive health measures interfere with God’s 
will1), others hold the view that vaccinations are 
not just ineffective but positively harmful for 
children (e.g. certain groups of vaccine-sceptics 
in the US and other countries believe that 
vaccinations cause autism2). 
These kinds of objections cause some liberals 
to feel conflicted about mandatory vaccination 
schemes [henceforth MVS]. On the one hand, 
they desire that the state be neutral towards the 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines of citizens 
which requires that state policies are not based 
on sectarian metaphysical, epistemological, or 
moral views. On the other, they want to protect 
children from severe bodily harm. However, since 
the decision to make vaccinations compulsory 
seems to rely on a controversial set of secular, 
scientific beliefs about the (relative) harm of 
1 The refusal of these groups to have their children vacci-
nated allowed the measles to make a return in 2013 which 
led to the hospitalisation of approximately 200 children. 
See Pierik, Roland. 2013. “Dan toch maar een vaccina-
tieplicht?”. Nederlands Juristenblad 88 (40):2798-2807; 
and Pierik, Roland. 2014. “The Return of the Measles to 
the Low Countries: A Legal-Philosophical Exploration”. 
Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 43(2):103-107.
2 This belief has become fairly widespread since medical 
researcher Andrew Wakefield suggested a link between 
MMR vaccinations and autism in a 1998 article, which 
was later retracted for fraud.
infectious diseases and the best prevention, it 
appears that these liberals must choose between 
these desiderata or balance them. 
Against this view,  I will argue that implementing 
MVS against the wishes of religiously-motivated 
anti-vaccinators and vaccine-sceptics does 
not violate the principle of liberal justificatory 
neutrality. If sound, my argument suggests that 
the putative tension between liberal commitments 
to state neutrality and children’s well-being need 
not exist in the case of MVS. 
I - State policies may be neutral in different 
ways: in terms of their impact on people’s well-
being, the opportunities they offer for living self-
directed lives, the intentions of policy-makers and 
so on. In this chapter, I will focus on a particular 
kind of neutrality, namely liberal justificatory 
neutrality. As I understand it, policies are 
neutrally justified from a liberal viewpoint if, and 
only if, the state’s motivations for implementing 
them are impartial in the right way (but more 
on this below). The reason for focusing on liberal 
justificatory neutrality is that, at least within 
the Dutch context, MVS are usually criticised 
for having non-neutral justifications, and, by 
virtue of this, of being illiberal. According to 
this line of criticism, MVS are only acceptable 
to citizens with mainstream, secular worldviews 
and not to those with alternative comprehensive 
doctrines, i.e. with alternative sets of moral, 
metaphysical and epistemological beliefs, such 
as the aforementioned orthodox Calvinists and 
vaccine-sceptics. Accordingly, it seems that if I 
can show that MVS respect the principle of liberal 
justificatory neutrality, this will help challenge the 
idea that such schemes are (unduly) sectarian or 
non-neutral. 
A side-note: even if sound, this chapter’s argument 
may not convince opponents of MVS that MVS are 
justified all-things-considered. Not only may they 
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oppose MVS on grounds other than these schemes’ 
putative violation of liberal justificatory neutrality 
(e.g. by arguing that MVS undermine religious 
liberty or certain communitarian goods), some 
opponents may hold that for MVS to be neutral 
simpliciter, it is not sufficient that they be neutrally 
justified. Rather than try to convince such critics 
that MVS are justified, all things considered, my 
aim here is merely to raise the argumentative bar 
for those maintaining that MVS violate liberal 
neutrality by showing that such schemes can be 
neutrally justified.
In order to show that MVS respect the principle 
of liberal justificatory neutrality, a definition is 
necessary. As I understand it, liberal justificatory 
neutrality is obtained when a state’s (in)actions 
are justified on grounds that are acceptable to 
all citizens who are “reasonable” in that they 
accept that all citizens should have equal liberal 
rights and freedoms, such as rights to bodily 
integrity, shelter, freedom of speech, freedom 
of association, and the right to vote3. Whilst 
political theorists disagree profoundly about what 
such acceptability involves, they seem to agree 
that liberal justificatory neutrality bars states 
from justifying policies on the basis of moral, 
metaphysical or epistemological beliefs to which 
only some reasonable citizens subscribe. On this 
understanding, a justificatory neutral state is 
precluded from, for example subsidising opera 
on the basis of opera’s (putative) intrinsic value, 
raising the price of NASCAR tickets on the basis 
of NASCAR’s (putative) lack of value, or revoking 
the Catholic church’s tax-exempt status on the 
basis of its (putative) false religious creeds, as 
not all reasonable citizens within contemporary 
liberal-democracies can accept the beliefs on 
which those justifications are predicated. That is, 
at least some reasonable citizens seem to believe 
that opera is worthless, NASCAR is valuable, and 
Catholicism is true, which is why  none of these 
policy justifications qualify as neutral within 
those societies. 
3 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism. (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 2005)
There are two influential schools of thought as 
to what render policies acceptable in the manner 
required by liberal justificatory neutrality. 
According to the convergence model developed 
by Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier4, a policy is 
neutrally justified (or, as they might prefer to say, 
‘publicly justified’) if and only if all citizens who 
are committed to treating one another as free 
and equal would decide that they have sufficient 
reason to accept it they were to carefully weigh 
all considerations that they believe bear on the 
decision. Put differently, all must be able to 
conclude that they have sufficient reason to accept 
the policy if they were to consult and carefully 
evaluate their beliefs and values5. Important for 
our purposes is that the reasons on which citizens 
accept (or reject) policies need not be shared or 
shareable. To illustrate this, suppose that groups 
of Orthodox Jews and feminists both supported a 
ban on pornography; on the convergence model, 
banning pornography may be neutrally justified 
here even if neither party could accept the the 
other’s reasons for supporting the ban  as being 
strong or good (suppose that the Orthodox Jew 
supported a ban on the basis of their faith and 
feminists did so out of concern for women’s 
autonomy)6. 
By contrast, the consensus model defended by 
Jonathan Quong7 (amongst others) requires that 
policies be justified by reasons that are “public” in 
that they can be shared by citizens with different 
4 See e.g. Gerald Gaus, The Order of Public Reason A The-
ory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded 
World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); 
Kevin Vallier, Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond 
Separation (New York: Routledge, 2014).
5 Gaus, Gerald and Kevin Vallier, “The Roles of Religious 
Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity: The Implica-
tions of Convergence, Asymmetry and Political Institu-
tions”. Philosophy and Social Criticism (35): 51-76, 2009.
6 That said, the convergence model does require that citi-
zens’ reasons be intelligible according to their own eval-
uative standards; I will not go into this requirement here 
due to space constraints. See Gaus and Vallier, “Reli-
gious Conviction”, 56-8.
7 Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010)
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reasonable comprehensive doctrines. When are 
policies backed by public reasons? Most defenders 
of the consensus model consider it to be necessary 
and sufficient that policies pursue important 
common interests with due concern for citizens’ 
rights. For example, modest subsidies for football 
clubs may be publicly justified if such subsidies 
help to promote children’s health and teach them 
about cooperation; in that case, weighty common 
interests are served  in a way that respects people’s 
rights 
Important here is that these subsidies would be 
publicly justified on the consensus model even 
if some Orthodox believers would oppose (after 
careful reflection) subsidising competitive sports 
on the basis of their conviction that competitive 
sports are sinful (a non-public reason). In 
this respect, the model differs from Gaus and 
Vallier’s convergence model which allows for 
the possibility that non-public reasons may 
delegitimate policy proposals, including reasons 
derived from “reasonable religious values […] 
without supporting secular rationales”8. 
Though a lot more may be said about the 
convergence and consensus models, what is 
pertinent for our purposes is this: Gaus and 
Vallier’s convergence model can be understood 
as providing a more demanding standard of 
public or neutral justification. Given how diverse 
contemporary liberal-democracies are, it seems 
that for any given policy, there are likely to be 
reasonable citizens who are civic-minded such 
that they will only be able to accept the policy 
in question from within their comprehensive 
doctrine if it is supported by public reason. 
If correct, this suggests that for policies to be 
publicly or neutrally justified on Gaus and 
Vallier’s convergence model, it will almost always 
8 Gaus and Vallier, “Religious Conviction”, 65.
be necessary that they be supported by both public 
reasons and various non-public ones9.   
Why does this matter? The answer is that if I can 
show MVS to be neutrally justified on Gaus and 
Vallier’s convergence model, then it seems that 
such schemes are a fortiori neutrally justified on 
the consensus model. This would  then suggest 
that MVS respect liberal justificatory neutrality 
irrespective of which model is adopted. For the rest 
of this chapter, I shall therefore accept arguendo 
Gaus and Vallier’s convergence model.
II - It may initially seem that MVS cannot 
be neutrally justified on Gaus and Vallier’s 
convergence model. Whilst such schemes serve 
an important public interest, namely protecting 
children from severe bodily harm, some citizens 
in contemporary liberal-democracies are likely 
to oppose them upon reflection. That is, at least 
some citizens within those societies are likely to 
believe, after careful consideration, that they have 
insufficient reason to accept MVS from within their 
comprehensive doctrine – just think of the Dutch 
orthodox Calvinists who regard vaccinations as 
interfering with divine predestination.
The problem with this view is this: it leaves out 
the fact that even in the convergence model, the 
principle of liberal justificatory neutrality only 
requires that policies be acceptable to citizens 
with reasonable comprehensive doctrines, i.e. with 
doctrines that respect the free and equal status of 
all citizens.10 To see why this is so, note that for 
liberal states to be neutral towards unreasonable 
comprehensive doctrines would defeat their most 
fundamental aim, namely protecting citizens’ 
9 Gaus and Vallier recognize this; see “Religious Convic-
tion”, 61.
10 Gaus and Vallier thus note that the individuals to whom 
policies ought to be justified should “conceive of each 
other as free and equal persons”; see “Religious Convic-
tion,” 54.
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freedom and equality. What this suggests is that 
liberal (justificatory) neutrality cannot coherently 
require states to be neutral towards unreasonable 
comprehensive doctrines.    
This observation is important, since if liberal 
justificatory neutrality is not violated when 
citizens oppose a policy on unreasonable 
grounds - regardless of whether the consensus 
or convergence model is used as our standard - 
then insofar as it is unreasonable to oppose MVS, 
such schemes would be compatible with liberal 
justificatory neutrality.  
I believe that this is indeed the case. Consider 
again the case of the Dutch orthodox Calvinists; 
even if many members of this group reject MVS 
in order to save their children from (possibly 
far greater) harm in the afterlife, the fact is that 
they are willing to endanger their children’s 
future freedom by denying them easily available 
protection against potentially disabling and lethal 
diseases. Regardless of the strand of liberalism 
one accepts, I take it that this willingness fails to 
show the minimum respect for the liberty of other 
citizens that is owed from a liberal perspective. 
Whilst many liberals allow adults of sound mind 
to freely expose themselves to health risks (e.g. 
smoking) that may severely undermine their 
future freedom, almost none seem willing – and 
quite rightly, I want to suggest - to extend this 
liberty to children. The reason is, of course, that we 
want people to make competent decisions about 
such important matters, something most children 
cannot do. (Notice further that the possibility 
that children may retrospectively endorse their 
parents’ decision not to vaccinate them seems 
irrelevant here; even if retrospective endorsement 
could in principle justify non-vaccination - which 
is dubious to say the least - there is no guarantee 
that children will later endorse their parents’ 
decision not to vaccinate them). If correct, this 
suggests that opposing MVS on purely religious 
(or other non-public) grounds is unreasonable, 
and therefore does not violate liberal justificatory 
neutrality.
In my view, vaccine-sceptics who oppose MVS 
on the basis of supposed health risks raise a more 
formidable challenge to this chapter’s claim.11 
Members of this group may well accept that 
liberal states should look after children’s future 
capacity for individual self-direction and protect 
citizens’ freedom and equality more generally. 
Unlike the orthodox Calvinists, such vaccine-
sceptics consequently need not hold less than 
fully reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Insofar 
as liberal justificatory neutrality requires that 
policies be neutrally justified towards all citizens 
with reasonable comprehensive doctrines (as I 
have argued it does), this may then suggest that 
MVS are non-neutral in societies where they face 
opposition from these individuals.. 
I do not think this follows. To see why not, 
notice that insofar as these vaccine-sceptics are 
reasonable, they would want the state to take 
measures to protect children from severe bodily 
harm if this can be done at moderate costs even 
if they falsely believed that those measures are 
not just ineffective but counterproductive. The 
assumption here is that one is not seriously 
committed to protecting citizens’ freedom and 
equality if one does not want the state to protect 
children’s future capacity for self-direction in case 
one falsely believed that the state’s measures had 
the contrary effect. Yet if this is so, then insofar 
as there is abundant evidence that vaccinations 
protect children from dangerous diseases and are 
likely to have negligible side-effects – as I assume 
there is - MVS seem neutrally justifiable on the 
convergence model despite the opposition of 
reasonable vaccine-sceptics. 
11 For an overview of anti-vaccination groups in various 
Western countries, see Stuart Blume, “Anti-vaccination 
movements and their interpretations” Social science & 
medicine, 62:628-664, 2006. 
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By implementing such schemes, the state would be 
acting on these individuals’ beliefs about what the 
state should do in case they were mistaken about 
the health benefits of vaccinations; i.e. it would be 
implementing a policy that reasonable vaccine-
sceptics believe they have sufficient reason to 
accept under those circumstances. As far as I 
can tell, this meets the principal requirement of 
Gaus and Vallier’s convergence model, namely 
that MVS be all-things-considered justified from 
within each reasonable citizen’s comprehensive 
doctrine.
If this is correct, we can conclude that, given that 
Gaus and Vallier’s convergence model is more 
demanding than its consensus-based counterpart 
(see above), MVS respect the principle of liberal 
justificatory neutrality.
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RESPECT FOR PERSONS 
AND THE RESTRICTED USE 
OF RELIGIOUS REASONS 
IN PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION
NEMANJA TODOROVIĆ
Arguably the dominant paradigm in contempo-
rary political theory, political liberalism1 (PL) 
asserts that exercise of political power solely on 
the basis of religious reasons2 is morally tainted. 
According to PL theorists, for a policy proposal to 
be publicly justified, its underlying rationale must 
be spelled out in terms that reasonable citizens 
can be expected to accept3. While the proponents 
of PL differ in their construal of the reasonable 
acceptability criterion, most agree that religious 
reasons are particularly ill suited to satisfy it. They 
(1) invite metaphysical and normative commit-
ments that other citizens might reasonably reject, 
and (2) appreciation of their validity depends on 
the kinds of experiences that many non-religious 
citizens cannot be expected to have. Consequently, 
in so far as they act in their political capacity, reli-
gious citizens ought to exercise restraint and jus-
tify their decisions on the grounds of secular rea-
1 For more familiar statements of Political Liberalism, see: 
John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993); Robert Audi, Religious Com-
mitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000); Charles Larmore, The Morals 
of Modernity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996); David Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philo-
sophical Framework (Princeton, NJ, Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 2009).See reference section
2 Robert Audi draws a distinction between religious and 
secular reasons in reference to their different epistemic 
grounds. Religious reason for action (or belief) is a rea-
son whose status as a justifier of an action (or belief) 
evidentially depends on the existence of God, or on the 
pronouncements of the individual or institution as a 
religious authority. Secular reason would then simply 
be a reason whose epistemic status is independent of the 
existence of God. See Audi, Religious Commitment, 67.
3 John Rawls Political Liberalism, (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1996), p. xlvi
sons, or, on the grounds of religious reasons that 
admit a secular analogue.  
Probably the most familiar argument for restraint 
is the argument of ‘respect for persons4’. This 
will be the focus of the paper. First, I will briefly 
unpack the structure of PL, providing the norma-
tive tools for interpreting and evaluating the con-
cept of respect for persons. Second, I will offer two 
possible interpretations of the concept of respect, 
arguing that they either do not provide unequivo-
cal support for restraint or demand more compre-
hensive foundations than PL is able to provide5. 
In the end, due to space constraints, I only ges-
ture toward a possible strategy for reinforcing the 
respect argument by supplementing it with auxil-
iary premises.
4 For more familiar statements of the argument, see 
Charles Larmore, “The Moral Basis of Political Liberal-
ism”, The Journal of Philosophy, 12 (1999), pp. 599-625; 
Joshua Cohen, “Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus 
in The Idea of Democracy, edited by David Copp, Jean 
Hampton, and John E. Roemer (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1993) pp. 270-291; James Boettcher, 
“Respect, Recognition, and Public Reason”, Social The-
ory and Practice, 33 (2007): 223-249.
5 The argument comes with two important caveats: while 
my main concern is the structure of the respect argu-
ment as it applies to all political actors, I recognize (a) 
that breach of respect by public officials might be more 
onerous, and (b) that there might be some subsidiary 
considerations that would impose the restraint on public 
officials, even if the argument for respect doesn’t succeed. 
For discussion of these points, see: Kent Greenawalt, Pri-
vate Consciences and Public Reasons (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), János Kis, “State Neutrality” 
in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitu-
tional Law; edited by Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp.318-335, Sec-
ond, I also assume that a variant of the respect argument 
can resist paternalistic (as well as perfectionist) state 
action more generally, rendering a number of religious 
rationales for public action illegitimate (i.e. policies aim-
ing at curtailing ‘sinful’ behavior that doesn’t harm oth-
ers). For a variant of this argument, see Jonathan Quong, 
Liberalism without perfection (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2010), chapter 3. See reference section
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I - PROJECT OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM
While the dominant narrative traces origins of 
liberalism to European wars of religion and a 
principled defense of freedom of conscience6, it is 
a more robust instantiation of the idea of moral 
equality, commitment to a range of political and 
individual rights and liberties, and focus on the 
reflective capacities that we tend to associate 
with present-day liberalism7. The way that these 
substantive commitments ‘fit’ into an overarching 
and systematic theoretical picture is, of course, a 
matter of intense controversy within the liberal 
scholarship8. 
One particularly influential strand of liberal 
theory9 ties liberalism closely to the ideal 
6 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxiv.
7 Jeremy Waldron, Liberal rights: Collected papers 1981-
1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 
37.
8 Scholars strongly disagree on the exact content and 
scope of those rights and liberties, as well as on the kinds 
of considerations that should be employed in justifying 
rights and their restrictions. Political liberals suggest a 
reasonable consensus on the content of appropriate pub-
lic reasons, but they allow for significant disagreements 
on what policies these might support. Still, any political 
project that licenses forced religious conversion, radical 
restriction of free speech in peacetime and/or criminal-
izes consensual sexual behavior in the privacy of one’s 
home is certainly illiberal. For a taxonomy of contem-
porary conceptions of liberalism see Jonathan Quong, 
Liberalism without Perfection, Chapter 1.  
9 We can call this conception comprehensive anti-perfec-
tionism (Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection, p. 21). 
This conception is comprehensive insofar as it claims 
that referring to a particular ideal of what constitutes a 
valuable and worthwhile human life (here, the ideal of 
personal autonomy) is the only way to adequately justify 
liberal principles or institutions. It is anti-perfectionist 
since it asserts that it is impermissible for a liberal state 
to promote or discourage activities on the grounds that 
they are worthwhile or worthless. For more familiar 
statements of comprehensive anti-perfectionism, see 
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1971), Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: 
The Theory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 2002); Will Kymlicka, Liberal-
ism, Community and Culture (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1989);
of personal autonomy10. One problem with 
this brand of liberalism is that many might 
regard the underlying ideal of autonomously-
conducted life as unduly controversial11. 
The failure of comprehensive anti-perfectionism 
points to an inseparable aspect of liberal 
democratic societies – intransigent disagreements 
on what is a good and successful life, on the nature 
and content of moral prescripts, existence of God 
and other metaphysical questions, nature of truth 
etc. These considerations, that determine one’s 
stance on most aspects of life, add up to what 
John Rawls calls a comprehensive doctrine12(CD). 
What accounts for this diversity of agonistic 
comprehensive doctrines is the existence of a 
number of obstacles to human reasoning, so-called 
‘burdens of judgment’(BOJ)13. 
10 It is precisely because we value and/or pay due respect to 
the fact that “human beings … are capable of forming 
and acting on intelligent conceptions of how their lives 
should be lived” that we think that (1) individuals should 
enjoy wide discretion in their life choices (constrained 
only by considerations of justice), and (2) that govern-
ment shouldn’t ground its activity on controversial judg-
ments about comparative value of such life choices. Ron-
ald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duck-
worth, 1991) p. 272.
11 What matters, they might argue, is that life is lived in 
accordance with divine law – life  conducted in contem-
plation and glorification of God. Whether this life has 
been achieved via self-reflection or not is of no interest. 
Furthermore, some might think that induced critical-
reflection might even effectively compromise religious 
devotion by inducing doubt and confusion.  
12 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, p.58
13 These are: (a) empirical and scientific evidence is con-
flicting and complex, (b) even when we agree about the 
kinds of considerations that are relevant, we may disa-
gree about their relative weight, (c) all concepts are to 
some extent vague and subject to hard cases, (d) the way 
we assess evidence and weigh values is shaped by our 
total life experience, (e) there are different kinds of nor-
mative considerations on both sides of any issue, and (f) 
any system of social institutions is limited in the values 
it can admit, so that some selection must be made. Many 
hard decisions may seem to have no clear answer. Rawls, 
Political Liberalism, pp. 56-57.
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In circumstances of such deep disagreement, 
liberalism “…entails focusing on what reasonable 
people can still share, despite their differences….
This commitment forms the moral core of liberal 
thought, and it embodies a principle of respect for 
persons”14. This ‘sharable’ justificatory currency, 
theorists of PL find in the political culture of liberal 
democracies, where ongoing disagreements seem 
often couched in terms of reasons that adherents 
of all sides to the debate can appreciate15. Political 
culture offers a conception of a citizen as being 
free and equal in virtue of their possession of 
two moral powers: capacity to have an effective 
sense of justice, and capacity to form, revise and 
rationally pursue a conception of the good16. 
14 Larmore, “The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism”, p. 
602. The concept of respect for persons doesn’t seem 
to involve commitment to the truth of any particular 
worldview. Of course, as I argue below, it does not mat-
ter whether all comprehensive doctrines recognize it as 
a central norm, only whether all reasonable comprehen-
sive doctrines do. A variety of religious and non-reli-
gious doctrines seem to recognize it as such. 
15 While it might be said that many citizens with religious 
affiliation might have strategic reasons for voicing their 
concerns in a manner that can be appreciated by those 
who don’t subscribe to a religious worldview, it wouldn’t 
be far-fetched to argue that the constant framing of pub-
lic debates on matters of common concern in mutually-
acceptable terminology indicates that this type of pub-
lic discourse is (a) already sufficiently internalized even 
by religious participants, and that (b) it offers a viable 
avenue for voicing their genuine moral concerns. For a 
particular example of how the Muslim community in 
the UK has advocated its appeal for censorship in the so-
called ‘Rushdie affair’ almost exclusively on genuinely 
public reasons, see John Horton, “Rawls, Public Reason 
and the Limits of Liberal Justification”, Contemporary 
Political Theory 2 (2003), 17-18 
16 That citizens are capable of exercising these powers 
above a certain threshold is what renders them free and 
equal. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 19.
17 Imagine A and B discussing whether to support a ban 
on the sale of alcohol in shops after 10pm. A defends the 
ban by claiming that the sale of alcohol at night heavily 
contributes to the sinful activity of the constituency. → 
Political culture also nurtures a relatively robust 
set of over-determined secular values - political 
values, which do not prejudge the truth of any 
comprehensive account17.
Needless to say, not all disagreements are 
normatively relevant18, it is disagreements among 
reasonable people that matter19. 
Reasonable persons are those who recognize 
others as free and equal, regard society as a fair 
system of cooperation, and accept the existence of 
BOJ20. Of course, a proper justificatory endeavor 
also involves converging on a set of epistemic 
 B defends the ban as well, but by claiming that statis-
tics show that imposing this ban not only bolsters the 
local economy (more people will be inclined to visit pubs 
and nightclubs), but also reduces alcohol consumption 
among underage population. There is a sense that A can 
not only asses the validity of B’s reasons but also accept 
them as valid, while B’s acceptance of A’s reasons seems 
conditional on his or her religious affiliation. 
18 Those who advocate racist or other extremist world 
views that either reject the presumption of moral equal-
ity of citizens, or actively oppose liberal-democratic 
institutions, have no claim on theoretical accommoda-
tion. Likewise, due to the fact that disagreements among 
people populating current liberal democracies often 
reflect no more than selfishness, laziness or misinforma-
tion on their part, PL doesn’t develop its conception of 
public justification and public reason from the value-
belief sets of actual citizens – it idealizes them. While 
there is some disagreement on the exact level of the 
prescribed idealization, we can safely say that PL ideal-
izes the value-belief sets of actual citizens across several 
dimensions: (1) moral dimension – it assumes that they 
are reasonable, (2) it holds that they are rational and 
capable of addressing manifest inconsistencies, and (3) 
that they have much of the information relevant for mat-
ters of policy-making. 
19 On the concept of reasonableness, see James Boettcher, 
“What is Reasonableness?” in Philosophy and Social 
Criticism, 30 (2004) pp.597-621; For an argument on 
why BOJ should be included in the commitments of rea-
sonableness see Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection, 
pp. 294-298.
20 Now, to be sure, the content of reasonable disagreement 
is orthogonal to a secular/religious divide, meaning that 
it is possible to dispute many claims that chime with a 
secularist outlook. The claim can (and does) have some 
relevance for assessing the distribution of justificatory 
burden across society but is not directly relevant to the 
points brought up in this paper. 
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practices – i.e. what counts as an appropriate mode 
of reasoning, what counts as an adequate way to 
acquire and assess evidence etc21. 
II - ARGUMENT FROM RESPECT FOR 
PERSONS
While the idea of respect for the individual might 
not seem too controversial when pitched at a 
fairly abstract level, the attempt to interpret and 
operationalize it is fraught with difficulties22. 
We might start with the distinction between 
two kinds of respect introduced by Stephen 
Darwall23. Appraisal respect is what we show to 
particular individuals by virtue of their exhibited 
degree of excellence. Recognition respect, on the 
other hand, is shown to people in general, out of 
recognition of their equal status as persons. It is 
21 Still, Rawls (and those supportive of his brand of PL) has 
been reluctant to offer any stringent criteria for judg-
ing the epistemic viability of either relevant modes of 
reasoning or findings of science. What they argued for 
– namely, that the appropriate epistemic practices are 
those that (morally) reasonable people will converge on, 
seems like a standard that can hardly be satisfactorily 
operationalized. For Rawls, it seems that comprehen-
sive doctrines can be counted as reasonable even if they 
exhibit nothing but moderate coherence among their 
beliefs and values (John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Rea-
son Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review, 
64 (1997), pp. 765-807; This criterion, however, seems 
compatible with antiscientific comprehensive doctrines. 
If this is so, then most scientific claims - even those 
that command consensus among the scientific commu-
nity - will be claims that not everyone can reasonably 
accept. In conclusion, the prospective list of epistemic 
practice on which all reasonable citizens converge might 
be empty, or fairly minimal. I treat this implication as a 
reduction, and strong support for what I later call a strict 
reading of the ‘burdens of judgment’. 
22 These difficulties concern (i) what morally-relevant fea-
ture grounds respect, (ii) how stringent is the duty of 
respect, and (iii) does discharging the duty of respect 
come in a particular currency (a specific course of 
action) or can it be discharged via different means.
23 Stephen Darwall, “Two Kinds of Respect”, Ethics 88 
(1977), 36-49;
the latter unconditional respect that PL theorists 
are interested in. And the property that grounds it 
is best understood by virtue of the aforementioned 
capacity for reflective endorsement24 that all 
reasonable agents are capable of exercising above 
a certain threshold. Perhaps the most obvious 
instance of failure to accord this basic kind of 
respect is when we make others conform to our 
directives by sheer threat of force rather than 
moral argument25 
There seem to be (at least) two renditions26 of 
the respect argument that we can elicit from the 
existing literature on PL. We can understand 
respect for persons either as (1) a respect for their 
reflective capacity in abstract, or (2) respect for the 
‘products of one’s moral powers’, the contingent 
normative and theoretical commitments that 
people ‘actually’ uphold. I will argue that both 
readings either end up being too weak to restrict 
24 The capacity, as already mentioned, is best understood 
not just as a capacity to respond to reasons, but to reflect 
on and revise them, and engage in responsive action. 
While there can be disageement on the exact specifi-
cation of the notion of respect, we can treat as uncon-
troversial that, at the very least, respect requires pro-
viding some opportunities for others to exercise their 
moral powers (on this, see also note 27). However, since 
the moral capacity in question includes a conception 
of autonomy, PL theorist should be wary of conflating 
the respect for persons argument with the respect for 
autonomy argument of comprehensive liberals. There 
is nothing in Rawls’ specification of reasonableness that 
warrants such conflation. For a start, the capacity for 
reflective endorsement appears much wider and more 
general than the account of autonomy promoted by com-
prehensive liberals. Bearing in mind the scope of possi-
ble reasonable disagrement, a viable strategy would be to 
pursue as non-controversial (and as general) a reading of 
this capacity as possible.
25 ‘If we attempt to make others to conform to our direc-
tives solely by the threat of force we shall be treating per-
sons merely as means... and not also as ends, engaging 
directly their capacity as persons’ Larmore, “The Moral 
Basis of Political Liberalism”, p. 602.
26 Steven Wall, “Perfectionism, Reasonableness and 
Respect”, Political Theory, 42 (2014), pp. 468-489.
religious reasons from public debate, or too 
controversial27. 
We might say that as an interpretation of a 
commitment to recognize the capacity of others, 
the first interpretation of the respect argument 
carries considerable plausibility28. But how is it 
that it constrains the use of religious reasons? 
Some argue that showing respect to others 
requires offering them what we take to be our 
best reasons for acting as we do29. The rationale 
behind this argument is: if what we are concerned 
27 The argument comes with a strong caveat. Due to space 
constraints, I will assume that a variant of the argument 
from respect for the second moral power offers a strong 
injunction against enacting paternalistic (and by exten-
sion, perfectionist) policies more generally (Quong, 
Liberalism Without Perfection, chapter 3). Focusing on 
the nature of paternalistic state acts, Quong argues that 
they seem to be motivated either by a negative judgment 
about citizens’ ability to make effective choices about 
the good, or to rationally pursue their conception of the 
good, or both. Therefore, paternalistic policies seem to 
treat citizens as if they (at least temporarily) lack the sec-
ond moral power, effectively undermining their moral 
status. If this is so, all religious reasons that aim to fur-
ther religious devotion or deter citizens from engag-
ing in ‘sinful’ activities (i.e. consumption of drug and 
alcohol, prostitution, etc.) might be deemed prima facie 
objectionable. Still, a number of distinctively religious 
arguments are not covered by this restriction – those 
abortion, stem-cell research or gay marriage. For a criti-
cism of Quong’s argument, see David Birks, “Moral Sta-
tus and the Wrongness of Paternalism”, Social Theory 
and Practice, 40 (2014), pp.483-498;
28 Also, bear in mind that while some conception of 
autonomy seems implicit in the second moral power, 
PL attempts to remain as non-committal as possible in 
ascribing value to its exercise, at least in non-political 
circumstances. This means (roughly) that there is no spe-
cial concern regarding how individuals came to endorse 
their CDs or whether they reflectively endorsed them at 
all. Since PL doesn’t ascribe (much) value to one’s actual 
exercise of the second moral power, it gives no special 
(autonomy-based) reason for respecting people’s actual 
moral commitments. This seems to further support the 
first reading of the respect argument. After all, it would 
be odd to say that we should respect the products of 
reflective capacity when we have never reflected on our 
choices. 
29 William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, 
and Diversity in The Liberal State (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1991), p. 109.
with is the capacity to reflect and possibly revise 
comprehensive commitments, we honor this 
capacity by offering the reasons we think merit 
such revision30. However, this argument makes a 
strong assumption that we might (plausibly) think 
does not hold in the case of religious reasons 
– namely, it assumes that the epistemic status 
of what we take to be the best reasons is readily 
available to others31. But, the validity of religious 
reasons seems conditional on a kind of ‘private 
experience’ that many non-religious citizens 
cannot be expected to have32. Is this fact sufficient 
to motivate the restraint in question? 
Not necessarily. One might argue that religious 
reasons can be accorded public status through 
an indirect route – through ‘Natural Theology’ 
which purports to prove God’s existence by using 
secular reasons alone, without recourse to divine 
revelation33. Provided a plausible secular claim 
along these lines can be conjured and provided, 
we add auxiliary premises pertaining more closely 
30 There is no talk of circumventing reflective capacities as 
in the case of sheer threat of force.
31 That there are common evaluative standards according 
to which members of the public might be able to assess 
their epistemic pedigree.
32 ‘It must be possible to present to others the basis of your 
own beliefs, so that once you have done so, they have 
what you have, and can arrive at the judgment on the 
same basis. That isn’t possible if part of the source of 
your conviction is personal faith of revelation – because 
to report your faith or revelation to someone else is not 
to give him what you have, as you do when you show 
him your evidence or give him your arguments’, Thomas 
Nagel, “Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy”, Phi-
losophy and Public Affairs, 16 (1987), p. 232. 
33 Of course, in order to make a distinctively religious 
argument it is not enough to merely draw from secular 
sources. Seemingly, all substantive claims of religious 
morality are acquired via divine revelation. Still, in so far 
as natural theology is capable of providing an argument 
for why (a) God exists, and that (b) one of his attributes 
is Omni-benevolence, one can conjure up an argument 
in which, supposedly, such good would be inclined to 
communicate with human beings and reveal his moral 
prescripts to them. Vallier pursues this strategy in Kevin 
Vallier, “Against Public Reason Liberalism’s Accessibil-
ity Requirement”, Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (2011), 
pp. 366-389.
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to the connection between God’s existence and 
validity of the moral prescripts found in revered 
religious texts34 - the aforementioned accessibility 
constraint might be suitably addressed.  
Still, one might argue that this strategy fails to pay 
proper heed to the main source of disagreement 
- the existence of BOJ. Even if I am able to grasp 
the epistemic character of a religious reason, in so 
far as I adhere to a reasonable secular doctrine, 
the prospect of regarding it as anything but a 
particularly bad reason seems unlikely35. However, 
we should be clear about the role BOJ play in this 
reading of the respect argument. Standard, or 
what I will call ‘loose’ reading of BOJ maintains 
that accepting their existence merely explains 
how different citizens end up disagreeing with 
each other, even if they don’t reason in bad faith 
or exhibit manifest inconsistencies36. Naturally, 
what explains judgment might not in any way 
contribute to its justification37. 
But, now imagine those whose CDs include a 
commitment to astrology as a reliable source 
of prediction of future events, or homeopathic 
medicine as a reliable procedure for treating a 
variety of illnesses. Would we say that a policy 
whose content explicitly rebuts the validity of 
these claims in any way disrespects the reflective 
34 At least in those instances where their moral prescripts 
unequivocally converge.
35 As we saw, this is explained by a variety of considera-
tions starting from how our personal history shapes our 
existing worldview, to the fact that proper assessment of 
all considerations might be too difficult.
36 Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection, pp. 294-298.
37 Think how A’s poor eyesight might explain why she 
thought she saw her friend, B, but doesn’t in any way jus-
tify her perceptual judgment that she saw her friend B. 
capacities of persons holding these beliefs? It 
seems not38. 
Now, while the ‘loose’ reading seems to be 
dominant in the literature, we can also read BOJ in 
a more committal manner. Let us propose a ‘strict’ 
reading of BOJ according to which acceptance39 
confers positive epistemic status on the CD 
in question, making the resulting reasonable 
disagreement one between epistemically-justified 
worldviews. 
We can argue that justifying a policy proposal by 
anything but ‘good reasons’ fails to accord proper 
respect to our reflective capacity40. However, 
provided some religious doctrines do enjoy 
epistemic support of this kind, why should the 
respect argument restrict their use in the political 
context? 
An intriguing suggestion might be found in 
Larmore’s claim that in cases of disagreement, 
citizens “should respond to the point of 
disagreement, by retreating to neutral ground, 
to the beliefs they still share”41. There might be 
several ways to understand the rationale for such 
38 What we might say is that they are simply epistemically-
faultless in holding these beliefs. But in so far as (a) we 
think that there are no cognitive impediments which 
might prevent them from realizing the validity of the 
policy in question, and (b) the policy is clearly justified 
by evaluative standards that enjoy wide inter-subjective 
recognition in the community, promotion of this pol-
icy could actually be deemed as an instance of genuine 
respect for the reflective capacities of these citizens. 
The alternative course of action (exercise of restriction) 
would seemingly be motivated by a negative judgment 
about the cognitive capacities of others – their inabil-
ity to grasp the validity of the claim. That would be an 
instance of disrespect.
39 And their accommodation in the individual’s compre-
hensive doctrine.
40 Commitment to a certain account of epistemic justifi-
ability might still maintain comprehensive robustness 
and need not involve controversial truth claims (that 
might compromise the project of PL), see Gerald Gaus, 
Justificatory Liberalism: an essay on epistemology and 
political theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1996), introductory chapter.
41 Charles Larmore, “Political Liberalism”, Political The-
ory, 18 (1990), pp. 339-360.
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departure, but they all seem to point away from 
the respect argument. We are either inclined 
to ‘retreat’ due to considerations of prudence42 
or because we are both equally likely to be right 
about the matter in question. The former option 
is certainly not what PL theorists have in mind, 
while the latter is a theme familiar from the 
literature on epistemology of peer disagreement. 
Notwithstanding the controversial43 character of 
this latter position, it is clear that the reason for 
pursuing the neutral ground it prescribes is of 
epistemic rather than moral character.  
So, it seems that we are left with the second reading 
of the respect argument – where respecting the 
reflective capacities of others means respecting 
the products of their reason, i.e. comprehensive 
commitments44.  
There are several problems with this reading. For 
a start, it seems to provide a rather inadequate 
account of moral power as the ability to reflect on, 
revise and pursue commitments. Consequently, it 
could be suggested that this rendition only makes 
sense in light of the comprehensive liberal project. 
42 i.e. cooperation is only possible if we meet halfway
43 Many people will be inclined to reject the idea that they 
are equally as likely as others ‘to be in the right’ regard-
ing the truth of their CD. Furthermore, many people 
will have good grounds to claim that their CD is better 
justified than those of others. While it is possible that 
a plausible argument along these lines can be pursued, 
I think that grounding it on ‘equal epistemic status’ is 
misguided. To be clear, what I have provided is merely a 
possible interpretation of Larmore’s argument. There is 
no further evidence that he intended for this claim to be 
interpreted in this manner.
44 Accepting the second reading doesn’t necessitate that 
we treat all individual commitments as being of equal 
importance. As Steven Wall observes, individuals might 
treat some of their evaluative commitments as identity-
constituting – closely tied to their sense of who they are. 
So,  they may be able (or willing) to reflect on and revise 
their peripheral commitments, but not those that figure 
prominently in their worldviews. Wall, “Perfectionism, 
Reasonableness and Respect”, p. 484.
Furthermore, the second reading of the respect 
argument (within the PL framework), seems to 
chime better with the ‘loose reading of BOJ’. 
If respect is granted through the fact that the 
individual’s comprehensive commitments figure 
prominently in their evaluative sets, then the 
motivation to pursue an epistemically-inflated 
conception of BOJ seems unwarranted. This is, 
however, an unwelcome result. Since the loose 
reading of BOJ says nothing about the epistemic 
pedigree of reasonable beliefs, the account may 
end up hosting a variety of idiosyncratic beliefs. 
However, since political justification cannot 
make reference to considerations that cannot be 
endorsed by other citizens45, we seemingly end up 
with an account of policy-making that caters to an 
infinite variety of prospective fringe beliefs.
45 Or, in this case, cannot make reference to any scientific 
claims or modes of reasoning that compromise these 
epistemically-unsound beliefs.
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CONCLUSION
This paper has criticized the familiar argument 
that respect for the individual generates a restraint 
on the public use of religious reasons. Such 
restraint, however, might be reinforced by adding 
auxiliary premises to the respect argument. Due 
to space constraints, I will only gesture toward 
such strategy. Firstly, I argue, exercise of political 
authority begs for appropriate justification, as a 
matter of respect for persons. This justification 
ought to be indexed to those points of view that 
are deemed reasonable. Naturally, we should 
opt for the ‘strict’ reading of BOJ – maintaining 
that reasonable disagreement is a disagreement 
between epistemically-justified views. Secondly, 
we should pay sufficient heed to the fact of 
disagreement conjoined with evidence that points 
to systematic problems in human reasoning and 
our general susceptibility to cognitive bias46. 
These, I argue, give individuals reasons to reduce 
the credence with which they hold their CDs. 
46 By ‘paying ‘sufficient heed’, I mean that the fact of some-
what idealized disagreement (and our general proneness 
to systematic errors in reasoning) gives those who disa-
gree a second order reason (as a matter of epistemic nor-
mativity) to be less certain about the view they hold. This 
is a controversial point in the epistemology of disagree-
ment which mostly focuses on disagreements between 
cognitive and informational peers. I have doubts about 
whether the concept of disagreement among ‘full’ peers 
is of any practical significance at all. There are insur-
mountable difficulties in tracking the nuances of one’s 
epistemic situation, so the best we can do is assume 
‘roughly’ equal peers. In this situation, however, the dis-
agreement doesn’t mandate that we suspend judgment, 
nor does it allow that we completely disregard it – what 
it does is give some reason to reduce the credence. For an 
argument that defends this position, see Jenifer Lackey, 
“What Should We Do When We Disagree?” in Tamar 
S. Gendler & John Hawthorne, Oxford Studies in Epis-
temology, Volume 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), pp.274-93. For an extensive treatment of common 
reasoning errors and cognitive biases, see Daniel Kah-
neman, Amos Tversky ed. Choices, Values, and Frames 
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2000).
These reasons become especially pertinent in 
the circumstances in which one’s actions might 
expose others to great harm. Exercise of political 
power threatens to do just that. 
Public reasons47 are capable of both capturing 
widespread intuitions about matters of justice48 
and are widely shared across the constituencies of 
liberal democracies49. Since the aforementioned 
epistemic component mandates risk-averseness 
in the exercise of political power, the ‘retreat’ to 
public reasons and exercise of restraint appears 
the most suitable outcome.
47 Political values, conjoined with a more robust epistemic 
criteria.
48 And responsible policy-making.
49 This claim is an empirical one. For empirical evidence 
supporting it, see Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind: 
Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion 
(New York: Pantheon, 2012), pp.153-185;
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CHALLENGING THE TOPOS 
OF “RELIGION AND 
VIOLENCE” IN LIBERAL 
POLITICAL THEORY 
ULRIKE SPOHN
In Western Europe, persistent religious pluralism 
constitutes a relatively recent phenomenon. In 
European history, the usual pattern of interaction 
with religious “Others”, such as Muslims and Jews, 
took the form of confrontation and persecution 
and was aimed at preserving or restoring a 
homogenous Christian society. The Reformation 
and its consequences was a major blow to the idea 
of a unitary Christian societal cosmos because it 
introduced an irreducible element of pluralism 
into that cosmos from within. One answer to this 
drew on homogenization strategies, of which the 
ruling principle cuius regio, eius religio constitutes 
the most prominent example. But this new 
experience of religious – or rather, confessional – 
pluralism also caused European political thinkers 
to acknowledge and reflect on the phenomenon 
of pluralism as a problem of state governance. 
Contemporary liberal political thinkers, like John 
Rawls, refer to this historical situation as the origin 
of liberalism as a tradition of political thought: 
“Thus, the historical origin 
of political liberalism (and of 
liberalism more generally) is the 
Reformation and its aftermath, with 
the long controversies over religious 
toleration in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. Something 
like the modern understanding of 
liberty of conscience and freedom of 
thought began then”1. 
1 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2005), xxiv.
Since the late 20th century, which saw processes 
of secularization on the one hand and waves of 
immigration, especially from Muslim countries 
on the other, religious pluralism has become 
an established fact in European society. At the 
same time, liberalism has become the dominant 
paradigm in Western political thought, and the 
liberal position, for which “[t]he overcoming of 
the early modern wars of religion and confessional 
disputes provided the historical backdrop against 
which… [it] emerged”2, has become the major 
reference point for contemporary normative 
debates in political theory about how to meet 
the challenge of religious pluralism in modern 
Western society. The particular strand of liberal 
theory that dominates these debates is political 
liberalism, and the central point of its answer to 
the challenge of religious pluralism is to establish 
special restrictions to the presence of religion in the 
public sphere. Such solutions include restricting 
the use of religious reasons in public deliberation. 
Political liberalism can be summed up as 
“that now-familiar version of 
political theory, articulating and 
defending the liberal democratic 
polity, which holds that it belongs to 
the role of citizen in such a polity to 
appeal to ‘public’ or ‘secular’ reason 
for conducting debates in public on 
political matters and for making 
political decisions” 3. 
This can be captured in the Rawlsian term of 
citizens’ “duty of civility”4 or duty of public reason5. 
In the writings of political liberals, we find two 
2 Jürgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere: Cog-
nitive Presuppositions for the ‘Public Use of Reason’ by 
Religious and Secular Citizens,” in Between Natural-
ism and Religion. Philosophical Essays (Malden: Polity 
Press), 120.
3 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Why Can’t We All Just Get 
Along With Each Other?” in Understanding Liberal 
Democracy. Essays in Political Philosophy, ed. Terence 
Cuneo (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2012), 277.
4 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 217.
5 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, 212-254.
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arguments that are supposed to justify this duty 
of public reason. The first is what we can call 
the respect argument. This is based on the claim 
that religious reasons lack general intelligibility 
and acceptability. Political liberals argue that 
individuals who have recourse to religious reasons 
in public debate violate the democratic principle 
of equal respect in denying their fellow citizens 
reasons that can be understood and accepted by 
all; they are not, we might say, attempting to live 
pluralistically. Habermas holds that the violation 
of the duty of public reason, under conditions of 
majority rule, paves the way for repression: 
“Majority rule mutates into 
repression if the majority deploys 
religious arguments in the process 
of political opinion- and will-
formation and refuses to offer 
publicly accessible justifications that 
the outvoted minority, be it secular 
or of a different faith, can follow 
and evaluate in the light of shared 
standards” 6. 
Besides the respect argument, there is a second, 
more implicit justification for the duty of public 
reason in political liberalism which is about 
public safety. This public safety argument suggests 
that special restrictions for religious reasons 
in public deliberation are needed also because 
religion bears a special potential for violence, thus 
posing a distinct threat to public safety. While 
the respect argument is tied to certain notions 
related to the European Enlightenment which 
assume the irrationality or lesser rationality of 
religious reasons as compared to secular ones, 
the public safety argument is tied to narrations 
about the European “wars of religion” that suggest 
an alleged special propensity of religion to spark 
violence. In this chapter, the focus will be on the 
public safety argument inscribed in the tradition 
of (political) liberalism. This argument, which 
helps to justify a duty of public reason, will be 
6 Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere,” 134.
elaborated on and critically scrutinized. The 
main point of this chapter’s criticism is that the 
argumentation of political liberals operates on the 
basis of an essentialist understanding of religion. 
It is concluded that the justification of a duty of 
public reason on the grounds of public safety is 
unconvincing because it rests on flawed premises 
about religion7.   
II-THE PUBLIC SAFETY ARGUMENT
The justification for the duty of public reason 
on the grounds of public safety is based on the 
presumption that religion bears a special potential 
for violence and poses a special threat to peaceful 
political interaction if not properly restrained 
in the public sphere. This presumption about 
religion is conveyed indirectly by text passages 
such as the following. Audi, for example, writes: 
“Where religious convictions are a basis of a 
disagreement, it is, other things being equal, less 
likely that the disputants can achieve resolution or 
even peacefully agree to disagree” 8. The statement 
suggests a special, intrinsic affinity of religion with 
violence. Such an assumption only makes sense, 
however, when referring to a particular nature 
or essence of religion. Indeed, this is where the 
argument of political liberals seems to originate. 
Habermas, too, despite having developed a more 
open and welcoming stance towards religion in 
more recent elaborations on “postsecular society” 
and “postmetaphysical thinking”9, preserves the 
idea of religion as threat in that he presupposes an 
7 It is this author’s contention that justifications of a duty 
of public reason on the grounds of the respect argument 
- which refers to a lesser rationality and acceptability of 
religious reasons - are also unconvincing because they 
rest on mistaken ideas regarding the extent of rationality 
and generalizability of secular reasons. Further elabora-
tion of this claim, however, lies beyond the scope of this 
chapter.
8 Robert Audi, “The Place of Religious Argument in a 
Free and Democratic Society,” San Diego Law Review 30 
(1993): 691.
9 Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere,” 140.
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essence of religion which bears a special potential 
for violence. He often uses the term “core” when 
talking about religion. For example, he points 
to “the dogmatic authority of an inviolable core 
of infallible revealed truths,” 10 the “discursive 
extraterritoriality of a core of existential 
certainties,”11 or “the opaque core of religious 
experience”12. He concludes that “[c]onflicts over 
existential values between communities of faith 
cannot be resolved by compromise”13.  
These extracts point to a general theory of religion 
underlying political liberalism which grasps it as an 
essence related to characteristics like dogmatism, 
blind obedience and inability to compromise. 
This theory is at the root of the presumption of 
an intrinsic connection between religion and 
violence. The reasoning goes as follows: first of all, 
there is the notion of a discursively-impenetrable 
core of religion. This implies that religious 
convictions are unamenable to rational criticism 
and compromise. On these grounds, it is assumed 
that religious individuals have a special disposition 
for dogmatism and intolerance. This, in turn, it 
is suggested can make them prone to the use of 
violence in cases of moral/political disagreement. 
The following sections will critically scrutinize the 
public safety argument and its underlying theory 
of religion from four different angles. 
10  Ibid., 129.
11  Ibid., 130.
12  Ibid., 143.
13  Ibid., 135.
III-THE PUBLIC SAFETY ARGUMENT:  
IS IT COGENT?
a: History
The historical dimension plays a part in this 
discussion because the general theory about 
religion and violence that informs the reasoning 
of political liberals derives from the particular 
historical situation sketched above. Political 
liberals refer back to the horrors of the “religious 
wars” in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries in order to illustrate and confirm the 
claim of a special connection between religion 
and violence14. These historical excursuses convey 
the impression of a clear-cut separation of roles 
between religion as the cause and motor for war 
on the one side, and the secular(ized) state as a 
neutral arbiter and force for peace on the other. 
Any detailed analysis of the civil wars during the 
early modern period shows, however, that the roles 
cannot be defined so clearly. Historians point to a 
long-standing controversy over the causes of the 
so-called “religious wars”: “As anybody familiar 
with the historiography of this period knows, the 
question of whether or not the wars of religion 
were truly motivated by religion is as old as the 
conflicts themselves”15. Benedict16 emphasizes that 
“[f]or virtually every conflict for which the label of 
a war of religion is conventional, controversy exists 
among historians over whether or not it was truly 
a war of religion, or whether other motives were 
paramount”. Other motives especially concern the 
ambition of the early modern states in Europe to 
gain strength and stability as political units. 
14 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxiiif., xxvi; Habermas, 
Jürgen, “Notes on Post-Secular Society,” New Perspec-
tives Quarterly 25, 4 (2008): 22.
15 Philip Benedict, “Religion and Politics in Europe, 1500 – 
1700,” in Religion und Gewalt. Konflikte, Rituale, Deu-
tungen (1500 – 1800), eds. Kaspar von Greyerz and Kim 
Siebenhüner (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
2006), 162. 
16 Benedict, “Religion and Politics,” 161.
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As Brady17 points out, control over religion was an 
important means in the process of state-formation 
– and a source for violence: “The primary agents 
of religious violence in early modern Europe 
were not the religious communities but the rulers 
who tried to coerce their subjects into religious 
conformity”. Casanova, too, lays stress on the 
process of state-formation. He suggests that “the 
so-called ‘religious wars’ could more appropriately 
be called the wars of early modern European state 
formation”18. 
It is not this chapter’s intention to simply reverse 
the roles of religion and state in the “religious 
wars”. The point is to see that the causes of violence 
in the early modern period were multiple and 
complex. They cannot be categorized conclusively: 
“Efforts to determine which motive was most 
important in the final analysis often quickly butt 
up against the limits of the available evidence”19. 
This means, however, that the “religious wars” of 
the early modern period cannot be so easily used 
as an illustration of, and support for, the idea of a 
religion-specific potential for violence as suggested 
by political liberals. 
   
b: Methodology
Furthermore, there is a methodological problem 
in the arguments of political liberals that concerns 
the generalization of a particular historical 
situation into a universal principle. There are real 
questions about how plausible it is to draw general 
conclusions regarding the right or most reasonable 
ordering of the relation of religion and politics 
from one particular constellation in European 
17 Thomas A. Brady Jr., “Limits of Religious Violence in 
Early Modern Europe,” in Religion und Gewalt. Kon-
flikte, Rituale, Deutungen (1500 – 1800), eds. Kaspar 
von Greyerz and Kim Siebenhüner (Göttingen: Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 141. 
18 José Casanova, “The Problem of Religion and the Anxi-
eties of European Secular Democracy,” in Religion and 
Democracy in Contemporary Europe, eds. Gabriel 
Motzkin and Yochi Fischer (London: Alliance Publish-
ing Trust, 2008), 65. Also Thomas M. Scott, “Taking 
Religious and Cultural Pluralism Seriously: The Global 
Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of Inter-
national Society,” in Millenium 29, 3 (2000), 819-824.
19  Benedict, “Religion and Politics,” 161.
history. Political liberals refer back to the early 
modern period, after all, not out of pure historical 
interest but because they view the “religious 
wars” as a paradigmatic conflict that can instruct 
contemporary Europeans – or even all nations – 
regarding their present predicament. However, it 
is not evident how exactly the course of events in 
that earlier societal setting, with all its differences 
from present-day Europe in political, economic, 
cultural and religious respects, is relevant to the 
problems faced by contemporary European society 
– or those faced by non-Western societies, for that 
matter. Political liberals largely fail to elaborate 
on this question. It is reasonable to suppose, 
therefore, that their essentialist understanding of 
religion prevents them from seeing the need for 
such elaboration, given that the idea of its having a 
fixed, unchanging essence suggests it will unleash 
the same dynamics and effects across different 
historical periods and cultural settings.  
c: Empirical Research
Political liberals conceive of contemporary violent 
conflicts with a religious dimension according 
to the model of the European “religious wars” 
by interpreting such conflicts as disputes about 
the “true faith”. Present conflicts are thought to 
illustrate anew the assumed special potential of 
religion to spark violence. However, findings from 
peace and conflict research suggest otherwise, 
revealing that things are much more complex. 
Casanova20 argues that instead of “seeing the 
common structural contexts of modern state 
formation, inter-state geopolitical conflicts, 
modern nationalism and the political mobilization 
of ethno-cultural and religious identities […] 
Europeans seem to prefer to attribute those 
conflicts to ‘religion’.” Hasenclever states that the 
role of religion in contemporary violent conflict 
is generally overrated, pointing to the fact that 
there is no evidence from quantitative research 
that religious difference as such is linked to a 
20 Casanova, “The Problem of Religion,” 67.
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heightened risk of civil war21. He highlights 
economic and political reasons as central causes 
of conflict22.
d: Social Theory
The last critical point concerns general social 
theoretical insights regarding the conditions of 
human action and, thus, violent action. This chapter 
does not wish to suggest that religion cannot 
be a real motor for human action - as claimed 
by materialistic positions, such as Marxism. 
According to this view, religious justifications 
simply obfuscate the “real” motors of action 
seen in struggles over economic distribution and 
political power. Considering the findings from 
peace and conflict research discussed above, such 
factors should be taken seriously indeed. At the 
same time, it is not plausible to say that religious 
meaning is never a genuine motivation for human 
action, whether violent or pacifistic. Any link 
between religious meaning and (violent/pacifistic) 
human action is contingent, however. There is no 
direct, irresistible path from a particular religious 
belief to a particular action23. Empirically, we 
observe both religious groups who work for 
peaceful solutions of conflicts and others who call 
their adherents to arms. There is even evidence 
of different groups who share exactly the same 
religious convictions but differ with regard to their 
attitude towards the use of violence as a means to 
reach their goals24. 
21 Cf. Andreas Hasenclever, “Getting Religion Right – Zur 
Rolle von Religionen in politischen Konflikten,” in Reli-
gion und globale Entwicklung. Der Einfluss der Reli-
gionen auf die soziale, politische und wirtschaftliche 
Entwicklung, eds. Jürgen Wilhelm and Hartmut Ihne 
(Berlin University Press, 2009), 170f.   
22 Cf. Hasenclever, “Getting Religion Right”, 180; see also 
Herfried Münkler, The New Wars (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2005), 90ff.
23 Cf. Hans G. Kippenberg, Gewalt als Gottesdienst. Reli-
gionskriege im Zeitalter der Globalisierung (München: 
C.H. Beck, 2008), 24f.; Hans G. Kippenberg, “Zur Kon-
tingenz religiösen Gewalthandelns,” in: Handlung und 
Erfahrung. Das Erbe von Historismus und Pragmatis-
mus und die Zukunft der Sozialtheorie, eds. Bettina 
Hollstein et al. (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 2011), 207; 
Hasenclever, “Getting Religion Right,” 177. 
24 Cf. “Getting Religion Right,” 175, 184.
On the basis of an essentialist, unitary 
understanding of religion, we cannot make sense 
of such differences. They become comprehensible 
only when religion is conceived discursively as 
a multi-layered, ambiguous system of meaning 
whose semantic resources can be interpreted in 
different ways and invoked to pursue different ends. 
What does not enter the picture in the essentialist 
view is how “religion” is constantly constructed by 
human actors in processes of interpretation and 
“iteration”25. By treating religion as an abstract, 
general category, the essentialist view has a 
homogenizing thrust. 
A major problem of essentialism is that it works 
to level out the vast variety of religious traditions 
and “the different intellectual schools, theological 
struggles and internally contested teachings that 
make up a religion”26.
Lastly, human beings can never be reduced to 
one single aspect of their identity. Their actions 
will hardly ever flow purely from their religious 
convictions but be the contingent result of a 
complex mixture of many different facets of their 
life and personality. These might include the 
individual’s social, political and economic standing 
in society, cultural and familial background, 
education and personal temperament and life 
experiences27. 
25 For this term, see Seyla Benhabib, “Democratic Itera-
tions: The Local, the National, and the Global,” in 
Another Cosmopolitanism, ed. Robert Post (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008); Michael Walzer, “Nation 
and Universe,” in Thinking Politically. Essays in Political 
Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).
26 Kristina Stoeckl, “The Theology Blind Spot,” in The 
Immanent Frame, February 13, 2014, accessed February 
26, 2015, http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2014/02/13/the-theol-
ogy-blind-spot/, para. 3.
27  Cf. R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred. 
Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation (Lanham: Row-
man & Littlefield, 2000), 55; Talal Asad, Formations of 
the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2003), 10f.; Hans Joas, Glaube 
als Option. Zukunftsmöglichkeiten des Christentums 
(Freiburg: Herder, 2012), 166f.; Kippenberg, Gewalt als 
Gottesdienst, 23.
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM: A Resource Book131
CONCLUSION
The analysis carried out in this chapter leads to 
the conclusion that the public safety argument 
as a justification for the duty of public reason is 
unconvincing because the underlying theory of 
religion and concomitant assumptions concerning 
a special relationship between religion and violence 
are flawed. Despite its rational weaknesses, the 
topos of “religion and violence” is unlikely to 
disappear any time soon, though. Old habits die 
hard, and the idea that religion breeds violence 
is one of the most deep-seated habits of thought 
in modern European consciousness28. Moreover, 
the assumed correlations between religion and 
violence have always served a vital function in 
the process of collective identity-building and 
seemingly continue to do so up to this day. The idea 
of a “premodern”, irrational and violent religious 
past has long served as the “Other” against which a 
secular, rational and peaceful “modern” European 
identity could be demarcated. In the context of 
colonial imperialism, this identity construction 
has been directed towards a double demarcation: 
one against Europe’s own past and the other against 
non-Western cultures. Today, identitarian self-
assurance along the latter demarcation takes the 
form of anti-Islamic movements in many Western 
European countries. A diffuse notion of Islam is 
invoked as the “barbaric” religious “Other” that is 
believed to threaten “civilized” Western values29. 
As regards possible prospects for future research, 
one of the most important desiderata is to open 
up the debate about the role of religion in politics 
further to interdisciplinary dialogue. Political 
theorists should work together with scholars 
from the fields of history, sociology, cultural and 
religious studies in order to gain a more adequate 
and profound understanding of the phenomenon 
called “religion.” 
28 Cf. Kippenberg, Gewalt als Gottesdienst, 16; Wolter-
storff, “Why Can’t We All,” 281.
29 Cf. Casanova, “The Problem of Religion,” 66.
For this sake, political theory must also overcome its 
“theology blind spot”30 and open up to theological 
perspectives. Only such interdisciplinary 
cooperation can create the conditions to prevent 
false premises about religion leading to flawed 
conclusions regarding its proper relationship with 
politics.
30 Stoeckl, “The Theology Blind Spot.”
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